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Abstract of Dissertation

Psychoanalysis as Political Critique
In the spirit of Kantian critique this dissertation pursues the enlightenment project of
examining the limits of reason and its political ramifications. Beginning from the claim
that psychoanalysis is the inheritor of the Kantian project, this dissertation argues the
limits of political reason lie beyond the concepts of overcoming and mastery. While
traditionally this conversation has been occupied with the concept of ideology, this
dissertation draws on the Freudian concept of self-deception. It contends the concept of
ideology contains the seeds of its own overcoming, and thus cannot represent the limits
of political reason. In contrast to ideology, this dissertation claims the Freudian concept
of disavowal indicates the limits of not only rationality, but also political rationality. As
such, the political ramifications of a critique focused on the limits of rationality must
grapple with the phenomenon of disavowal, a phenomenon that blatantly defies the logic
of non-contradiction. This dissertation concludes that this form of critique would demand
turning political thought toward historical manifestations that continue to exist but are not
recognized, such as the relationship between slavery and prisons as articulated in the 13th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
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It is a Paradox of Freudian psychoanalysis that, whilst consistently struggling against
illusion, it somehow activates it.
--Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel and Béla Grunberger, Freud or Reich?
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Introduction
Critique Beyond the Boundaries of Reason Alone
In occultism the mind groans under its own spell like someone in a nightmare, whose torment
grows with the feeling that he is dreaming yet cannot wake up.
--Adorno, ―Theses Against Occultism,‖ Minima Moralia

The project of liberating reason is the same project of liberating ourselves. Indeed,
this sentiment seems to be at the very core of the Enlightenment project itself. And
nowhere is this sentiment more clearly expressed than in Kant‘s enlightenment motto:
―Have the courage of your own understanding‖ (Kant, PW 54). For, was not this sense of
autonomy based on the demand to fight through our ―self-incurred immaturity‖ so we
may use our newly liberated faculties, unaided by ―lazy‖ doctrines stepped in the
―cowardice‖ of dogma and tradition (PW 54)? Certainly, at the very apex of
Enlightenment thought, we are to free ourselves by virtue of the independent, yet
universal, use of reason. No longer will one‘s faculties of reason remain tethered to the
authority of those who have set themselves up as our ―guardians‖ (PW 54). Political
liberation is inseparable from severing reason from its dependence on illusions, tradition,
and authority.
This push toward freedom and progress informs the urgency of, the very demand
for, Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason. To free ourselves we must first free our thought; we
must free reason from its own chimeras and the self-imposed yoke strung around its neck.
The project of enlightenment, the very project of liberation, is, for Kant, the ―duty of
philosophy‖ which should aim ―to remove the deception arising from misinterpretation,
even at the cost of destroying the most highly extolled and cherished delusion‖ (CPR
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Axii). And surely this is the purpose of critique: to secure the independent use of reason
so that our material autonomy may follow. After all is not critique like the ―police‖
whose ―job is to put a stop to the violence on whose account citizens must fear each
other, in order that everyone may carry on his business calmly and safely‖ (CPR Bxxv)?
Certainly, it would seem liberation is the foundation not only of Kant‘s enlightenment
thought, but also the project of critique itself.
Yet, there is no escape from deception. This, not liberation, was the lesson of the
Enlightenment. Kant is quite clear about this, even if it seems contradictory. Lodged
within the heart of his project, illusions are not only the target of critique but also what
pushes his libratory project forward. This project contends that the necessity of illusion in
the project of Enlightenment—the necessity of self-deception in the faculties of thought
itself—demands turning to the tools of psychoanalysis. In fact, as I will show, Sigmund
Freud‘s project directly inherits the Kantian project on this point. In this way one can
think of Freudian psychoanalysis as offering an important framework for both
understanding the project of critique and the political liberation it promises. Hence,
before we begin to investigate the stakes of a psychoanalytic critique of political reason,
let us examine the stakes of Kant‘s critique, the form it takes and its object—the
compulsive nature of reason.

I. Dialectics of Reason

The need for critique in Kant‘s work emerges from the nature of reason. Reason,
unlike the intuition and the understanding, has no direct connection with experience.
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―[C]ognition [Erkenntnis],‖ Kant argues, ―starts from the senses, proceeds from there to
the understanding, and ends with reason‖ (CPR A299/B355). The understanding, Kant
writes ―may be considered a power of providing unity of appearances [Erscheinungen] by
means of rules‖ (CPR A302/B359). In other words, the very becoming of appearance
occurs through the a priori organization of the manifold of sense impressions by means of
concepts of the understanding. In order for appearances to maintain their unity, the rules
of the understanding must also be unified. This is the job of reason; for it unifies the rules
of the understanding beneath the abstracted guidelines of principles.1 Whereas the
understanding provides an organizational unity to the intuition, reason provides an
organizational unity to the understanding. As such, Kant writes that reason ―initially
never deals with experience or any object‖ (CPR A302/B359). Reason is, thus, one step
removed from the senses, and thus the touchstone of experience.
Since reason seeks to unify the rules of the understanding, it seeks a governing
unity beyond the bounds of the understanding. In other words, in seeking the totality
organizing the rules that give unity to appearance as such, reason must seek the
unconditional ground conditioning appearance itself. The unity it seeks, Kant finds, ―can
be a completeness [Vollständigkeit] of principles only, not of intuitions and of objects‖
(PFM 68; GS 4: 332). Because principles organize concepts and not the objects of the
senses, this unity exists not only beyond experience, but also beyond the rules of the
understanding organizing experience. Thus the unity of the principles of reason cannot be
represented as an object that can be experienced, as there is no experiential object ―there‖
to be experienced. Having no objective status, the principles of reason are merely
1

By analogy, Kant claims that the work of reason is similar to the ―ancient wish, which someday, who
knows how remote, will perhaps be filled: viz., that we might yet, instead of the endless manifoldness of
civil laws, locate their principles‖ (CPR A302/B358).
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subjective. They are the means by which we organize experience, and thus the sensual
impressions of the world. The problem is that in order to present the unity behind the
rules of the understanding, reason can only represent it ―after the fashion of the cognition
of an object‖ (PFM 68; GS 4: 332). The unity of the organizing force of the
understanding appears like an object, some ―thing‖ that can be brought before the senses,
while it is no more than a self-grounded subjective abstraction beyond the bounds of
experience. In other words, reason ―foists [unterschiebt]‖ these ―subjective principles‖ on
us as ―objective ones‖ giving rise to ―a natural and unavoidable illusion [einer
natürlichen und unvermeidlichen Illusion]‖ that Kant calls the ―dialectic of pure reason‖
(CPR A298/B354). Because reason seeks the unconditional, it not only transgresses the
boundaries of what can be experienced by the senses itself, but it also constantly
―removes these limits—indeed, even commands us to step beyond them‖ (CPR
A296/B353).
We find ourselves, now, in the throes of Kantian dialectics. This dialectic does not
overcome or liberate; rather it entangles and fends off reconciliation. We cannot escape
it. Forever, Kant finds, shall we transgress the boundaries of experience adhering to
necessary illusions produced by the excess of reason as though they were, or even could
be, truth. These illusions are ―sophistries not of human beings but of pure reason itself‖
(CPR A339/B397). And indeed, these ―sophistries‖ are both endemic to the function of
reason as well as the target of the critique of reason. In fact, in as much as reason grounds
the unity of the understanding, and in as much as it must seek the unconditional for this
understanding, then one could easily claim that the conditions for appearance are
grounded in the desire of reason to transcend those conditions. The removal of the
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conditions of experience creates a world of beings produced solely from the principles of
reason. As Kant writes, by virtue of the very nature of reason itself, the ―understanding
inadvertently adds for itself to the house of experience a much more extensive wing
which it fills with nothing but beings of thought‖ (PFM 54; GS 4: 315f.). In as much as
appearance remains unified, so too will reason have broken beyond the bounds of
empirical experience and presented to the understanding that totality of subjective
principles as something objective. We are beings that are necessarily haunted, and
perhaps even chased by, the spirits of reason; nothing can save us from ourselves.
We cannot liberate ourselves from the movement to coronate the subjective
principles of reason as objective. As tides ebb and flow with gravitational interaction
between the earth and the moon, so too are we propelled to believe in illusions produced
by the dialectical movement of reason. As Kant writes, none ―cannot detach himself from
them; perhaps he can after much effort forestall the error, but he can never fully rid
himself of the illusion that incessantly teases and mocks him [den Schein aber, der ihn
unaufhörlich zwackt und ässt, niemals völlig los werden kann]‖ (CPR A339/B397). Back
and forth, we are brought to believe in the illusions of reason despite our best efforts. We
may delay our ―error‖; we might even be able to withhold our belief initially through the
power of skepticism, but in the end despite ourselves, despite the power of critique itself
[…] we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in our estimate of the proper
application of our reason and of its principles and suffer from a dialectic
which confuses the empirical use of reason and also sets reason at variance
with itself. (PFM 84; GS 4: 350)
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Reason will always go beyond the boundaries of that to which it can legitimately lay
claim; the very nature of reason will always lead it beyond these markers, creating
―illusions‖ which will continually ―tease‖ and ―mock‖ us (CPR A339/B397). In other
words, even though the project of critique is to liberate us from subjection to the illusory
use of reason, Kant continually must reiterate the fact that we will forever suffer the
dialectic, remaining in the thrall of its projected being-less beings. Reason‘s push past
itself will continually split itself into the antinomical divide from which it cannot escape.
In other words, no matter how hard we fight, no matter how much we set one side of
reason against another, no matter how much we attempt to liberate ourselves from
ourselves, in the end there is no escape from the transgressions of reason, and thus,
perhaps, from feeling the sting of the broken promise of the liberation to come.
If we take the idea that we suffer a necessary dialectic of reason seriously, then
we cannot, in the end, but conclude that the story of the power of reason, and thus the
liberation it promises, might be different from our standard story of the Enlightenment.
What we find is not liberation, but stasis. Even if one wants to say that Kant identifies the
problem to be overcome in pointing toward the dialectics of reason, one cannot but
conclude that critique is a weak power against the intractable and compulsive swinging of
reason between the conditioned and the unconditioned. For this ―natural‖ and ―necessary‖
dialectic from which we ―suffer,‖ the continual creation of and belief in beings existing
outside of experience, can only be removed by dint of ―scientific instruction and with
much difficulty‖ (PFM 69; GS 4: 332f.). There is not much hope if science can only
offer a tenuous defense against these illusions; for after all perhaps what has been
revealed in Kant‘s enlightenment is the fact that there is no escape and that we must learn
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to live with these beings conjured from the far reaches of reason‘s attempt to unify
experience. While a weak force providing little in the way of encouragement, it is still
worth investigating what form the critique of reason takes.
As is well known, yet still worth revisiting, Kant‘s critique seeks to do nothing
less than to subject ―metaphysics to a complete revolution‖ as Copernicus did for the
natural sciences (CPR Bxxiii). The analogy with Copernicus is quite telling. For just as
Copernicus‘ revolution decentered the subject‘s perspective in relation to the passing
stars, so too did Kant seek to decenter the subject‘s relationship to objects. Through a
slight augmentation in how this relationship was understood Kant instituted a critique that
he hoped would tame the tide of the compulsive transgressions of reason.
For Kant this reorientation occurs at the level of the subject‘s apprehension of
objects, the very point from which the subject orients itself in the world. Kant‘s critical
project overturns the assumption that cognition ―must conform to objects‖ (CPR Bxvi).
He asks us, instead, to imagine what it would mean to ―assume that objects must conform
to our cognition‖ (CPR Bxvi). Unlike a strict empiricism, which attributes the form
cognition takes to the material conditions from which it springs, Kant argues the form of
thought gives us the object. Just as Kant avoids the dictates of a strict empiricism, so too
does he bypass idealism; for the form of thought does not replace the independence of the
object from thought. As Kant writes, the representation of an object is nothing more than
the ―appearance of the thing, which is unknown to us but is not therefore less real‖ (PFM
30; GS 4 289). In as much as objects appear for us, this appearance conforms to the
structures of our thought. Yet, the object itself remains independent from the structures of
thought. In this sense ―the existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed as
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in genuine idealism, but it is only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as
it is in itself‖ (PFM 30; GS 4: 289). In decentering the relationship between thought and
objects, Kant performs a revolution not so much in that he reverses the relationship
between subject and object, or thought and object, but that in doing so he releases the
object in-it-self from the demands of thought, thus positing a third entity between subject
and object—that which is but does not appear, that which remains outside of and beyond
the boundaries of reason alone.
And indeed freeing the object from the subject by turning thought toward the initself provides the decisive insight for critique to tame the compulsions of reason. If the
relationship between subject and object were dictated by the subject‘s form of thought,
then the object appearing before the subject would be no more than representation; it
would be an illusion with no experiential referent. Nevertheless, representation is not
mere illusion for Kant because there must be some ―thing‖ there corresponding to the
subject‘s form of thought. And indeed it is the phenomenal distinction producing this
third that provides
[…] the only means of preventing the transcendental illusion, by which
metaphysics has been deceived hitherto and misled into childish efforts of
catching at bubbles, because appearances, which are mere representations,
were taken for things in themselves. (PFM 33; GS 4: 293)
That is to say, there must be some ―thing‖ for thought to present to the subject. And as we
have seen, reason goes beyond its bounds when it attempts to present what has no
experiential referent, no existing yet foreclosed third. Kant‘s critique of illusion thus
introduces us to a third that both grounds and is simultaneously excluded from the form
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of thought that conditions appearance. The existence of this third is not only the excluded
ground of appearance itself, but it is what anchors appearance in reality, allowing one to
differentiate between appearance and illusion. In this sense, Kant paradoxically grounds
thought in the object by granting the autonomy of the object from thought. The institution
of the distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself is the insight allowing the
critique of illusion to function.
Kant‘s work promises the critique of reason‘s illusions. It is a critique based
reorienting the axis from which one confronts the world. The reorientation between
subject and object is predicated on the becoming autonomous of the object. Although
letting the object go, freeing the in-itself from the predetermined categories of thought,
provides the very pivot on which Kant‘s critique of the compulsive transgressions of
reason operates, critique does not rid us of this compulsion, nor does it tame it. Rather it
teaches us to live with the compulsion of reason by turning though toward the enigmatic
third. And in this sense, the purpose of critique is to set up a levee between the
compulsion of reason to transgress its legitimate boundaries so that we may on the whole
benefit from reason and not remain subjected to the terrors of those being-less beings
which it attempts to present to us as objectively real.

II. Dialectics of Desire
At the other end of the Enlightenment, Freud modifies Kant‘s critique of the
dialectic of reason. It is from Freud‘s appropriation of Kant‘s critique of reason that I
believe one can begin to outline a psychoanalytic critique of political reason. Thus, in the
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interest of moving toward the political implications of this critique, let us examine
Freud‘s Kantian inheritance in light of the illusions of reason.
Freud‘s critique of reason emerges from a similar Enlightenment concern for the
subject‘s production of and subjugation to illusion. This shared concern is not accidental.
Freud, like Kant, highlights the transgressions of reason beyond its own boundaries.
Although Freud takes this conclusion further than Kant, they both agree the desire to
transgress the bounds of reason begins with a schism in the self—a fracture constituting a
part of the self remaining forever alien from the self. Beginning from many of the same
ontological and epistemological premises, it is no surprise that Freud, like Kant, also
draws our attention to the inescapable production of illusion besieging the human
condition. And while both thinkers aim to liberate us from our entangled subjection to
these compulsions neither thinker believes it is fully possible. It was as though Freud
took his cue directly from Kant; for Freud‘s critique of reason also focuses on an
overwhelming sense of entrapment from which there is no escape.
While Freud‘s concern for dialectical illusion is similar to Kant, Freud differs
from Kant on its source. Whereas Kant locates the center of this movement within reason
itself, Freud attributes it to the affective foundation of reason. As we saw, transcendental
illusion denotes the attempt to present the totality of principles as though it were
something that could be experienced in Kant‘s work. For Freud an illusion denotes
desire‘s infusion of reality; it is the attempt to present desire as reality.2 Because illusion
signifies the mixture of reality and desire, Freud claims it ―is not the same thing as an
error‖ (Freud, SE 21: 30; GW 14: 353). An error is false and often made in good faith; it
2

In Freud, Jonathan Lear describes an illusion as ―belief caused by a wish. We take our beliefs to be
responsive to reality; thus when we are in the grip of an illusion we are misled about the source and
authority of our belief‖ (Lear 2005, 255).
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is an assertion made from ignorance, where the correct grounds for the belief are not
available or have been miscalculated. An illusion is also not delusion, for Freud. A
delusion represents the negation of reality, whereas an illusion is the affective
construction of the appearance of reality. Moreover, whereas both error and delusion
presuppose the distinction between truth and falsity, reality and irreality, Freud‘s concept
of illusion undermines these distinctions.
Contrary to both an error and delusion, an illusion is ―derived from human
wishes‖; it represents the role of the drives in constructing how the world appears (SE 21:
31; GW 14: 353). For example, Freud states that the claim ―made by certain nationalists
that the Indo-Germanic race is the only one capable of civilization‖ is an illusion (SE 21:
30f.; GW 14: 353). It is an illusion because despite its veracity (although one does have
the distinct feeling that Freud thinks this claim is false) its defining characteristic is the
satisfaction of wish. It is a way of structuring appearance in light of the fulfillment of a
desire. The production of illusion results from how we apprehend the world for Freud and
can be, thus, traced back to primary narcissism.
Primary narcissism is the developmental stage propelling the infant into the
distinction between self and object, between self and world.3 First in Totem and Taboo,

3

It is worth noting that D.W Winnicott develops Freud‘s concept of illusion in light of primary narcissism
in his 1953 essay ―Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena.‖ In this essay Winnicott argues for
the central role of illusion in the development of infantile object-relations. He begins by examining the use
of illusion within the developmental schema of the institution of the reality principle. In order to ―accept‖
reality and displace pleasure one must first come to differentiate between one‘s self and external reality,
between what is ―me‖ and what is ―not-me.‖ In this sense, illusion is a central mechanism aiding this
transition. It aids in the infant‘s understanding of his or her self as distinct from the world, and hence as
capable of having relations to objects in the world. In examining how this transition Winnicott‘s work
focuses on developmental moment between having no objects and having full object relations. Winnicott
claims that this transition is aided by the infant‘s first object. Winnicott argues that with the first not-me
object the infant enters into an illusory space defined as ―the intermediate area between the subjective and
that which is objectively perceived‖ (Winnicott 2002, 4). The transitional object is, for the infant, neither
part of the infant nor is it part of the external world. Thus, the infant‘s perception of the object is both
grounded in a reality outside of the infant and part of the infant‘s subjective construction of the world. As
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and subsequently in ―On Narcissism,‖ Freud posits an intermediate stage between the
developmental touchstones of the organization of the drives called primary narcissism. At
first, for Freud, the infant is auto-erotic. The drives are disorganized and ―obtain pleasure
and find satisfaction in the subject‘s own body‖ (SE 13: 88; GW 9: 109). This stage is
followed by the organization of the drives and pleasures in accordance with external
objects. In other words in the first stage the drives ―work independently‖ of each other
seeking pleasure in the body, because the infant does not yet have external objects, does
not have a world that it can differentiate from itself (SE 13: 88; GW 9: 109). This gives
way to the distinction between inside and outside, subject and object. For it is only after
this distinction has been instituted that one can develop affective attachments to objects.
Primary narcissism is an intermediate stage describing how the distinction between self
and world occurs. For Freud, the movement from auto-eroticism to object-love must be
ushered in by an intermediary stage in which the drives organize themselves around a
proto-object. This proto-object is the ego. Taking oneself as an object, splitting oneself
from oneself, institutes a fracture in the infant from which it will never recover. It is an
ambivalent wound, alienating the infant from itself while simultaneously giving it the
world.

such, the infant understands the transitional object as both the result of his or her fantasmatic constructions
and also as an entity that resists his or her fantasmatic constructions. This object is, hence, split between
being laden with fantastical meaning and a materiality that resists this subjective institution of meaning.
The object, for the infant, is illusory in as much as it is split for the infant as both an internal and an
external phenomena for the infant. The object‘s features that resist the child‘s fantasmatic constructions
catapult the infant into a reality outside of his or her self and thus help the infant come to a sense of his or
her self as separate from it. Winnicott attributes this productive development of the sense of self to illusion.
He writes that illusion is ―the intermediate area that is allowed to the infant between primary creativity and
objective perception based on reality testing. The transitional phenomena represent the early states of the
use of illusion, without which there is no meaning for the human being in the idea of a relationship with an
object that is perceived by others as external to that being‖ (Winnicott 2002, 4).
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Primary narcissism is a strange moment in development, leaving permanent traces
not only on the subject‘s understanding of the distinction between self and object, but
also how the subject orients itself from this very distinction. While eventually this
distinction will be sustained by the reality principle, initially it is governed by the drives.
That is to say, the very becoming of this distinction between self and world, inside and
outside is governed by the role of pleasure and displeasure.4 The very orientation of the
self toward objects, and thus the very constitution of the self in light of the distinction
between inside and outside, originates in the drives seeking release, and thus pleasure.
Indeed, Freud calls this orientation projection. One normally associates the
concept of projection with a defense mechanism that presupposes the distinction between
inside and outside. In this sense, projection is defined as the treatment of the affect, or the
drives, as though they belong to the external world. In this way, one can rid oneself of the
drives that come into conflict with the reality principle or pose a threat to the subject, by
attaching them to external objects so that they can be treated as external objects. Yet, in
Totem and Taboo, Freud argues that projection is not just a defense presupposing the
distinction between subject and object, but also a primary way of coming to understand
the distinction between subject and object. Here, he claims ―the projection outwards of
4

Freud describes this principle in his essay ―Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning‖
written in 1911. He claims the ―reality principle‖ develops as a response to the dominance of the ―pleasure
principle,‖ which is guided by hallucinatory wish-fulfillment (SE 12: 219; GW 8: 231). Freud writes that
after the continual suffering caused by the ―non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction, the disappointment
experienced [das Ausbleiben der erwarteten Befriedigung, die Enttäuschung]‖ one eventually abandons the
pleasure principle‘s ―attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination‖ as the sole means to achieve
pleasure (SE 12: 219; GW 8: 231).4 In the face of this suffering, caused by the disappointment of
hallucinatory pleasure, the reality principle comes to act as an attempt to find pleasure not in what ―was
presented in the mind‖; but, rather, in ―what was real [real], even if it happened to be disagreeable ‖ (SE
12: 219; GW 8: 232). Through the suffering caused by the attempt to find pleasure in hallucinatory
fantasies, the infant moves toward discerning between what is ―real‖ and ―not real,‖ between what is
produced in the mind and what exists in the external world. Freud, therefore, will claim that the
development of this discernment is the same as the ―suppression [die Ablösung] of the pleasure principle by
the reality principle‖ (SE 12: 222: GW 8: 234).
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internal perception‖ to ―which our sense perceptions are subject,‖ will ―play a very large
part in determining the form taken by the external world‖ (SE 13: 64; GW 9: 81). The
very attempts to distinguish between inside and outside occur before one can orient
themselves from that distinction, thus the early foundation for making this distinction
relies on how subjective desire acts as the transcendental schema for the appearance of
objects.5
The insertion of primary narcissism as intermediary stage between auto-eroticism
and object-love, thus explains how objects appear. From this sense, they do not appear
from an a priori organization of matter, but rather they appear as a reflection of the early
egoic organization of the drives sent outside of the self in search of pleasure. As the very
foundation not only of our understanding of the self, but also the world, the drives are
―thus employed for building up the external world, though they should by rights remain
part of the internal world‖ (SE 13: 64; GW 9: 81). And in this sense we could say that
just as the subjective principles of reason cannot but appear to us as objective in Kantian
dialectics, the subjective drives shaping the presentation of appearance cannot but appear
as objective, as a necessary part of the world itself, in Freud‘s appropriation of the
Kantian dialectic. And just as the Kantian dialectic ensnares thought with the being-less
beings of reason, so too will Freud‘s dialectics of desire entrap us by presenting our
hopes and despairs as an objective.
In Freud‘s work illusions are the necessary byproduct of the foundational role of
drives in constructing appearance; they represent nothing more than the becoming
objective of the inevitable projection of subjective drives orienting the distinction
between subject and object. If illusion is the residue of primary narcissism, then to
5

Slavoj Žižek makes a similar claim vis-à-vis Jacques Lacan in The Plague of Fantasies.
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threaten illusion is to threaten the very ideal instituting the division between self and the
world. It is to disrupt the very ground from which one stabilizes one‘s sense of self. This
is precisely what not only Freud but also Kant‘s critique of reason demands. It demands
curbing the illusions of reason orienting the comprehension of the world; critique
demands giving up the certainty of illusion for the humility of a truth offending the
remnants of the infantile narcissism, which promises we can master the world. In both
instances, they critique reason by turning it toward its own limits, toward that which
exists but exceeds the ability of reason to understand. As Freud writes, ―[t]he more we
seek to win our way to a metapsychological view of mental life, the more we must learn
to emancipate ourselves from the importance of the symptom of ‗being conscious‘‖ (SE
14: 193; GW10: 291). By turning reason to its other, each thinker hopes, not to
eradicate—for neither thinker believes this is possible—but rather to temper the effect of
the illusions of reason on our lives. In other words, the disenchantment of thought occurs,
each thinker contends, by turning thought toward the unconditioned ground of its own
operation.
Standing at the intersection between Kant and Freud, standing, that is, on both
sides of the enlightenment, we find ourselves trapped within the transgressions of reason.
Just as reason will produce a house of being-less beings, a house of spirits that we cannot
help but believe in, so too will the affective basis of reason produce the illusions that
grasp and present the world through our narcissistic desires. And in both of these
instances there is nothing we can do. We can fight against these illusions but in each case
the weak force of reason is like ―mills grind[ing] so slowly that people may starve before
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they get their flour‖ (SE 22: 213). Our only hope, however weak it might be, is to critique
reason by virtue of turning it toward its own limits.
I would like to suggest that in as much as the dialectics of reason force us to
believe in the existence of a soul, or substance, or first cause, so too will the dialectics of
desire force us to believe in the necessity of political hope or despair, the future end of
need after the revolution or the end of humanity after the apocalypse. And that just as
Kant and Freud suggest turning thought toward that which is but does not appear—the initself and the unconscious—as a manner of critiquing not just the production of illusion,
but also our willing self-subjugation to illusion, so too must we turn toward the limit of
appearance to provide the grounds from which to critique political rationality. The
question becomes what would it mean to think of the dialectic of desire in relationship to
political life and political thought?

III. A Psychoanalytic Critique of Political Reason

Psychoanalysis is a body of thought dedicated to a critique of reason oriented
toward the necessary production of self-deception. In this sense, while it may very well
have signaled the end of an enlightenment grounded in the illusion of liberation, it
nonetheless remains the inheritor of Kantian critique. As such, a critique of political
reason, if it wants to both turn thought toward the non-identical while simultaneously
avoiding illusions grounded in the false mastery of infantile narcissism, must take its cue
from the framework of psychoanalysis. For is not political reason beset by illusions
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motivated by unnamed affect, even when it employs the critical tools of psychoanalysis?6
Is not the political drive for change, for overcoming, for, indeed, reconciliation a demand
predicated on the affective basis of reality? 7 Is not this demand the same overvaluation of
the egoic rationality and the mastery of human action that resonates so closely with the
intermediate stage of primary narcissism?8 Moreover, what might we learn not only about
the illusions of political thought, but about the nature of that ―thing‖ which is, but does
not appear in a critique oriented not from appearance, but rather the non-identical
grounds of appearance?9
Taking its cue from Kant and Freud this project argues that the psychoanalytic
concept of Verleugnung—disavowal—must act as the starting point for a psychoanalytic
critique of political reason. For it is only in the psychoanalytic concept of disavowal that
thought confronts what it cannot overcome, that which defies the boundaries of reason
itself, indeed as we will see of the phenomenological basis of appearance.
6

In ―‗Omnes et Singulatim:‘ Toward a Critique of Political Reason,‖ Michel Foucault argues that a
contemporary critique of political reason would have to move past the dialectics of desire which would
―trap us into tplaying the arbitrary and boring part of either the rationalist or the irrationalist‖ (Foucualt
1994, 299). Rather he argues that a critique of political reason should take up the relation between
rationalization and power so that we can understand how ―political rationality has grown and imposed itself
all thought the history of western societies‖ (Foucault 1994, 325).
7

Most notably one can point to the following examples: Willhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism,
ed. Mary Higgins and Chester M. Raphael, M.D., trans. Mary Boyd Higgins (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1980); Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1974); Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,
2000); Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); and Filip Kovacevic, Liberating Oedipus? Psychoanalysis and
Critical Theory (New York: Lexington Books, 2007).
8

Some authors have recently begun to take up this type of critique from the angle of psychoanalysis. For
example see: Adam Rosen, ―On the Fate of Psychoanalysis and Political Theory,‖ Psychoanalytic
Quarterly 76, no.3 (2007): 943-980.
9

In some senses, this is similar to Gayatri Spivak‘s examination of the ―native informant‖ in A Critique of
Postcolonial Reason and her investigation of the subaltern in ―Can the Subaltern Speak?‖ In both of these
works Spivak, one could argue, takes up the structural foreclosures that secure the absence of the other
from European discourses—or the symbolic fortifications against the Kantian in-itself or Lacanian ―real.‖
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The work of understanding the political implications of these boundaries, of
indeed appearance itself, would have to begin with concept of ideology. The task of the
first chapter is, thus, to investigate the Theordor Adorno‘s augmentations of Marx‘s
concept of ideology as representative of an important shift in the orientation between
rationality and appearance in the political. I perform this work by putting pressure on
both Marx and Adorno‘s appropriation of the Hegelian concept of Spirit. In tracing out
the shift in this concept from Marx to Adorno, one notes an important transformation in
what it represents and what it means for reason to come to comprehend it. As we will
see, for Marx, spirits must be exorcised by turning thought to material foundation of
thought that is excluded from appearance. Uncovering the knowable conditions that are
excised from appearance itself can thus overturn the spell of ideology. In contrast to
Marx, Adorno takes a more Kantian route, arguing ideology, and thus spirit, reflects not
just illusion, but also what is most real: what Adorno will call the non-identical core of
appearance itself. The question becomes, then what does it mean to think this core, and
how exactly might psychoanalysis help us in this endeavor.
While those who have taken up this question have often focused on the
psychoanalytic concept of repression, the second chapter argues the repressed cannot be
the non-identical. To support this argument this chapter reads the metapsychological
nature of repression in light of Freud‘s Kantian inheritance. Beginning with Freud‘s
claim that the unconscious is timeless (Zeitlos), it argues the relationship between the
conscious and the unconscious—that which appears and that which does not appear—is
predicated on the schematizing function of linear time. That which is temporalized is, or
contains the potential, to become conscious. What remains without time, what remains
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unschematized, is not only radically unconscious, but also cannot be brought to
consciousness. Whatever the non-identical would be, given this framework, it would have
to remain radically without time. Given this distinction, the chapter goes on to argue,
because repression excises already schematized presentations from consciousness, what
remains repressed cannot be the non-identical, because the repressed has been, and thus
can be subjected to the linear temporality of reason. Thus, if we are to take up the
question of the non-identical in psychoanalysis, we must take up the question of what
remains unschematized, what remains outside of time, what, essentially, remains
radically unconscious.
In contrast to repression, the third chapter argues what has been disavowed, and
thus the function of disavowal, is the non-identical toward which political thought must
turn. While most associate the function of disavowal with fetishism, and thus the Oedipal
narrative of castration, Freud‘s concept of disavowal surpasses not only these
frameworks, but also the assumptions buried beneath them. With respect to this, the
chapter first addresses the problems of disavowal‘s association with fetishism and then
dissociates the concept from fetishism. Distinguishing disavowal from fetishism
illuminates the constitutive nature of disavowal, especially in Freud‘s late work. In these
works one comes to see that disavowal represents not only the limits of rationality, of
what has never been brought to consciousness—thus remaining unschematized—but also
an irreparable split in consciousness lying beyond the boundaries of reason while still
affecting the subject. Because disavowal institutes this split, because what has been
disavowed is radically unconscious and timeless, a critique of political thought would
turn toward what has been disavowed. And indeed, this is a project that even Freud
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engaged in when he attempted to understand the political implications of this concept in
his last work Moses and Monotheism.
The fourth chapter provides a reading of Freudian disavowal as a political concept
in order to examine its full implications in light of the tangled relationship between the
constitution, slavery, and prisons in the United States. Because much of Freud‘s political
work operates on the assumption of the historical nature of consciousness, this chapter
first begins, through a reading of the relationship between phylogenesis and ontogenesis,
by arguing the historical nature of consciousness is grounded in what might be
understood as the modes of punishment in Freud‘s work. Using this as a framework from
which to engage in Freud‘s use of the concept of disavowal in Moses and Monotheism,
the chapter goes on to argue, political disavowal indicates the schematizing function of
the law that excludes the very deed constituting it. It is in light of this, that the chapter
then explores this concept further by examining the reverberations of the 13th
Amendment‘s simultaneous abolishment and preservation of the practice of slavery in
light of political appearance.
Finally, the project concludes by suggesting that a psychoanalytic critique of
political reason would not only turn political thought toward the concept of disavowal,
but that this very turn would be predicated on examining how the non-identical is
sustained throughout time, throughout generations. To think thins we must begin to turn
to the question of the intergenerational transmission of trauma. In fact, a psychoanalytic
critique of the political reason would end by orienting ourselves in the political in light of
a genealogy of the historical transmission of the non-identical.
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Chapter One:
Exorcising Specters:
Ideology and the Non-identical from Marx to Adorno
Who among us is not battling with specters that implore Heaven and demand of us theirdue, while
we are beholden to them for our own salvation?
--N. Abraham and M. Torok, ―‗The Lost object—me‘‖: Notes on Endocryptic
Identification‖

―So we now enter the wilderness of the spirit [die Wüste des Geistes],‖ Marx
declares in The German Ideology (CW 5: 148; W 3: 131).
―Spirits? Wildernesses?‖ one might ask. ―Nothing more than a rhetorical
flourish,‖ one might conclude; ―for surely there is nothing there.‖ Yet, perhaps Jacques
Derrida is right in Specters of Marx when he warns that ―[w]hen Marx evokes specters at
the moment he analyzes, for example, the mystical character or the becoming-fetish of
the commodity, we should therefore not see in that only effects of rhetoric, turns of
phrase that are contingent or merely apt to convince by striking the imagination‖ (Derrida
1994, 185f.).10 Derrida seems to be on to something. Marx is clearly haunted by some
―thing.‖ 11 After all, the association between the specter and ideology in Marx‘s text is not

10

For a contextualized discussion of this text see: Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques
Derrida’s Spectres of Marx, ed. Michael Sprinker (New York: Verso, 1999); Ernesto Laclau, ―The Time is
Out of Joint,‖ Diacritics 25, no. 2 (1995): 85-96; Colin Davis, ―Hauntology, Spectres, and Phantoms,‖
French Studies 59, no. 3 (2005): 373-379.
11

While Derrida‘s examination of the ―subtle argument‖ lying beneath Marx‘s analysis of specters and
spirits is geared toward demonstrating the family resemblance between Marxism and deconstruction, my
interest in the spirits haunting Marx stems from a different concern (Derrida 1994, 157). Specifically,
Derrida takes up the various spirits, the séances and possessed tables, conjurers and necromancers
inhabiting Marx‘s texts to investigate the automation of the ―spirit that spirits itself‖ (Derrida 1994, 217). In
other words, the hauntological aspects of Marx‘s texts, for Derrida, will indicate another way to view the
critique of the metaphysics of presence. But, as Derrida notes, not all aspects of Marx critique these
phantasms, there are still arguments and assumptions that assume this metaphysics. For example Antonio
Negri has argued this is the case with the concept of ―exploitation‖ in Derrida‘s text. [See Antonio Negri,
―The Specter‘s Smile,‖ in Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Spectres of Marx,

accidental. Indeed, Derrida was not the first to pick up on this language. One could just as
easily turn to Adorno, who not only explicitly claims that the ―spell and ideology are one
and the same [Bann und Ideologie sind dasselbe]‖ (Adorno, ND: 349; GS 6: 342); but
also evokes the language of ―bewitchment‖ and ―conjuring‖ to describe the grip of
ideology on consciousness.12 What is this ―thing,‖ the ―thing‖ both of and in ideology
leading Marx and Adorno to appeal to the language of possession, magic, and haunting to
describe it? Is it, as Derrida suggests, more than just a rhetorical metaphor?
Perhaps what ideology represses haunts it. Or perhaps, the very rationality of
recognizing what has been covered over by political illusion haunts the concept of
ideology. Certainly there is an internal oscillation in the concept between what it hides
and the possibility of bringing it to light. On the one hand, the concept conjures up
images of populations possessed, as if by some spell. Their activity automated, alienated,
by some external force, they are entranced by a spirit they do not even recognize. As
Sarah Kofman notes in Camera Obscura, it is an apparatus of ―occultation, which
plunges consciousness into darkness, evil and error,‖ thus rendering ―real relationships

ed. Michael Sprinker, trans. Patrica Dailey and Costantino Costantini (New York: Verso, 1999), 5-16].
Derrida‘s text, as Pierre Macherey has noted, claims: ―Father Marx is Dead: the time has come for him to
return to his children, to us, in the form of his ghost or phantom‖ (Macherey 1999, 17). Thus, one can say
that Derrida‘s text, is focused on assessing how Marx‘s ghost haunts us, continuously returning, demanding
that we negotiate our inheritance from Marx, suggesting all the while that deconstruction in one of these
inheritors. For example, also in Ghostly Demarcations, Terry Eagleton writes in ―Marxism without Marx,‖
that Derrida seems to suggest that ―deconstruction was all along a radicalized version of the creed
[Marxism]‖ (Eagleton 1999, 84). Although I am in many senses taking my cue from Derrida, my interest in
this language of ghosts specifically concerns not just how to think the phenomenal concept of ideology in
Marx, but also how this language indicates and bespeaks of an investment in the rational overcoming of
alienation in political philosophy. And while there are many things that will haunt Marx in his texts, the
thing that I would like to track is the relationship between appearance and consciousness in ideology.
12

For historical and theoretical overviews of this concept see: Terry Eagleton, Ideology (New York: Verso,
1991); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, trans. Louis
Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1985); Theordor Adorno, ―Beitrag zur
Ideologienlehre,‖ in Theodor W. Adorno: Gesammelte Schriften, Band 8: Soziologische Schriften, I
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972), 457-477; Christopher L. Pines, Ideology and False Consciousness: Marxism
and his Historical Progenitors (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993).
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elusive and secret‖ (Kofman 1998, 14). Not recognizing one‘s own possession, one very
well might wonder how to break the spell or if it can be broken. On the other hand, the
concept carries the seeds of its own overcoming, a promise that this spell of ideology can
be both recognized and thus broken. Thus, this concept oscillates between entrapment
and liberation, between the mesmerizing illusions of politics and the clear-sighted
revolutionary break from a wretched state of affairs.13 Can reason break this spell? What
is the relationship, in other words, between reason and ideology? How might this
relationship be defined b the ―thing‖ ideology covers over or reason would reveal? In
other words, what is the form of rationality grounding our understanding of political
illusion and the promise of its disenchantment?
In this chapter I follow Marx and Adorno‘s haunted language, investigating how
they constellate the relationships between ideology and rationality. I argue Marx‘s
account of ideology attempts to dispel political illusion by reorienting the relationship
between thought and the world, between subject and object, while simultaneously
assuming the form of rationality it seeks to undermine. I then turn to Adorno‘s usage of
this language to indicate the augmentations he makes to the relationship between thought
and object under the spell of political illusion. What we will see, in the end, is that while
Marx concentrates on disenchanting political illusion, Adorno argues that the spirit of
ideology reflects the thing that appears as no thing, but nonetheless remains something.

13

In ―The Concept of ‗Critique‘ and the ‗Critique of Political Economy,‘‖ Jacques Rancière marks out a
similar contradiction in Marx. He argues that that the concepts of ―crisis‖ and ―Critique‖ come ―into
contradiction with another conception in Marx—that of the purity of science. The possibility of this science
is then linked to a sort of breathing space in history‖ (Rancière 1989, 176). This contradiction represents
the difference between critique and a ―radical rupture with the conditions of existence of historical agents‖
(Rancière 1989, 176). See also Etienne Balibar, ―The Vacillation of Ideology,‖ in Masses, Classes, and
Ideas: Studies in Politics and Philosophy before and after Marx, trans. James Swenson (New York:
Routledge, 1994), 87-124.
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In other words, Adorno‘s modifications of the relationship between rationality and
ideology begin to point us toward the non-identical in political thought, something I
suggest might act not only as the point of critique for political thought, but also as the
point of demand for a psychoanalytic intervention into political thought.
I. Haunted by Spirits: Marx’s Concept of Ideology
To understand the internal oscillations of Marx‘s concept of ideology, and thus its
troubled inheritance in Adorno, we must constellate his discussion of ideology with the
concepts of alienation and commodity fetishism. For it is in these discussions that not
only does the language of magic, spells, and spirits arise, but also that Marx focuses on
how political illusion mediates the relations between thought and world, subject and
object. Let us, then, contextualize Marx‘s discussion of the rationality of ideology in
German Ideology, which will demand entering the ―wilderness of the spirit.‖
Spirits (Geister) and specters (Gespenster) abound in Marx‘s German Ideology.14
This proliferation of these beings disrupting the clean boundaries between space and
time, between appearance and absence, bespeak of Marx‘s clear anxiety in this text—an
anxiety of the hunted.15 In the section entitled ―Saint Max,‖ Marx pits himself against a
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In Specters of Marx Derrida points out the ―discreet and subtle‖ argument that ―permits [Marx] to
distinguish between spirit and specter. The specter is of the spirit, it participates in the latter and stems from
it even as it follows it as its ghostly double. The difference between the two is precisely what tends to
disappear in the ghost effect, just as the concept of such a difference or the argumentative movement that
puts it to work in the rhetoric tends to vanish‖ (Derrida 1994, 156f.).
15

In Specters of Marx, Derrida positions Marx as giving rise to the chase, the hunt. While Marx does fancy
himself a sort of ghost-buster in this text, the question I would like to ask is what is hunting Marx, what is
driving Marx into the hunt? In reference to Marx‘s language in this section, Derrida asks ―Why such
relentless pursuit? Why this hunt for ghosts? What is the reason for Marx‘s rage? Why does he harass
Stirner with such irresistible irony?‖ (Derrida 1994, 174). He concludes that it is a ―Specular circle: one
chases after in order to chase away, on pursues, sets off in pursuit of someone to make him flee, but in
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―saintly conjurer [Der Heilige Esamoteur]‖ (CW 5: 149; W 3: 132) who also gives
―instruction in the art of spirit-seeing [Geistersehen]‖ (CW 5: 152; W 3: 136). Marx
seems keen on exorcising all the different spirits and specters Max Stirner continuously
fabricates. Yet, what drives Marx into this furious fit of exorcism? What spell has this
magician cast to fabricate the specters [Gespensterfabrikation] Marx casts back out (W 3:
138)?
Each attempt at expelling these spirits begins with a barrage of adjectives that
concretize the nouns modify. Almost compulsively, Marx writes: ―The fact is, therefore,
that definite [bestimmte] individuals who are productively active in a definite [bestimmte]
way enter into these definite [bestimmten] social and political relations‖ (CW 5: 35; W 3:
25). Whence all these Bestimmungen? Or, again, one can see this when Marx claims one
must be a ―real [wirkliche] individual‖ at a ―definite [bestimmte]‖ moment in
development using an ―existing [vorhandene] language‖ in order ―hear‖ something (CW
5: 150; W 3: 133). The ―real,‖ the ―definite,‖ the ―existing,‖ each is an adjective lodged
against the existence of spirits in ―things,‖ as though by modifying the noun with these
terms the ―thing‖ becomes purified or disenchanted. In many senses, these adjectives are
counter-spells warding off the unwanted.
Resonating with Plato‘s Parmenides or Sophist, Marx‘s concern for this spirit is
that it ―creates itself out of nothing, hence it is a question of nothing, which out of nothing
makes itself spirit [dich selbst aus Nichts erschafft—also um Nichts, das sich aus Nichts
zum Geist schafft] (CW 5: 149; W 3: 133). It is also a question, of course, of the nature
transcendental illusion in Kant, and similar to Kant Marx also seeks to critique this being

making him flee, distances him, expulses him so as to go after him again and remain in pursuit‖ (Derrida
1994, 175).
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that emerges ―out‖ of and ―from‖ this nothing. Marx argues ―something is created by
something out of something, and by no means comes, as in Hegel‘s Logik, from nothing,
through nothing to nothing [Etwas von Etwas durch Etwas geschaffen, und Keineswegs,
wie in der Hegelschen Logik, von Nichts durch Nichts zu Nichts gekommen] (CW 5: 150;
W 3: 133). This coming ―from‖ and ―through‖ the nothing, will only end by coming ―to‖
nothing, according to Marx; for zero multiplied by anything can only come to zero. To
create something out of nothing is no more than magic. To make others believe you can
create something from nothing is no more than to put them under a spell. Under the spell,
thus, one only sees spirits and ghosts, beings emerging from nothing. Are these the
beings the ―things‖ that are haunting Marx? They are surely the object Marx seeks to cast
out with his adjectives; they are certainly the symptom of our possession, but what is this
―thing,‖ this thing Marx does not chase down and exorcise, but rather that hunts, and thus
haunts him?
What haunts Marx not only in The German Ideology, but also in Capital, is the
spirit of Hegel. More specifically, Marx‘s attempt to distinguish the ―scientific‖ nature of
dialectic materialism from the dialectics of Hegel haunts the concept of ideology. In the
second afterward to Capital, Marx claims dialectic materialism is ―not only different
from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite‖ (CW 35: 19; W 23: 27). He argues Hegel
―transforms‖ the ―thought process [Denkprozeß]‖ into ―an independent subject‖ (CW 35:
19; W 23: 27, my translation). In Hegel, Marx contends, the ―idea‖—is the ―demiurgos of
reality, that forms only its external appearance [der Demiurg des wirklichen, das nur
seine äußere Erscheinung bildet]‖ (CW 35: 19; W 23: 27, my translation). It is, quite
simply, the creation of some ―thing‖ out of no ―thing.‖ To turn thought into the sole
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fabricator of appearance is to create reality from nothing. In contrast, Marx argues there
must be some ―thing‖—the ―definite‖ of materiality—shaping the conscious
apprehension of reality outside of consciousness itself. ―For me,‖ Marx writes, ―the ideal
is nothing else than the material reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms
of thought [Bei mir is umgekehrt das Ideelle nichts anders als das im Menschenkopf
umgesetzte und übersetzte Materielle]‖ (CW 35: 19; W 23: 27). Concepts are only the
―reflexes‖ and ―echoes‖ of the ―real,‖ the ―definite‖ organization of reality, which is the
inverse of Hegel‘s dialectics (CW 5: 36: W 3: 25). Thus, each time Marx invokes the
―definite‖ and the ―real,‖ each time he exorcises the ―spirit‖ from ―things,‖ he inverts the
priority of materiality in thought against Hegel‘s spiritualism.16
In The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx takes up this
inversion in terms of the relationship between subject and object, a relationship that is
essential for understanding both his language of spirits and his concept of ideology. He
argues a ―being which does have its nature outside of itself is not a natural being, and
plays no part in the system of nature‖ (CW 3: 337; W 1: 578). A natural being, for Marx,
―suffers‖ objects (CW 3: 337; W 1: 579). It ―creates or posits [schafft, setzt] objects‖
because this being ―is posited through objects [durch Gegenstände gesetzt ist]‖ (CW 3:
336; W 1: 578, translation modified). What motivates this ―natural‖ being is the fact that
―the objects of his instincts [Triebe] exist outside of him, as objects independent
[unabhängige] of him; yet these objects are objects that he needs—essential objects‖
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For a discussion of this relation see: Daniel Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 278-281.
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(CW 3: 336; W 1: 578).17 A ―natural‖ or ―real‖ being for Marx is ―objective‖ because it is
driven to seek objects outside of its being. One‘s activity to seek the external object, this
thing, reflects the nature of the object sought. Indeed, we are human for Marx in as much
as we engage in this creative activity spurred by the external world.
In contrast to this, Marx finds that in Hegel being is self-differentiating because
its objects are objects of consciousness. As Marx argues, a ―being which has no object
outside of itself is not an objective being‖ and ―a non-objective being is a non-being‖
(CW 3: 337; W 1: 578). To be more than an ―unreal, non-sensuous [unwirkliches,
unsinnliches] thing—a product of mere thought,‖ that is to be an ―actual being [wirklich
sein] means to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object, and thus to have sensuous
objects outside oneself—objects of one‘s sensuousness. To be sensuous is to suffer‖ (CW
3: 337; W 1: 579). What does not suffer a world outside of itself is not a being. A nonobjective being, a being that has only itself for its object is nothing more than a spirit that
has been conjured up, capturing, mesmerizing one with its spell. Actual, determined,
beings have external objects that send consciousness outside of itself, and material
dialectics is the reflection of this externality in one‘s thought.18
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Or as Angela Davis writes in ―Women and Capitalism: Dialectics of Oppression and Liberation,‖ for
―[a]rmed with their biological powers and drives, living as they do in and through nature, human beings can
only survive by acting upon and transforming the material of nature,‖ and thus the very nature of their
being (Davis 1998, 164).
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Marx further clarifies this point later in the text when he writes: ―For example, superseded being is
essence, superseded essence is concept, the concept superseded is…absolute idea. But what, then, is the
absolute idea? It supersedes its own self again, if it does not want to perform once more from the beginning
the whole act of abstraction, an and to satisfy itself with being a totality of abstractions or the selfcomprehending of abstraction. But abstraction comprehending itself as abstraction knows itself to be
nothing: it must abandon itself—abandon abstraction—and so it arrives at an entity which is its opposite—
at nature. Thus, the entire logic is the demonstration that abstract thought is nothing in itself; that the
absolute idea is nothing for itself; that only nature is something‖ (CW 3: 343; W 1: 585).
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Inverting the relationship between subject and object has more than just
epistemological ramifications for Marx. Because Hegel begins from the idea and not the
―real‖ his dialectics are a ―mystified [mystifizierten]‖ legitimation of ―the existing state of
affairs‖; whereas the ―rational [rationellen]‖ materialist dialectic includes an ―affirmative
recognition of the existing state of things, and at the same time also, the recognition of
the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up [seines notwendigen Untergangs
einschließt]‖ (CW 35: 20; W 23: 27f.). At stake in the difference between this ―thing‖
which comes from nothing and this ―thing‖ that comes from something, is nothing less
than the revolutionary possibility of rational thought itself.19 And this ―thing‖ coming
from no ―thing,‖ forms the specter haunting Marx‘s concept of ideology.
In the preface to The German Ideology, Marx indicates how these spirits justify
the existing state of affairs and dominate society. In the preface to this text Marx writes
[h]itherto men have always formed false ideas about themselves [Die Menschen
haben sich bisher stets falsche Vorstellungen über sich selbst gemacht], about
what they are and what they ought to be. They have arranged their relations
according to their ideas of God, of normal man, etc. The products of their heads
have grown above their heads [Die Ausgeburten ihres Kopfes sind ihnen über den
Kopf gewachsen]. They, the creators, have bowed down before their creations. Let
19

While critical of Hegel in this text, Marx is also polemically arguing against those who consider Hegel a
―dead dog‖ (CW 35: 19; W 23: 27). Despite the fact that the dialectic ―suffers [erleidet]‖ from a
―mystification [Mystification]‖ at the ―hands of Hegel,‖ Marx was nonetheless a ―pupil of that mighty
thinker‖ and at times still ―flirts [kokettierte]‖ with Hegel‘s ―modes of expression‖ (CW 35: 19; W 23: 27).
Ambivalent in his relationship to Hegel, Marx thus claims, that because the Hegelian dialectic is ―standing
on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the
mystical shell‖ (CW 35: 19; W 23: 27). For more on the relationship between Hegel and Marx see: Joseph
McCarney, ―‗The Entire Mystery‘: Marx‘s Understanding of Hegel,‖ in Karl Marx and Contemporary
Philosophy, ed. Andre Chitty and Martin McIvor (New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2009), 15-35; Warren
Breckman, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social theory: Dethroning the Self
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Tom Rockmore, Marx after Marxism: The Philosophy of
Karl Marx (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002).
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us liberate them from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the
yoke of which they are pining away [Befreien wir sie von den Hirngespinsten, den
Ideen, den Dogmen, den eingebildeten Wesen, unter deren Joch sie verkümmern].
(CW 5: 23; W 3: 13, translation modified)
Similar to the psychoanalytic concept of projection Freud develops at the turn of the
twentieth century, ideology, for Marx, describes the appearance of an idea as autonomous
in relationship to its ―definite‖ and ―real‖ conditions, which, thus comes to justify the
current conditions of that society but also to dominate the society.20 Ideology is the
appearance of the idea as separate from the material conditions; it appears as some
―thing‖ conjured out of nothing. For once conjured, these ―spirits‖ quickly instantiate the
spell leading one to ―pine away‖ under the dictates of one‘s own ideas.21 One ―pines
away‖ under the ―yoke‖ of these ―imaginary beings‖ and ―chimeras,‖ constantly seeking
to appease them, to quell the projections of one‘s own mind, to quell the force of one‘s
own activity. Under the spell of ideology thought becomes ―an activity directed against‖
itself; thinking becomes a form of ―Self-estrangement [Selbstentfremdung]‖ conditioning
the activity of passive self-domination (CW 3: 275; W 1: 515). The German Ideology is
Marx‘s attempt to break the spell of self-domination by exorcising these spirits, placing
them back into their ―real‖ and ―definite‖ home in our heads, and thus under our control.

20

For instance see: Totem and Taboo (Freud, SE 13: 64f.; GW 9: 80f.) and ―Instincts and their
Vicissitudes,‖ (Freud, SE 14: 136f.; GW 10: 228f.)
21

Hannah Arendt captures this logic well when she writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism, ―An ideology
is quite literally what its name indicates; it is the logic of an idea‖ (Arendt 1994, 469). This logic for Arendt
is purely deductive. The force of ideology sets into motion the law while assuming a one to one
correspondence between the idea and its application. It is an unconditional application, or as Arendt writes
―the only possible movement in the realm of logic is the process of deduction from the premise‖ (Arendt
1994, 469). Since the application of the logic of the idea in the form of law is strictly deductive, Arendt
finds that ―Ideologies are never interested in the miracle of being,‖ rather they are concerned with forcibly
aligning the world with the idea (Arendt 1994, 469).
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It is an attempt to disenchant Hegel‘s dialectics. What does it mean to break this spell?
Where do those spirits belong? And what will this ―rational‖ form of the dialectic tell us
about the ―definite‖ material conditions, such that it will also tell us about the necessity of
its dissolution?
For Marx, our alienation from the products of our thought can only be the
reflection of an alienation produced in the material organization of society. Whereas, for
Hegel, ―[a]ll alienation of the human being is therefore nothing but alienation of selfconsciousness‖; for Marx this alienation is not conjured from nothing, but results from
some ―thing,‖ a ―real [wirklichen] alienation‖ (CW 3: 334; W 1: 575, translation
modified). For if consciousness is not the reflection of reality but the ―demiurgos‖ of
reality, then if alienation exists it is ―nothing but the manifestation of alienation of the
real human essence, of self-consciousness‖ (CW 3: 334; W 1: 576). For Marx, this
naturalization of alienation is the naturalization of material contradictions produced by
society.22 To naturalize this alienation is nothing other than to naturalize the material
conditions, which in reality determine the ―definite‖ conditions of our alienation. Thus,
for Marx, one must look to the material organization of society in order to reveal the
―thing‖ that is our alienation.
This material organization of society is the mode of production in a given society,
for Marx. Under the capitalist modes of production the worker must sell his or her life,
his or her ―real‖ laboring activity in the world, ―piecemeal‖ to the owners of the means of
22

In Dialectics of Labor: Marx and his Relation to Hegel, C. J. Arthur puts it nicely when he argues the
sticking point for Marx is the fact that Hegel ―insists that estrangement can be overcome precisely when
self-consciousness appropriates objectivity and finds itself at home in this its other. This is achieved when
spirit understands that the object is nothing but its own self-alienation‖ (Arthur 1986, 73). If this
estrangement is the product of the modes of production then to ―be at home‖ with this estrangement is to
reconcile one self to the modes of production in society. This reconciliation seems to be the driving point of
Marx‘s distinction from Hegel.
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production for a price less than what the labor itself produces (CW 9: 198). Only under
these ―definite‖ circumstances would the object of one‘s labor, similar to the ideas one
produces, confront one as a perversely autonomous being demanding subservience. In
The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx explains alienation as the
confrontation between the worker and his or her object of production. Marx argues since
the activity, products, and value of the object the worker produces do not belong to him
or her, ―the worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object [fremden
Gegenstand]‖ under the material conditions of capital (CW 3: 272; W 1: 512). More
specifically, Marx explains the relationship between subject and object under the
conditions of capital as follows:
[t]he alienation [Entäußrung] of the worker in his product means not only that his
labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him,
independently, as something alien to him, and becomes a power on its own
confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object
confronts him as something hostile and alien. (CW 3: 272; W 1: 512)
The products of labor, much like Marx‘s account of the spell of ―imaginary beings‖ in
The German Ideology, confront workers as something external and disconnected from
them despite the fact it is a product they have fcreated. In a system of alienated labor the
product appears as autonomous to the producer setting up an inverse relationship between
the worker and the products of the worker‘s labor. If the objects we seek and the objects
we produce impress themselves on our consciousness, and if we are alienated from these
objects, then we will also be alienated from our own consciousness. Simply put, the more
the worker produces, the more the worker externalizes activity under the conditions of
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alienated labor, the more the worker becomes not only severed from his or her life
process, but also his or her conscious reflection of the world. Materially, the more riches
the worker produces the poorer the worker becomes; the more life activity the worker
exerts for another the more life activity the worker loses and the more another gains.23 Or
as Marx writes, ―The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer
belongs to him but to the object‖ (CW 3: 272; W 1: 512). 24
Capitalism, for Marx, operates by alienating us from our activity, which
consequently affects the structure of our thought. The objects of our labor, like the
objects of our thought, become autonomous, self-standing things demanding
subservience. If our ideas are merely the ―reflexes‖ and ―echoes‖ of our material activity,
and if these activities are structured by a capitalist mode of production that alienates one
from activity, then the very structure of alienation in thought—i.e. ideology—must be the
displaced schema of alienated labor (CW 5: 36; W 3: 26). Or in other words, if ideology
is the displaced schema of alienated labor, then this must mean we do not recognize the
reflection of our own labor in the products we produce, we do not recognize what Marx
would call our ―real‖ or ―determinate‖ ―objectivity.‖ Thus ideology must be the
misrecognition of one‘s activity reflected in the object of one‘s own labor. The
misrecognition of the reflection of our creative activities in the pursuit of objects is the
ballast for unhinging market activity from use value and attaching it to the floating

23

Or as Marx writes production ―appears as a loss of reality for the worker, objectification as loss and
bondage to the object, and appropriation as estrangement, as alienation [die Vergegenständlichung als
Verlust und Knechtschaft des Gegenstandes, die Aneignung als Entfremdung, als Entäußerung]‖ (CW 3:
272; W 1: 512).
24

In Critique, Norm and Utopia Selya Benhabib puts it nicely: ―For Marx as well, objectification is an
activity through which what is inner becomes outer and external. The purpose of the activity is to adequate
embodiment and expression to the potentialities of the individual‖ (Benhabib 1986, 55).
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signifier of exchange for Marx. In other words the logic of alienated labor grounding the
modes of production under capital is the sine qua non of capitalism.
The structural expression of this alienation is found in commodity fetishism‘s
valuation of the worker‘s product. This highlights not only the alienation of subject from
the production of objects, but also how this alienation affects the appearance of those
objects on the global market. In the first volume of Capital Marx argues that the
appearance of the commodity is structured by the alienation of the worker. At first, he
writes, a commodity appears as ―obvious, trivial thing [selbstverständliches, triviales
Ding]‖ but becomes ―dodgy‖ or ―complicated‖ when one takes a closer look at it (CW
35: 81; W 23: 85, my translation). It is a ―complicated‖ thing because, on one hand, it has
a use-value attached to the labor that produced it. ―The form of wood, for instance‖ Marx
writes, ―is altered, by making a table out of it‖ (CW 35: 81f.; W 23: 85). Although
transformed through both formal and material causes it ―[n]onetheless remains a wooden
table, an ordinary sensible thing [sinnliches Ding]‖ (CW 35: 82; W 23: 85, my
translation). On the other hand, this ―thing,‖ also bears an exchange value obfuscating its
use-value and, thus, the labor that produced it. As Marx writes:
[b]ut once it emerges [auftritt] as a commodity, it changes itself into a sensuously
supersensible thing [sinnlich übersinnliches Ding].25 It stands [steht] not only
with its feet on the ground, but also positions itself [stellt sich] against all other
commodities at its head and develops out of its wooden-head whims [Holzkopf
Grillen] more fantastical [wunderlicher] things than if it were to begin to dance

25

This is Derrida‘s translation of sinnlich übersinnliches Ding from Specters of Marx. See: (Derrida 1994,
189).
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from its freewill [aus freien Stücken]. (CW 35: 82; W 23: 85, my translation) 26
The appearance of the product as it steps out onto the stage of the market of global
capitalism as a commodity is both sinnlich and übersinnlich; it is both sensible and
supersensible. The table itself is sensible. It is a thing one can touch feel, indeed, use.
Although this ―real‖ part of the table has its ―feet on the ground,‖ rooted as it is in
―determinate‖ materiality and use, its head, higher up and thus farther away from
―determinate‖ materiality, participates in another form of valuation. It stellt sich,
positions itself, at its head against the other heads of other sensuously supersensible
things. And it is from this positioning, this comparative balancing against other
commodities that the ―real‖ table begins to dance. Surely a séance is at hand, a
―spiritualist séance‖ as Derrida is quick to remind us in Specters of Marx (Derrida 1994,
189).27
Of course, this séance is a metaphor; but it is a serious one nonetheless. The ―dead‖

26

The full text reads: ―Aber sobald er als Ware auftritt, verwandelt er sich in ein sinnlich übersinnliches
Ding. Er steht nicht nur mit seinen Füßen auf dem Boden, sondern er stellt sich allen andren Waren
gegenüber auf den Kopf und entwickelt aus seinem Holzkopf Grillen, viel wunderlicher, als wenn er aus
freien Stücken zu tanzen begänne.‖ The two other standard translations of this are as follows. The
Collected Works translates this as ―But, so soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into
something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but in relation to all other
commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful
than ―table-turning‖ ever was‖ (CW 35: 82). And the Penguin edition translates it as: ―But as soon as it
emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its
feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its
wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own freewill‖
(Marx 1977, 163f.).
27

This ritual, this calling forth, as the editors of Capital in The Collected Works of Marx and Engels note
―was the rage among the European Aristocracy‖ after the ―defeat of the 1848-49 revolutions‖ (CW 35: 771,
fn. 66). The image Marx draws for us in explaining the mystical character of the commodity is thus: The
aristocracy sits around a table, perhaps holding hands. The candles are lit. The table moves. They pause.
They still do not believe, but they concentrate more. If nothing else, it is entertaining. This time the table
shakes. They feel a little anxious. Things fall of the table; the table is now dancing on its own. They
believe. Surely this is the sign of spirits, of ghosts they have called forth through their efforts. Or, perhaps
as Marx notes, it is Zauber und Spuk, or what has been translated as ―magic and necromancy‖—a spell
raising the dead. In raising the table they have raised spirits. It is the raising of something from no ―thing.‖
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wood coming alive is the replacement of use value with exchange value. The abstraction
of exchange value replaces use value. For the übersinnliche quality of the commodity, the
exchange value, endows the table with a value formed by its relationships to other tables,
other commodities. In the abstraction of exchange value, the ―real‖ labor that transformed
the raw material into the now ―mystical character [mystische Charakter]‖ of the
commodity becomes covered over, making it appear as though the exchange value and its
fluctuations are a natural characteristic of the commodity itself (CW 35: 82; W 23: 85).
The table does shake, the markets do move in accordance with ups and downs of
exchange. But for Marx, as we have seen, the table can only shake from something just as
the movement of the markets must too be anchored in something, and to believe that it
shakes from nothing, just as one might believe that the exchange value of the commodity
emerges on its own, is to fall under a spell. But what is this spell making tables dance by
uprooting that part of the commodity with its ―feet on the ground‖?
Separated from the labor producing it, and appearing as a self-standing,
autonomous object for exchange, the commodity takes on the form of the fetish because
it appears to be the bearer of its own value. As Marx famously analogizes, just as in the
―misty realm of religion,‖ 28
[…] the productions of the human brain appear [scheinen] as independent figures
[stehende selbständige Gestalten] endowed with a life and entering into relations
both with one another and with the human race. So it is in the world of
commodities with the products of men‘s hands. I call this the fetishism which

28

For an analysis of the ideological nature of commodity fetishism in Marx in relation to religious
fetishism see: Christopher L. Pines, Ideology and False Consciousness: Marxism and his Historical
Progenitors (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993),147-152; Authur Ripstein,
―Commodity Fetishism,‖ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 4 (Dec. 1987): 773-748.
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attaches itself to the products of labour so soon as they are produced as
commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of
commodities. (Marx, CW 35: 83; W 23: 86) 29
The commodity becomes a fetish when it appears as independent of its creators, and thus
as a self-standing figure supported by a logic that appears to be natural. In its
transformation from product to commodity, in its movement from alienated production to
self-standing thing, the commodity conceals the social relationships composing the
modes of production beneath the veneer of the symbolic relationship it has come to
acquire between things, between commodities ruled by the movements in their exchange
value. Now independent of its material conditions, Marx claims the ―social character of
[the workers‘] own labor is reflected back to them as an objective character of the
products of labor [die gesellschaftlichen Charaktere ihrer eigenen Arbeit als
gegenständliche Charaktere der Arbeitsprodukte selbst…zurückspieglet]‖ (CW 35: 83;
W 23: 86, my translation).30 At this moment of reflection, the worker comes face to face

29

Marx makes a similar claim in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. There he writes
that: ―The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an
external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it
becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object
confronts him as something hostile and alien [Die Entäußrung des Arbeiters in seinem Produkt hat die
Bedeutung, nicht nur, daß seine Arbeit zu einem Gegenstand, zu einer äußern Existenz wird, sondern daß
sie außer ihm, unabhängig, fremd von ihm existiert und eine selbständige Macht ihm gegenüber wird, daß
das Leben, was er dem Gegenstand verliehen hat, ihm feindlich und fremd gegenübertritt.]‖ (CW 3: 272; W
1: 512).
30

The problem with the standard translation is that it misconstrues the fundamental element of the
commodity fetish. Whereas the standard translation claims that the relationships of labor are ―stamped‖ into
the commodity, when one looks at the German one finds these relations are not ―stamped‖ into the
commodity, but rather ―reflected back to [zurückspieglt]‖ the workers as an objective character of the
commodity. The full lines in the Collected Works and the Werke are as follows: ―A commodity is therefore
a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men‘s labour appears to them as an objective
character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of
their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the
products of their labor [Das Geheimnisvolle der Warenform besteht also einfach darin, daß sie den
Menschen die gesellschaftlichen Charaktere ihrer eigenen Arbeit als gegenständliche Charaktere der
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with the externalization of his or her labor and does not recognize it as belonging to him
or her, but rather as an objective characteristic belonging solely to the commodity. It is
misrecognition. The object appears as autonomous by virtue of this distorted reflecting
back to the worker, by virtue of converting the reality of his or her activity into the denied
ground of the product‘s seeming ―autonomy.‖ In this reflecting back the worker not only
does not recognize his or her own labor in the products of his or her activity, but
moreover the worker faces this labor as never having belonged to him or her. Indeed, this
is the commodity‘s ―mysterious [Geheimnisvolle]‖ nature (CW 35: 82; W 23: 86).
Separated from the labor producing it, raised up and fetishized, the commodity
participates in a market moved by the fluctuations of exchange value. Exchange value
abstracts away the particularities of the commodity, including the real labor producing it.
Exchange value is a system of signification denoting commodities under the universal
sign of gold or money. The exchangeability of products can only occur through the
obfuscation of their particularities. Giving the products a value attached not to their
production or use, but rather to other commodities triangulated by a universal value, gold,
obscures the value of the labor producing the products, thus erasing any differences
between the products and its material conditions. In other words, the commodity enters
into a symbolic relationship that can equate ―two ounces of gold‖ with ―one ton of iron,‖
despite the fact that more labor and time went into mining one ton of iron than two
ounces of gold (CW 35: 85; W 23: 89). The product can only take on the value of the
commodity, that is the abstracted symbolic function allowing it to be exchanged for other
things, by obscuring its material conditions—the labor, time, and social relationships in
Arbeitsprodukte selbst, als gesellschaftliche Natureigenschaften dieser Dinge zurückspieglt, daher auch
das gesellschaftliche Verhältnis der Produzenten zur Gesamtarbeit als ein außer ihnen existierendes
gesellschaftliches Verhältnis von Gegenständen] (CW 35: 83; W 23: 86).
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the act of its production.
As the commodity bears this new value through symbolic acts of exchange with
other products, according to Marx, it appears to have ―absolutely no connection with their
physical properties and the material relations arising out of this‖ (CW 35: 83; W 23: 86).
Or as Georg Lukács has noted in History and Class Consciousness the commodity fetish
takes on a ―‗phantom objectivity‘, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all
embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between
people‖ (Lukács 1971, 83). Its appearance as a commodity is simultaneously a
concealment of the material relations of labor that actually produce the commodity.31
When the ―proportions‖ of value set in exchange ―appear [scheinen] to spring
[entspringen] from the nature of the products‖ themselves, then one must move from
spirits to the entrapment of spirit in the object, that is to say to the fetish (CW 35: 85; W
23: 89). Instead of viewing the value of the commodity as the ―material husks of
homogenous human labor [sachliche Hüllen gleichartig menschlicher Arbeit],‖ one
―inversely‖ begins by ―equating different products to one another as values‖ which thus
differentiates the value of human labor (CW 35: 84f.; W 23: 88, my translation).
The spell of fetishistic exchange begins with an abstracted idea that orients the
material organization of the society. Instead of anchoring the value of the commodity
form in its ―real‖ and ―definite‖ conditions for the production of the commodity and then
proceeding to its abstraction, the spell of fetishistic exchange value begins with the

31

―Political economy conceals [verbirgt] the estrangement in the nature of labour by not considering the
direct relationship between the worker (labour) and production. It is true that labour produces marvels for
the rich, but it produces privation for the worker. It produces palaces, but hovels for the worker. It produces
beauty, but deformity for the worker. It replaces labour by machines, but casts some of the workers back
into barbarous forms of labour and turns others into machines‖ (CW 3: 273; W 1: 513).
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abstraction of the commodity and proceeds to the material conditions. In other words,
exchange value begins from the no ―thing‖ of abstraction and conjures up the something
of value; it is, simply the raising of spirits.32 As Sarah Kofman writes in Camera
Obscura, the ―idea is a reflection cut off from its source, henceforth unable to engender
anything but reflections of reflections, simulacra, fetishes‖ (Kofman 1998, 4). For once
you attach the value to this spirit, the market appears to dance and move as an
autonomous thing. Once the value of the commodity is only found in its reference to
other commodities, then ―their own social movement possesses for them the form of the
movement of things, beneath whose control they stand, instead of them controlling it‖
(CW 35: 85; W 23: 89). Like the table that dances, when the value of the commodity
becomes fetishized, the market based on the exchange of these fetishes appears to dance
on its own; it appears to move beyond human will and volition. Indeed the movement of
the market, just like the movement of the table, is the sign of spirits or the laws of nature,
of some transcendent force, an idea, not an object, that humans must suffer. Marx wants
to expel this spiritual dancing of both tables and markets with the ―real,‖ the ―definite,‖
nature of a scientific materialist dialectics. For under the spell of the fetishized value of
the market we dominate ourselves, but do not know it; ―Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun
es‖—this is the spirit of ideology (W 23: 88).33

32

Here we note the difference between Marx‘s concept of fetishism and Freud‘s concept of fetishism.
While both thinkers use fetishism to describe a resistance to representative thinking present in the
―modern‖ world, the manner in which the representational function of thought is denied occurs in exactly
converse ways. For Freud, thought denies the signifier, or concept, by focusing on the material object that
is associated with that idea. In direct contrast for Marx, fetishism represents the erasure of the signified by
the signifier, or the eclipse of the materiality of the concept by the concept itself.
33

Slavoj Žižek argues, in The Sublime Object of Ideology, that when Marx writes ―they do not know it, but
they are doing it‖ in Capital, the problem is not strictly epistemological, i.e., that a society‘s knowledge of
its own activities is false and thus needs to be corrected by the science of a materialist political economy.
And I would suggest that Marx‘s concept of ideology means more than just shifting the notion of falsity
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As we have seen, Ideology in, Marx‘s texts, produces spirits. It is the creation of
some ―thing,‖ a market, the movement of a table, or value, from nothing. It begins with
the concept and shapes the appearance of social relationships in light of that concept.
Marx wants to exorcise these spirits, to expose the knee shaking the table from below. To
do this he turns thought back to the thing, its ―real‖ object. Since concepts do not give us
objects, but rather our objects give us concepts, Marx‘s appeal to the ―real‖ and the
―definite‖ is an appeal to the thing orienting our concepts themselves. It is a reversal. For
when one disenchants the table, when one exorcises the fetishistic value haunting the
commodity, one can see that it is only in a world in which we have convinced ourselves
that the products of our own hands belong to another, that could we convince ourselves
that the products of thought are external and autonomous. Beginning with the idea, the
appearance of the world can only reflect that idea. In other words in Marx‘s conception of
ideology, there is some ―thing,‖ something that can be known, recognized, and
understood, hidden behind the violent abstraction of exchange. All one need, Marx finds
is to do is to reverse the standpoint of knowing itself, to reverse the dialectic to expose
the ―determinate‖ and real state of affairs. The idea, it seems, is that if one begins with
something—if one begins from the world and not the concept—then thought will lead to
the necessary negation of ―real‖ state of affairs. For as Lukács writes in History and
Class Consciousness, the essence of all Marxism lies in the fact that the ―[m]aterialist

from the ―knowing‖ to the ―doing‖ as Žižek claims in that text, such that a society knows the truth but acts
otherwise. Yet, it seems that ideology seems to emerge from the dislocating alienation from thought,
activities, and relationships. In other words, ideology has less to do with truth, than it does the
phenomenological relation between subject and object.
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dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic‖ (Lukács 1971, 2).34 Here, we finally come to what
haunts Marx, to what chases him and hunts him into his furious fit of exorcism. What
haunts Marx is the spirit behind the revolutionary potential of the science of materialist
dialectics—Hegel.
Consciousness begins with something, for Marx. As we saw, the human ―suffers‖
objects. In fact, the human not only suffers objects, but is also constituted by these
external objects. Consciousness is sent out of itself by the human need to attain external
objects that will sate this need. I am tempted to say that for Marx, as for Freud in The Ego
and Id, the imprint of one‘s attachment to these objects forms consciousness.35 As we
have seen, Marx argues that under the conditions of capitalism alienation constitutes our
relationship to the objects impressing themselves upon us. Our thought, and thus our very
being, is also alienated. If one starts from the side of the object in the materialist dialectic,
if one begins with some ―thing,‖ and if our relationship to this ―thing‖ is one of alienated
activity, then not only is our thought itself alienated, but the very kernel of our being is
one of alienation as well. In other words if the schema of our activity is founded in the
contradictions of capital, then where does the logic of non-contradiction, the logic that
keeps the dialectic moving, emerge? Thrown into the ―real‖ and ―definite‖ conditions of
alienation, how can we help but be alienated? Yet, nonetheless, in Marx, from this
something a nothing arises, the impending thought of overcoming these conditions of
alienation.
34
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Marx does not want this overcoming to emerge from no ―thing.‖ It cannot arise
from some pre-existing subject or rationality. Rather, as we saw in our reading of
Capital, the ―scandal and abomination‖ of the ―rational‖ form of the dialectic lies in the
fact that it contains both ―the affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, and at
the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking
up‖ (CW 35: 20; W 23: 27). The nothing that will take over the something here does not
begin with the concept or the idea. Rather, it is because the material conditions of capital,
specifically found in our alienation to the objects of our production, contain an inherent
contradiction, that the ―echoes‖ and ―reflexes‖ of this object in our consciousness also
contain this contradiction. Because thought begins with something, and because this
something is contradictory, our thought itself should be contradictory. That is to say, our
thought should be based on the logic of contradiction and not the logic of noncontradiction. If our thought were based on the logic of contradiction, then from where
would it get the ability to recognize contradiction? From where would it get the ability to
operate on the logic of non-contradiction, the very logic that would not only name the
difference of alienation as contradiction, but also demand the overcoming of
contradiction itself? Furthermore, and this seems to be the place where another, more
problematic spirit arises, it is because the impression of the material conditions is
contradictory, that we not only ―recognize‖ the existing state of affairs as contradictory,
but therefore can also ―recognize‖ its negation, its necessary, ―inevitable,‖ negation.
Are not both of these recognitions conjured? In arguing that one can recognize a
contradiction, and thus the negation, or overcoming of that contradiction, have we not
just conjured something, a recognition, from nothing, the necessary presupposition of
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both a non-alienated subject and rationality? Hegel haunts Marx because he cannot
overcome Hegel.
Let me be clear. If humans ―suffer‖ objects and if this suffering propels the
formation of their conscious recognition of the world, and thus thought itself, then if the
human‘s relation to these objects were structured by a separation from these objects, then
this would not be alienation from thought, ideas, or humanness—it would just be the type
of creatures humans are. From what would one be alienated, if not a presupposed
wholeness or naturalness that would, essentially be, according to Marx, no ―thing‖ at all?
And when we talk about recognizing the contradiction of the material conditions because
these conditions form thought are we not creating some ―thing‖ from nothing? Have we
not just conjured the spirit of the human outside of alienation? From where do we
recognize this contradiction? From what standpoint? Certainly not from the standpoint of
materialism. For if we actually played out this materialism, we would not end in the
second recognition, the recognition of negating the current state of affairs, but we would
rather end in the inability to even recognize the contradiction, that is to say a state of
disavowal. In this state reason would not, could not, be constituted by an intolerance of
the logic of non-contradiction—that force that would propel thought to recognize and
then exorcise contradictions and alienation—but rather rationality would be constituted
by contradiction, and would thus remain the unnamed motor from which consciousness
emerges.
When Marx seeks the ―real‖ and the ―definite,‖ he seeks to overturn the priority
of the concept in the Hegelian dialectic, yet he fails to overturn the dialectic itself. A
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spirit that cannot forebear contradiction propels the dialectic.36 Even if one exorcises
these ―things‖ that come from no ―thing,‖ with the ―real‖ material objects that impress
themselves on consciousness, in as much as this relationship contains a recognition of the
contradiction, which propels it to overcome this contradiction, the dialectic will still
retain a trace of the spirit, despite its appeal to the ―real‖ which acts as the critique of
ideological illusion. Thus, the dialectic remains haunted, perhaps not only by rationality,
but one might say a desire for rationality to deliver us from the very same suffering we
inflict on our selves.37 As Abraham and Torok write in ―‗The Lost object—me‘: Notes
on Endocryptic Identification‖: ―Who among us is not battling with specters that implore
Heaven and demand of us their due, while we are beholden to them for our own
salvation?‖ (Abraham and Torok 1994a, 139f.).

II. The Spell of Ideology: Adorno and Kantian Schema

The language of ―spells‖ and ―conjuring,‖ indeed ―bewitchment‖ and ―fetishes,‖
permeates Adorno‘s discussion of ideology. As with Marx, who attempts to disenchant
thought by reorienting the priority of the object in the dialectic, so too will Adorno
approach the spell of ideology by reorienting the dialectic. He too is disturbed by the
ideological conjuring of something from nothing; after all, as he writes in Minima
Moralia: ―[n]o spirit is there [Kein Geist ist da]‖ (MM 260; GS 4: 151). While this
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language is inherited from Marx, Adorno‘s language of bewitchment takes a different
turn, for it is rooted in the dialectical struggle between reason and magic outlined in the
Dialectic of Enlightenment. Given Adorno‘s concern for the development of an
enlightenment science grounded in domination, it is of no surprise that he remains wary
of the ―scientific‖ tendencies of dialectical materialism.38 For what would stop Marx‘s
material dialectics from aligning with a form of reason that has become automated,
fetishistically material, and brutal, indeed a form of logical positivism?39
Nowhere is this concern more evident than in the difference between Adorno and
Marx‘s conceptualization of the ―real‖ to which thought must turn in order to critique
ideology‘s slow march toward destruction. For a form of reason that seeks to uncover the
―real,‖ to grasp its totality with the power of thought, must do so by expelling myth from
thought. Scientific rationality, Adorno and Horkheimer argue is ―protected within the
departments of science from the dreams of a spirit-seer [Geistersehers]‖ and it ―has to
pay the price: world domination [Weltherrschaft] over nature turns against the thinking
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subject itself‖ (DE 20; GS 3: 43). 40 Thought protected from conjurers and spirit-seers
turns in on itself, turns back on the subject; the domination and disenchantment of nature
in science leads only to the subjugation of the subject and its forms of thought. If Adorno
is concerned with rationality compulsively divesting the ―real‖ of spirit, yet still employs
the language of the ―spell‖ and ―bewitchment‖ to describe ideology, then what he means
by the real must be qualitatively different than Marx. In as much as Adorno differs from
Marx on what the spell of ideology is, then so too will he his concept of critique differ
from Marx‘s.
In this section I argue that while Adorno will struggle with Hegel in ways similar
to Marx—or Idealism more broadly—he will distance himself from the tendencies in the
Marxist dialectic that attempt to exorcise spirit though its compulsive convocations of the
―real,‖ the ―actual,‖ the ―determined.‖ And while Adorno, too, will believe that the
creation of something from no ―thing‖ is magic, he will argue these conjured beings still
reflect something real. As a result, he argues critique must be oriented it toward the nonidentical of rationality, i.e., the Kantian ―in-itself‖ which both represents the liberation of
the object from the subject, while simultaneously shaping the contours of the subject‘s
thought. And it will be this shift, from the ―real‖ to the ―non-identical‖ that will offer us a
direction that is helpful in beginning to locate what the framework of a psychoanalytic
critique of political reason. In order to demonstrate the full value of this shift from the
real to the non-identical we must take up Adorno‘s relationship to Kant, and specifically
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the role of the transcendental schematism in thought. Yet, before we can turn to Kant, we
must first take up Adorno‘s relationship to spirit, and thus Marx and Hegel. Again, we
must return to the ―wilderness of the spirit,‖ but perhaps this time it will be a different
wilderness.
In many ways, in Negative Dialectics Adorno makes the same theoretical moves
Marx does in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. As we saw, in this
text Marx argues thought, indeed consciousness itself, emerges from the impression of
external objects. Marx‘s dialectic does not begin with the thought processes grasping the
object as a reflection of itself. Objects are not merely the reflection of conscious
structures. Rather, Marx‘s material dialectic begins by claiming objects impress
themselves on thought. In other words, something—concepts—must come from some
―thing,‖ ―real‖ and ―definite‖ objects or social relations. And this is also the case for
Adorno.
Just as Marx argues the contradictions forming, and propelling, thought itself are
not endemic to thought itself, but rather the reflection of ―definite‖ material social
conditions, so too Adorno argues the contradictions forming the basis of thought are
rooted in ―a most real, antagonistic system in itself [höchst real, antagonistisches
System]‖ (ND 10; GS 6: 22, translation modified). Thus, when the ―knowing subject‖
―rediscovers itself‖ in the reflection of the ―real‖ of material contradiction, what the
subject finds is not necessarily the processes of thought reconfirmed in its relation to the
object, but rather the impressions of the ―real‖ on the structures of its thought. Faced with
the ―knowing subject‘s‖ ―rediscovery‖ of itself through its relationship to the material
contradictions that shape it, Adorno argues:
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[t]he state of obsessively gripping reality [Die zwangshafte Verfassung der
Realität], which idealism had projected onto the region of the subject and the
mind [Subjekt und Geist], must be retranslated [zurückzuübersetzen] from that
region. (ND 10; GS 6: 22, translation modified)
In this sense, for Adorno the forms of thought grasping and presenting objects to the
subject are structured in advance by the material conditions the subject finds itself in. The
task of thought is not to solely recognize its universal functions in the reflection of the
object, but rather is to ―retranslate‖ these forms of thought back into the material
conditions of which they are a reflection. Much like Marx, who will claim that Hegel
misrecognizes the source of alienation in the subject‘s dialectical relationship to the
object, Adorno too will claim that we must translate this ―state of obsessively gripping
reality‖ back into the material conditions that produce this structure, or even desire, of
thought itself. In light of this Adorno argues dialectical thought represents ―the ontology
of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be free of it: neither system
nor contradiction‖ (ND 11; GS 6: 22).
Despite Adorno‘s affinity to Marx, Susan Buck-Morss has noted in The Origin of
Negative Dialectics, Adorno‘ engagement with identity critique is not strictly Marxist
(Buck-Morss 1977, 24). While Buck-Morss locates this difference in the fact that Adorno
never included a theory of political action,‖ I think we can also articulate this difference
in each thinker‘s understanding of spirit (Buck-Morss 1977, 24). As we saw, for Marx,
spirit begins with nothing and creates something. It is an empty being with no ground and
thus no truth. In contrast to Marx, the illusion arising from nothing is simultaneously real
and unreal for Adorno. ―[H]idden‖ in identity, he argues, there is ―a truth moment of
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ideology‖ (ND 149; GS 6: 152). Every spirit reflects what is. The bewitchment of the
subject by these spirits is both ―true, because it forms that ‗ether‘ which Hegel calls spirit;
untrue, because its reason is not reason yet, because its universality is the product of
particular interests‖ (ND 10f.; GS 6: 22). On the one hand, spirit is the residue of the
historical constellation organizing the material conditions of society. Yet, on the other
hand, these forms of thought are not universal; they do not correspond with the promise
of thought because they are no more than the result of a particular historical
organization.41 Spirit is both true and untrue—a claim surpassing the logic of the
excluded middle.42
If thought reflects both the truth and untruth of society, it is necessary, Adorno
argues, to tweak the Marxist inversion of Hegelian dialectics. The dialectic cannot begin
with consciousness grasping the object, as with Hegel. It also cannot simply begin with
the object impressing itself on consciousness, as with Marx, because ―[n]o object is
wholly known‖ (ND 14; GS 6: 25).43 Since objects, for Adorno, ―do not go into their
concepts without leaving a remainder‖ one must begin with that part of the object that
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escapes consciousness (ND 5; GS 6: 17). In other words, one must orient the relationship
between subject and object toward neither the subject nor the object, but rather to the
non-identical, the third escaping both the subject and the appearance of the object.44 This
reorientation shifts the ―direction of conceptuality‖ toward that ―thing‖ which does not
appear, but remains ―real‖ nonetheless (ND 12; GS 6: 24). The shift toward non-identity
is neither dialectics nor dialectical materialism, but rather ―negative dialectics,‖ for
Adorno (ND 12; GS 6: 24).45 This form of dialectics moves away from the ―real‖ of the
Marx‘s dialectic, and thus from the ―spirit‖ of Marx‘s ideology critique, by turning, as we
will see, back to Kant.
Yet, before we get to Kant it is important to note that reorienting the dialectic
toward the non-identical demands that we begin with the truth of illusion. If, unlike
Marx‘s concept of spirit, for Adorno sprit is both true and false, then what is the content
of its truth and falsity? That is to say, if the spell for Marx explains ideology as the belief
in the emergence of something from nothing—a belief which is false—then what is the
spell of ideology if it is the emergence of something from a nothing which is still remains
some ―thing‖?
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Negative Dialectics is one of the few places where Adorno explicitly discusses the
spell as ideology. The ―spell,‖ Adorno claims, is the ―subjective form of the world spirit‖
(ND: 344; GS 6: 337). In this sense it describes the dialectical relationship between the
individual and world spirit, the particular and the universal, this moment and the weight
of history. It describes the traces and imprints of the objective as the subjective emerges
from its dialectical relationship to it. To be under a spell is to be possessed by the ―most
conditioned [allerbedingtesten] spirit of those who have it and cannot even know how
much it is their own‖ (ND 10: GS 6: 22). The individual, thus, emerges from and is
imprinted by objective and material conditions in ways that remain pre-reflective and
unconscious.46 For Adorno, the current world spirit is defined by the technical rationality
of industrial capitalism. Thus, it should be of no surprise that for Adorno the spell
grasping the subject is ―equivalent of the fetish character of the commodity [Ware]. The
self-made thing becomes a thing-in-itself, from which the self cannot escape any more‖
(ND: 346; GS 6: 339, translation modified). The very same logic of exchange
underwriting the market supports our understanding of self. In as much as commodities
appear as an independent entity so too do individuals. We inflect our experience of
ourselves and the world through the commodity‘s metaphysical logic. As a result we
imprison both the world and ourselves in our experience of them as reified, universal, and
exchangeable things. In other words the spell of ideology for Adorno describes the
incanting rhythms of how capital has structured not only the material conditions but also
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appearance itself. We, like the commodity, appear to ourselves as things in ourselves; we,
like the commodity, appear as autonomous entities; we, like the commodities we
produce, appear exchangeable, replaceable, disposable.
In as much as capital has structured the becoming of appearance, and in as much
as this appearance rests on the exclusion of the non-identical, then it makes sense that
Adorno not only turns the very conditions of appearance, but also specifically to Kant‘s
discussion of the conditions of appearance in the Critique of Pure Reason. Specifically,
Kant‘s description of the phenomenal character of the relation between subject and
object, explains for Adorno, the ideological infusion of the subject with ―opaque,
mediated, and mitigated power relations‖ (GS 8: 466, my translation).47 To further
elucidate this bewitchment, we must turn more explicitly to Adorno‘s understanding of
the relationship between our faculties and the material organization of society, and thus to
Kantian schematism.
In making the distinction between what appears and the ―real,‖ or an object initself, Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason critiques the illusion of reason by delimiting the
boundaries of knowledge to which we can legitimately lay claim. This distinction
between what appears and the object-itself is predicated on the subject‘s a priori
temporalization of space. What is brought into space and time appears and what is not
does not appear for the subject. For as we all now, for Kant schematism brings together
the understanding and the intuition through transcendental time determination. Although
there will be an extended discussion of this function in the second chapter, suffice it to
say for now that for Kant, transcendental schematism presents a ―rule for determining our
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intuition in accordance with such and such a general concept‖ (Kant, CPR A141/ B180).
The problem for determining this rule, for Kant, is that the foundations for manifold of
intuition and the concepts of the understanding are radically heterogeneous. For Adorno,
this is a question of how matter and form come together. He positions Kant‘s question in
the chapter on schematism as ―how it is possible for knowledge to be not just something
alien to its object but also the truth because it adapts itself to the nature of what it is
classifying the nature of what is immediately given‖ (Adorno, KCPR 2001, 131).48
Concepts belong to the understanding, which is grounded in the a priori determinations
of the categories of understanding. Intuition presents the understanding with the manifold
of empirical determinations. Having their foundations in heterogeneous functions of the
subject, Kant must explain how the manifold of the intuition and the concepts of the
understanding come together in such a way as to present objects to the subject.
For Kant, schematism bridges these heterogeneous processes. The pure intuition
of transcendental time determination, as schematism, zips together, as it were, human
experience. The a priori temporal ordering conditioning experience is the third that brings
together the pure concepts of the understanding with the objects of experience.
Schematism, thus, becomes an essential element in Kant‘s account of how concepts are
brought to the intuition, because schematism explains the ground upon which both the
understanding and the intuition are compatible. They become compatible because the a
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priori temporal structure that allows for an object to appear prepares both the concept for
the manifold of intuition as well as preparing the manifold of intuition for the concept.
The question of how they meet, and exactly how the pure intuition of time sets up this
rendezvous, remains as Kant famously writes, ―a secret art residing in the depths of the
human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay
bare before ourselves‖ (CPR A142/ B181).
For Adorno, the merger between the intuition and concepts is not necessarily a
―secret art.‖ Since intuitions are distinct from concepts one must ask how they come
together. But when Kant does ask this, Adorno argues Kant cannot help but concede that
it occurs through thought adapting to the object itself. Adorno, thus reads a material
moment into Kantian schematism a material moment, where the in-itself, the ―nonidentical‖ makes itself felt in thought despite of all of the subjective mediation defining
Kant‘s project (KCPR 2001, 133). In other words, the schematism is where thought
touches things; thus Adorno wonders if this is where Kant does ―justice to the given
instead of simply dictating to it brutally‖ (KCPR 2001, 133).
If we take this moment of the ―non-identical‖ seriously for Adorno, then we can
see that what was a ―secret‖ for Kant ―has been unraveled‖ (DE: 98; GS 3: 146f.). If we
want to find the spontaneity of thought itself, this spontaneity will not be found in
thought‘s relationship to the object per se. Rather we would have to look in the places
where the non-identical would touch thought by means of transcendental time
determination. Yet, because this merger is structured in advance by the fetishistic logic of
capital that obeys the strict schema of identity, this place is foreclosed in advance. That is
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to say that schematism under the auspices of capital works against the spontaneity of the
subject that would resist the fetishistic appearances it engenders.49 In fact, Adorno claims
[t]he active contribution, which Kantian Schematism still expected of subjects—
that they should, from the first, relate sensuous multiplicity to fundamental
concepts is denied to the subject by industry. It purveys schematism as its first
service to the customer. According to Kantian schematism, a secret mechanism
within the psyche [geheimer Mechanismus in der Seele] preformed immediate
data to fit them into the system of pure reason. (DE: 98; GS 3: 146f.)
The schema rendering the world sensible to the subject is the same one organizing the
modes of production in capitalism. In fact this pre-figuring of the world is the very first
―product‖ that the culture industry provides to subjects. For Adorno schematization
reflects the structure of the rationality propelling the modes of production in industrial
capitalism. One could say material objects and concepts merge—forming the experience
of the subject—in ways that propel capital. Kant‘s description of the schematism of the
understanding and the categories of consciousness ―is undoubtedly the index of a specific
state of the self-consciousness of spirit and at the same time as a mediated stage in the
history of thought‖ (KCPR 2001, 136). In this sense, the spell of ideology grasping the
subject schematizes concepts and materiality through the temporal logic of commodity
fetishism. Just as the logic of the fetish rests on the abstraction of its materiality so that it
can enter into the symbolic relationships of exchange, so too does the logic organizing
schematism begin to abstract sensuous materiality so as to ready it for exchange. What
appears is only what is subjected to a model of temporality reflecting the schema of
49
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capital itself. As Adorno writes, the Kantian categories reflect the world in which we live;
―it is the world of exchange, the world of commodities, the world of reified human
relations that confront us, presenting us with a façade of objectivity, a second nature‖
(KCPR 2001, 137). What appears is false because it is based on a violent abstraction of
particular qualities. And in this sense the truth of appearance becomes what does not
appear, that which has been left out of the illusory fetishization of appearance itself: the
non-identical. One can, thus, map the negative impression of the non-identical within
appearance because ideological illusion is simultaneously true and false.
Our experience of the world becomes inflected by the logic and rhythm of the
commodity fetish, because our ability to allow sensuous materiality to touch the
understanding is silenced in advance by the process of abstraction equating all sensuous
materiality.50 For instance, the pre-figuration of the world in alignment with the logic of
commodity fetishism can be seen, according to Adorno, in that ―familiar experience of
the moviegoer, who perceives the street outside as continuation of the film he has just
left‖ (DE 99; GS 3: 147). One experiences the world according to the characters, plots,
rhythms, temporalities, scoured over and abstracted to appeal to the most possible people,
for the ―universal‖ consumer. In this way, ―all appearance [Erscheinende] is so
thoroughly stamped [gestempelt] that nothing can occur that does not bear in advance the
trace of the jargon, that is not seen at first glance to be approved‖ (DE 101; GS 3: 149,
translation modified). The very becoming of appearance itself is ―stamped‖ in advance to
us via the schematism of capitalism. The term gestempelt is tricky here. While it can
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Deborah Cook discusses this introjection of the modes of production in terms of Adorno‘s relationship to
Freudian Psychoanalysis in ―The Sundered Totality: Adorno‘s Freudo-Marxism,‖ Journal for the Theory of
Social Behavior 25, no. 2 (1995): 191-215.
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mean stamped as ―imprint‖ or ―impression,‖ it can also mean stamped as ―postmarked.‖
Given Adorno‘s use of Kantian schema, and the context of the sentence in which this
―stamping‖ of ―appearances‖ happens in advance, it might make more sense to
understand this sense of ―stamping‖ in terms of a postmark. That is to say, that since the
conditioning of these appearances happens a priori, unconsciously even, one could speak
of them being sent in advance of the subject, or in advance and to the subject, instead of
as imprinted in the subject.51 And indeed, this aligns with Adorno‘s claim that through
the pre-figuration of the world through the schema of the modes of production the
appearance of the world is ―passed through the filter of the culture industry‖ (DE 99: GS
3: 147).52 Stamping in advance secures the necromancy and magic of the spell of
ideology for Adorno. For as Adorno argues in Dialectic of Enlightenment, we have been
―bewitched [verhext] by the objectification of mind‖ (DE 21; GS 3: 45).53
What comes to us before ourselves in the schema of production under? What spell
has reified our thought? As we have seen, for Adorno the logic of fetishism has ordered
the concepts of the understanding, thus it has inflecting the appearance of the world. All
appearances are exchangeable because they are abstracted from their contexts. Our
thought is alienated, because it is first and foremost the reflection of the fetishistic logic
underpinning the exchange of commodities under capital. But what does it mean to claim
that fetishism stamps our appearance in advance, thus unconsciously capturing our
51

In many senses this is what Althusser means by his Lacanian interpretation of the concept of ideology.
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Or as Adorno writes: ―The culture industry snatches up these tendencies [that] strengthens and validates
them, while the insubordinate either stay away or are explicitly discarded. [Sie greift diese Tendenzen auf,
verstärkt und bestätigt sie, während alles Unbotmäßige entweder wegbleibt oder ausdrücklich verworfen
wird” (GS 8: 476, my translation).
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For an excellent analysis of the concept of reification from Lukács forward see: Axel Honneth,
―Reification and Recognition: A New Look at an Old Idea,‖ in Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea, ed.
Martin Jay (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17-96.
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engagement with the world and its objects? This stamping is simultaneously a denial and
displacement.54 It denies, or perhaps disavows as we will see in the third chapter, what
resists and falls outside of the temporal synthesis that conditions appearance itself. It then
displaces this disavowal in order to guarantee that what appears is all there is, that the
concept has presented the object. Thus the spell of fetishism conjures some ―thing‖
(appearance) from no ―thing‖ (that which falls outside of temporal synthesis), yet, this no
―thing‖ still remains a ―thing‖ (the disavowed ground of appearance itself). And one can
see this ―thing,‖ this nothing, in the spirit that appears before us. Thus ―false
consciousness‖ should no longer to be understood as a ―crystallized blind and anonymous
social process itself‖; instead today it represents ―the tailored science of society‖
(Adorno, GS 8: 474f., my translation).55 This active grasping that ―obsessively grips
reality‖ by excising a part of this reality will form the heart not only of the spell, but also
explain how the possession of the spell affects us, how we have in some sense become
the brutality of capital.
The universal processes of exchange, grounded in the capitalist modes of
production, inflect thought, slowly erasing the ―spontaneous activity‖ of the non-identical
at the hinge of schematism between concepts and sensuality. Adorno thus comes to the
conclusion that the destruction of the ―secret art‖ of schematism is ―the violence [Die
Gewalt] of industrial society‖ that becomes ―imprinted on [wirkt in] people once and for
all‖ (DE: 100; GS 3: 148 translation modified). The logic of the fetish is the indelible
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This is similar to Althusser‘s anti-humanist articulation of the concept of ideology.
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―Das gesellschaftlich bedingte falsche Bewußtsein von heute ist nicht mehr objektiver Geist, auch in dem
Sinne, daß es keineswegs blind, anonym aus dem gesellschaftlichen Prozeß sich kristallisiert, sondern
wissenschaftlich auf die Gesellschaft zugeschnitten wird.‖
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stamp of capital sending abstracted figurations of the world in advance of the subject.
The procrustean logic of exchange forming the backbone of the commodity becomes the
mode for how the subject judges, experiences, and comes to know both the world and
oneself once it has been internalized. It is a machine, a stamping machine perhaps—one
constantly catching the subject as it attempts to experience the world from the gap
between concepts and materiality, one that obviates this alienating gap by ―compulsively‖
securing it, covering it over, by sending a pre-packaged version to the subject in advance
of itself.
The internalization of this denial of the non-identical not only violently excises
particularity in appearance, but also violently excises particularity in one‘s reflexive
experience of self. And one can see this in Minima Moralia, where Adorno uses the
psychoanalytic concepts of the death drive and projection to think through the
internalization of this violence. He writes
[o]nly when the process that begins with the metamorphosis of labour-power into
a commodity has permeated men through and through and objectified each of
their impulses as a priori commensurable variations of the exchange relationship,
is it possible for life to reproduce itself under the dominant relations of
production. Its consummate organization demands the coordination of people that
are dead. The will to live depends on the negation [Verneinung] of the will to
live.‖ (MM 229; GS 4: 261; translation modified) 56
For Adorno, to be the subject of the ideological spell under modern capital is to kill
oneself while telling oneself that one is alive. One becomes the living dead, which is no
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This is Joe Weiss‘ translation.
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more than an immunization that takes in the brutal logic of capital in order to inoculate
the subject to the brutality of his or her material conditions. Through the internalization
of the modern modes of production we are seized by a logic propelling life by its
negation—a principle, as we will see in the next chapter, clearly outlined in the Freud‘s
Beyond the Pleasure Principle.57 In experiencing the world we are compelled to reify,
harden, it and ourselves. To become a subject, to live in and negotiate the world under
these conditions, is to simultaneously hollow out experience and to murder what is living
and ―spontaneous‖ in our own subjectivity. Or as Adorno writes in Negative Dialectics
―the subject is spent and impoverished in its categorical performance […] the subject
must dilute itself to the point of mere universality‖ (ND 139; GS 6: 142f.) One becomes a
subject by dissolving into a schema that abstracts particularity for the purposes of
exchange.
Having become the living dead through the internalization of schema of capital,
subjects project this internalized, murdering ―whatever to them seems living‖ so that it
―shall resemble themselves‖ (MM 231; GS 4: 262). Or one could imagine Adorno
rhetorically asking: ―Having become a subject by virtue of the internalization of the
violence of the capital, how can one help but be violent‖?58 Spellbound by the
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See Freud‘s metaphorical discussion of the development of the cortical layer in chapter four of Beyond
the Pleasure Principle. Taking the development of simplified living organism as he starting point, Freud
will write that ―It would be easy to suppose, then, that as a result of the ceaseless impact of external stimuli
on the surface of the vesicle, its substance to a certain depth may have become permanently modified […]
A crust would thus be formed which would at last have been so thoroughly ‗baked through‘‖ that it would
create easy pathways for interpreting certain stimuli (Freud, SE 18: 26; GW 13: 25).
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For Axel Honneth reification represents the forgetting of a prior moment of recognition, and it is this
forgetting that allows us to act brutally against people conceived of in advance instead of in light of
recognition. Speaking of Nazi practices, Honneth writes ―[e]ven today it is difficult to comprehend reports
describing how young men could nonchalantly shoot hundreds of Jewish children and women in the back
of the head. And elements of such horrifying practices can also be found in all the genocides that marked
the end of the twentieth century. If we as humans relate to each other though antecedent recognition, a fact
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mechanical rhythms of modern capital that demand the ―coordination‖ of the living dead,
ideology then becomes the experience of being unknowingly seized by the violent logic
of capital in ways that we do not recognize, resulting in an unconscious repetition of its
violence on others, the world, and ourselves.59
In general, Adorno‘s language of the spell describes commodity fetishism as a
transcendental schema pre-figuring the world for abstract exchange. According to
Adorno, the schema of the fetish is a ―technical rationality‖ reflecting the ―compulsive
character of a society alienated [entfremdeten] from itself‖ (DE 95; GS 3: 142). The
technical rationality conditioning the experience of the world is the compulsive attempt to
cover over the alienation of the non-identical instituted by the modes of production in
industrial capitalism. Ideology is the attempt to compulsively cover over this alienation
by collapsing appearance with ontological status. In a different register, we might say that
ideology closes the phenomenal divide between subject and object, forcing the object into
the subjective construction of its appearance. And the danger lies, as Adorno writes in his
1954 essay ―Contribution to the Theory of Ideology,‖ in the fact that with this collapse
between what is and what ought to be, it makes the current state of affairs appear as
―beyond the integration of all transcendence and all critique‖ (GS 8: 476, my
translation).60 The dialectical relationship between concepts and materiality no longer
define experience, rather the positivism declaring the tautology: what is is all there is
of which I am certain, then these mass murders raise the question as to how we can explain the vanishing or
‗forgetting‘ of this previous recognition‖ (Honneth 2008b, 158).
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We will see how this unconscious repetition engendered by the framework of the categories of the
understanding will play out in terms of slavery and prisons in the United states in chapter four.
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The full sentence is: ―Wollte man in einem Satz zusammendrängen, worauf eigentlich die Ideologie der
Massenkultur hinausläuft, man müßte sie als Parodie des Satzes: ‗Werde was du bist‘ darstellen: als
überhöhende Verdoppelung und Rechtfertigung des ohnehin bestehenden Zustandes, unter Einbeziehung
aller Transzendenz und aller Kritik.‖
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defines experience. Appearance under the aegis of fetishism eschews the moment of
critique that would demand what is is not all there is.61 In other words, ideology fixes
thought ―in the beliefless belief of pure existence [glaubenslosen Glauben an die pure
Existenz]‖ (GS 8: 476, my translation).62 Thus, for Adorno, ideology does not just
describe the alienating facture we experience in our relationship to the world and our
selves, but rather, one might say, it is the internalization of the fetish as the transcendental
logic of appearance in general. Because the fetish pre-figures the becoming of appearance
in Adorno‘s understanding of ideology, and because appearance is both true and false for
Adorno, the nature of ideology critique is different in Adorno‘s work than it is in Marx‘s.
And it is from this difference that we might begin to form the starting point for a critique
of political rationality.
As we saw, in Marx‘s work ideology critique is aimed at the real, a real that when
taken as the starting point of thought punctures the illusions, and thus subservience,
forming the backbone of capitalism. For Adorno, thought must also be turned toward the
real, but the status of this real, as the non-identical, is slightly different than in Marx‘s
work. The real, for Adorno, is that which is, but that which does not appear. While this
might seem similar to Marx, and in many senses it is, there is an important difference.
Ideological illusion for Marx covers over the real. The real can thus be recognized; it can
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Given not only Adorno‘s explicit claim that the idea of no transcendence is ideology rooted in base
positivism, but also the fact that Adorno adheres to the spirit of Hegel, a spirit that remains both true and
false, one might wonder how Joel Whitebook could argue in his essay ―Weighty Objects: On Adorno‘s
Kant-Freudian Interpretation‖ that in Negative Dialectics ―Adorno brilliantly (and repetitiously) elucidates
the same aporia from innumerable angels but never gets beyond it. My claim is that the concept of
sublimation would have allowed him to get beyond this situation. And although he implicitly makes use of
the concept he cannot embrace it; sublimation apparently lacks the requisite negativity and comes too close
to a Hegelian notion of reconciliation‖ (Whitebook 2004, 52).
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Or, as Martin Jay writes in ―The Frankfurt School Critique of Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of
Knowledge,‖ ―[a]nything smacking of ontology was itself ideological‖ for Adorno (Jay 1974, 86).
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be known despite and outside of the ideological configuration of appearance itself. In fact
is the only way to break the illusions supporting capitalism is to conjure up the ―real.‖
For Adorno, the real is known not by its appearance, but rather by its absence; it is that
which has been left outside of the conceptual configuration of space and time and thus is
more than just simply subjected to the misdirection of recognition itself. For under the
current constellation forming the schema of thought the non-identical is the necessary
occlusion forming what appears. For just as material alienation forms the schema of
thought for Marx, so too does the mechanism of occlusion present in commodity
fetishism form the schema not only of thought but also of appearance for Adorno. Now
since thought and appearance itself is formed by occlusion, then the real, that which is
but does not appear cannot be recognized by a prior form of thought, but rather from the
internally, and material, contradictions within the formation of appearance itself.
Breaking the spell of ideology in Adorno occurs not solely through the power of
recognition, but rather with the immanent and ambivalent figuration of the world through
the logic of the commodity. This is to say that despite the fact that the culture industry‘s
grasp on schematism there lies hope in ideology critique. In a world where all
appearances are flattened out and serve capital, the capacity for ideology critique begins
with the truth embedded within these reified appearances. In other words, ideology
critique concerns the immanent confrontation of the falsity of experience with its own
truth (GS 8: 474). Since the spell conjures spirits that are both true and false, since
ideology is not just the negation of materiality, the immanent structuring of appearance
itself is contradictory. In other words, for Adorno, the ideological pre-figuration of the
world carries its own seed of destruction. ―It is not altogether unlikely,‖ as Adorno writes
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in Negative Dialectics, ―that the spell is thus breaking itself‖ (ND 346; GS 6: 339).63 But
in what way might the spell break itself, and what is the job of thought, of critical
thought, in the face of this spell that breaks itself?
Since the thought that grasps the world is a reflection of the schema of the modes
of production, and since these modes of production are constituted by contradiction, then
the contradictions of thought will be no more than the mere reflection of the
contradictions of the material conditions. Thus, the immanent nature of the contradictions
of society will reflect themselves in not only how the subject grasps the world, but also in
the appearance of the world that the subject grasps. Spirit is both true and false. As we
saw earlier:
[t]he subjective preconception of the material production process in society—
fundamentally different from its theoretical constitution—is the unresolved part,
the part unreconciled with its subjects. Their own reason, unconscious
[bewußtlos] like the transcendental subject and establishing identity by barter,
remains incommensurable with the subjects it reduces to the same denominator:
the subject as the subject‘s foe. The preceding generality is both true and untrue:
true, because it forms that ‗ether‘ which Hegel calls spirit; untrue, because its
reason is no reason yet, because its universality is the product of particular
interests.‖ (ND 10f.; GS 6: 22, translation modified)

63

In ―The Lament over Reification‖ Gillian Rose explains this idea as Adorno‘s attempt to choose ―a hard
path between Benjamin‘s view of history as the corruption of the world, and Lukács‘ view of history
according to which reconcilement between subject and object can be ‗imputed‘ as the end of history.
Adorno‘s position is encapsulated in the aphorism ‗Universal history must be construed and denied.‘ It
must be construed because it is the only perspective from which the socio-historical formation of society
and thought can be grasped; it must be denied because the world has no telos and capitalism has developed
new means of enslavement, not of liberation‖ (Rose 2007, 170).
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The constellation of appearance itself would point negatively toward what has been
excluded. The subject‘s thought is antagonistic to the subject itself. Its reason, as a
reflection of the material conditions, is ―incommensurable‖ with the subject. As we saw,
this stamping in advance, creates the subject as the living dead, as the living that must cut
away at itself in order to survive, through the fetishistic logic of abstraction forcing the
subject to disavow and displace that part of itself that does not adhere to the logic of the
modes of production. What falls outside of the logic of appearance supporting the modes
of production, returns, negatively of course, and haunts the production of appearance and
subjectivity. Simply put, the logic of fetishism is inimical to the subject it produces, and
in the production of that subject it creates a contradiction within the subject that can only
break itself, because it promises a form of subjectivity that it fundamentally denies the
subject. It promises freedom by coercing. It promises universality through particular
historical conditions. What remains, that which is ―real‖ but does not appear, returns to
unsettle the stasis of these contradictions.
In the face of this not only might the spell break itself, but also the fetishistic logic
of thought must be resisted by reconfiguring it toward the non-identical. One must begin
with neither the subject nor the object, but that which the fetishistic logic of capital expels
from appearance, with the non-identical. This ―negative‖ dialectic would begin with no
―thing‖ that is some ―thing.‖ And it would be the conjuration of this ―real‖ that does not
appear that would lead to the disenchantment of the spell of ideology. He concludes that
by making this shift we can gain an ―insight into the constitutive character of the
nonconceptual in the concept,‖ and thus philosophy can ―end the compulsive
identification [Identitätzwang] which the concept brings unless it is halted by such

70

reflection‖ (ND 12; GS 6: 24). For, as Adorno writes ―knowledge is not supposed to
prepare the phantasm [Phantasma] of a whole‖ (ND 14; GS 6: 25). Just as the
presentation of principles as thought they were objects of experience forms the basis of
transcendental illusion for Kant, so too will the phantasm of the whole become the
cauldron of the ideological illusion capturing the thought processes, for Adorno Negative
dialectics are, of course, as Adorno writes a ―[d]isenchantment [Entzauberung] of the
concept‖ which is the ―antidote [Gegengift] of philosophy‖ (ND 13; GS 6: 24). This
disenchantment occurs when we reorient the conceptual to the non-identical that lies
within it—the very resistance to identity at the heart of identity. This reorientation would
exorcise a reified spirit that comes to the object and instead investigate the ―real‖ no
―thing‖ that emerges from the particularity of a historical constellation of things. As
Adorno writes, we must orient the dialectic to a ―diversity not wrought by any schema; to
those objects philosophy would truly give itself rather than use them as a mirror in which
to reread itself, mistaking its own image for concretion‖ (ND 13; GS 6: 25).

III. Beyond Spirits: Failed Exorcisms and the Non-identical

The language of specters is embroidered throughout the texts of Marx and
Adorno. At each moment Marx and Adorno conjure up these ghosts, the experiences of
mysticism and mystery, the concept of ideology is present. And as we have seen this
conjunction between the language of spells and the concept of ideology is neither
accidental, nor merely rhetorical. Rather, this language is central to their understanding of
ideology and its possible dissolution. In response to these spells, Adorno and Marx are
keen on reorienting the dialectic toward the ―real.‖ And as we have seen, ideology
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critique is, thus, centered on reorienting thought toward the real so that it may overcome
the illusions politics, the illusions of reason.
They differ, however, on the status of the real, and this has great consequences on
how they conceptualize ideology and the form of its critique. By following out these
differences we might be able to move toward the function of the non-identical in critique.
Since the ―real‖ for Marx represents the material conditions, some ―definite‖ thing, then
to dispel the spirits of ideology means directing thought back to this ―definite‖ and ―real‖
thing, back toward the material conditions of thought. For Adorno, the case is different.
For the ―real‖ is the remainder of thought, that part of the object that does not appear, that
is not schematized. Thus for Adorno to redirect thought back to the ―real‖ is not to
redirect back to the ―definite‖ but rather back to the non-identical, or those places where
thought touches the non-identical.
Because they differ on what defines the ―real‖ their conceptions of overcoming
the spell of ideology differ. For Marx, the overcoming of ideology conjures another spirit.
For, as we saw, if the concepts of consciousness are structured by material conditions,
and if these material conditions are contradictory, then consciousness itself must also be
contradictory. Yet, if consciousness is contradictory, then how does it recognize its own
contradictions? To put it in another register, if the material conditions that structure
thought do not recognize the logic of non-contradiction, then how can thought access this
logic, such that a recognition, and then overcoming, of contradiction could ever occur,
unless we presuppose the spirit of a rationality based on the logic of contradiction, which
appeals to a pre-existing unity of consciousness. This specter of rationality lodged in the
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heart of materialist dialectics, this haunting of a pre-existing form of thought, sends Marx
into his fits of failed exorcisms.
Yet, Adorno is not haunted by spirits in the same way that Marx is. Adorno does
not furiously seek to cast out the very same spirits that haunt him. Rather, for Adorno, we
must read the negative impression of the spirit, that place where the non-identical affects
a form of thought that constructs appearance as fetishes. Yet how does the non-identical
make itself ―felt‖ within a ―space defined entirely by the subject (KCPR 2001, 131)? For
Adorno, the construction of this form of thought will immanently undo itself; it is, as
Derrida might say it is ―autoimmune.‖64 One the one hand, this form of thought promises
the technical mastery of nature, and the world, a mastery that can only set one free. Yet,
simultaneously, the subject is not free, because this mastery turns in on the subject. The
very same mastery that conquers the forces of nature, simultaneously conquers the
subject. And it is in the subject‘s thought obsessively gripping objects, that the negative
impression of the non-identical touches the schema, affecting thought itself, slowly
cracking appearance, as appearance itself becomes more rigid. And while there may be
aspects of this immanent dissolution of the reified spirits of appearance that remain
haunted by the same rationality that Marx remains haunted by, Adorno‘s indication of the
non-identical, sets up a crucial project for political thought, thus acting as a fundamental
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Derrida first defines autoimmunity in a footnote in his essay ―Faith and Knowledge.‖ In this text he
attempts to explain a logic of self-destructive protection along the lines of a biological model. He writes
that this process consists in a ―living organism‖ ―protecting itself against its self-protection by destroying
its own immune system‖ (Derrida 1998, 73). In Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, Derrida claims that the
logic of autoimmunity points not only to a ―harming or ruining oneself, indeed destroying one‘s own
protections,‖ a certain kind of suicide, but also and, ―more seriously still,‖ it consists in ―threatening the I
[moi] or the self [soi], the ego or the autos, ipseity itself, compromising the immunity of the autos itself‖
(Derrida 2005, 45). Autoimmunity demonstrates how the attempts to shore up the sovereignty of the ego,
the autonomy of the individual, to protect a notion of a self that remains the master of itself, undercut the
very thing it was meant to protect: the self, the ego, the power and mastery of the sovereign.
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hinge between political thought‘s attempt to think the non-identical and psychoanalysis.
Thus, in order to explore this question, let us then turn to that nothing that remains
something, that which negatively impresses itself on thought itself, the non-identical in
psychoanalysis.
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Chapter Two
The Spirit of Repression:
The Return of Kant in Freud
The liberation of the past does not end in its reconciliation with the present. Against the selfimposed restraint of the discover, the orientation on the past tends toward an orientation on the
future. The recherche du temps perdu becomes the vehicle of future liberation.
--Herbert Marcuse, Civilization and its Discontents

Sparked by the fantasy of a politics buried in psychoanalysis, political thought has
often taken up the question of the non-identical and alienation through the paradigms of
repression. 65 For what else could be the no ―thing‖ that is something other than what has
been repressed?66 Does not repression form the void structuring appearance itself? Are
not the drives themselves subject to a form of ―surplus repression‖ structured by the
material conditions of capital, as Marcuse argues in Eros and Civilization (Marcuse 1974,
35)? Is not the fracture in being the reflection of the material conditions of this surplus
repression?67 Can we not speak of repressed moments in our collective history, moments
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too traumatic to integrate and metabolize through in the public and political sphere, as
Cathy Caruth does in Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History?68 Is not
the repressed that which returns, thus remaining uncanny, that part of ourselves alienating
us from ourselves as Julia Kristeva reminds us in Strangers to Ourselves? In other words,
is not the repressed that which ―is,‖ but does not appear, that which political thought if it
wants to critique its unfettered dream of liberation founded in rational mastery must turn
toward?
In this chapter I will take up the question of whether the non-identical is
equivalent to the repressed. While the analogy between the repressed and the nonidentical is quite tempting, I am not sure the psychoanalytic concept of repression can do
this work. Specifically, as we will see, the concept of repression is based on a similar
form of rationality as political overcoming—an underlying hope that all can be resolved,
that liberation will come, and that all forms of alienation are just an expression of the
wrong state of affairs. And in this sense, while the repressed is, and should remain, an
important concept for political thought, it is not the place from which a critique centered
on the non-identical should begin. To understand the force of this claim, we must first
turn to the unconscious characteristic of the repressed, which means we must turn to the
metapsychological relationships between time and the unconscious.69
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In this chapter I argue the concept of repression is metapsychologically rooted in
a form of rationality that assumes a linear model of temporality. In as much as this model
of temporality renders repression subject to therapy, then so too will can repression be
rationalized, so too can it be overcome. In order to support this claim, we must first return
to Freud‘s Kantian inheritance, by examining the relationship between cognition and time
in Kant. Second, I will demonstrate how Kantian schematism influences Freud‘s concept
of the drives and thus repression, arguing that repression disrupts a linear model of time
and therefore presupposes a linear model of time. Finally, I argue that because of
repression‘s presupposition of a linear model of time we must rethink what is radical
about the temporality of Nachträglichkeit. Rather than orienting critique from the axis of
linear and non-linear temporality, I argue the orientation of the non-identical in
psychoanalysis must operate from the axis of time and timelessness. It is from the former
that one finds liberation from the past and it is from the latter one confronts the limits of
the therapeutic situation. This means, as I argue in the third chapter, changing the
constellation of psychoanalytic concepts from repression and toward the concept that
poses the limits of the therapeutic situation: disavowal.
―‗So muss denn doch die Hexe dran!—the Witch Metapsychology‖ (SE 23:
225).70
I. Kant and the Timeless Unconscious

69

Freud defines metapsychological as the collation of the three different ways of discussing the workings
of the psyche: economic, dynamic, and topographical. See (SE 14: 181).
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Alan Bass uses this quotation as the starting point for his paper ―Time and the Witch: Femininity,
Metapsychology and the Temporality of the Unconscious,‖ MLN 91, no. 5, Centennial Issue:
Responsibilities of the Critic (Oct. 1976): 871-912.
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Freud hinted at the timeless nature of the unconscious as early as his 1895 Studies
on Hysteria written with Josef Breuer. It was a hypothesis he carried throughout his
career, even in his shift from the first to the second topography, that helped explain the
strange temporality of repression. For how else could the repressed collapse the
experience of the past and the present for the subject if the repressed were not located in
an unconscious that was not part of the linear progression of time—unless the
unconscious was, in fact, timeless. Freud‘s hypothesis has lead some, like Jacques Lacan
and Jean Laplanche to claim that the unconscious is outside of time, because it is time
itself.71 Freud‘s claim has lead others, such as Alan Bass to argue the unconscious is not
outside of time, but rather composed of a discontinuous temporality.72 Others have just
discarded Freud‘s hypothesis, claiming that it is not only inconsistent, but also not helpful
in the analytic situation. I would like to suggest that that the key to understanding Freud‘s
hypothesis about the timeless nature of the unconscious and its relationship to repression,
is Kant.
The fact that Freud appealed to Kant throughout his career is widely known, but it
is rarely taken seriously. Just think of Jean Laplanche‟s claim in “Temporality and
Translation,” where he argues Freud‟s references were rooted in “a debased, a sort of
ready-made Kantianism such as was in currency” at the time (Laplanche 1989, 243).73
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Lacan‘s reading of the timeless nature of the unconscious is inflected through Hegel. Lacan writes, that
the unconscious is ―located outside time exactly like the concept, because it is itself time, the pure time of
the thing [le temps pur de la chose]‖ (Lacan, S1: 243; L1: 267). This distinction is so primary, between
Freud and Lacan on the timeless nature of the unconscious, that I would say it is one of the differentiating
factors of their theoretical systems.
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See Alan Bass, ―Time and the Witch: Femininity, Metapsychology and the Temporality of the
Unconscious,‖ MLN 91, no. 5, Centennial Issue: Responsibilities of the Critic (Oct. 1976): 871-912.
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When it is taken seriously thinkers analogize the unconscious with the unknowable, but
assumed existence, of the transcendental unity of apperception in the “Deduction” of
Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason 74 or they focus on Freud‟s Kantian methodology of
deducing the unconscious from existing symptoms.75 Both of these approaches begin
with Kant‟s claim that the transcendental unity of apperception cannot be subject to the
conditions for the possibility of presentation, and end by claiming Freud‟s concept of the
unconscious follows out and modifies the consequences of a subject that cannot know its
self.76 Essential to these arguments is the relationship between Kant‟s use of temporality
to explain the phenomenal split in appearance and Freud‟s claim about the timeless
nature of the unconscious. Thus, for Freud they conclude, just as for Kant, the subject is
split from its self and this split is defined by time.
In this section I will argue that to ground the timeless nature of the unconscious in
Kant's transcendental unity of apperception is to misunderstand not only Freud's
relationship to Kant, but also to misunderstand the a-temporal nature of the unconscious.
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One could also think of Charles Hanly‘s argument in ―A Problem with Freud‘s Idea of the Timelessness
of the Unconscious‖ where he claims that Freud‘s references to ―the timelessness of the unconscious are
empirically mistaken and hearken back to the narcissistic longing for indications of the immutable and
timeless in human nature‖ (Hanly 2009, 22).
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For a variety of approaches to this analogy see: Adrian Johnston, Time Driven: Metapsychology and the
Splitting of the Drive (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2005); Nishad Patnaik, ―Fetishism and
its Relation to Time,‖ Social Scientist 34, no. 9/10 (Sep. – Oct., 2006): 72-93; Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and
Cruelty, in Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty & Venus in Furs, 9-142 (New York: Zone Books, 1991).
75

For example see: Bettina Bergo, ―Psychoanalytic Models: Freud‘s Debt to Philosophy and His
Copernican Revolution,‖ in The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, ed. Jennifer Radden (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 338-350; Alfred I. Tauber, Freud, the Reluctant Philosopher (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Alfred I. Tauber, ―Freud‘s Dream of Reason: The Kantian Structure
of Psychoanalysis,‖ History of the Human Sciences 22, no. 4 (2009): 1-29.
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For example see: Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Adrian Johnston,
Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
2005); Alan Bass, Difference and Disavowal: The Trauma of Eros (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2000), 84-85; for a discussion of this in terms of Kant and the Cartesian ―cogito‖ see: Cogito and the
Unconscious, ed. Slavoj Žižek (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
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For as I will show in the next section Freud appeals to Kant to demonstrate the
phenomenal character of the drives, which creates the division between the conscious and
unconscious, a division further supported by repression. Yet to get there, we must first
meet Freud where he directly takes up Kant on the subject of the timeless nature of the
unconscious.
In his 1915 essay ―The Unconscious,‖ Freud argues that the psychoanalytic
concept of the unconscious is ―an extension of the corrections undertaken by Kant of our
views on external perception‖ (SE 14: 171; GW 10: 271). Just as Kant ―warned us not to
overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be
regarded as identical with what is perceived‖ so too for Freud ―psychoanalysis warns us
not to equate perceptions of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which
are their object‖ (SE 14: 171; GW 10: 271). Whereas, for Kant, ―appearances are not
things in themselves, but are the mere play of our presentations, which in the end amount
to determinations of inner sense,‖ for Freud the appearance of our ―mental processes‖ is
not equivalent with these processes themselves (Kant, CPR A102). What we know of the
mental processes are only appearances, the result of our cognition. Freud thus
understands the division between the conscious and the unconscious as a phenomenal
split.
Four years after he writes the essay ―The Unconscious,‖ Freud defines this
phenomenal split in terms of time with another reference to Kant in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle. A text that confronts the repetition of trauma amongst the veterans of the First
World War, it explores not just lost time, but moments that repeat themselves,
continuously subjecting those who suffer these neuroses to a single non-integrated
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moment of their history.77 In the fourth chapter of this text, Freud begins a ―far-fetched
speculation [weitausholende Spekulation]‖ to explain traumatic repetition as failure to
synthesize stimulus (SE 18: 24; GW 13: 23). The veterans, he suggests, were exposed to
a stimulus that occurred too quickly or that was too much to synthesize. In other words,
consciousness failed to bind this stimulus. Remaining outside of consciousness, the
stimulus not only stands outside of meaning, but also the subject‘s experience of time, for
Freud. He writes:
[a]s a result of certain psycho-analytic discoveries, we are to-day in a position to
embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and space are ‗necessary
forms of thought‘. We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in
themselves ‗timeless‘. This means in the first place that they are not ordered
temporally [zeitlich geordnet werden], that time does not change them in any way
and that the idea of time [Zeitvorstellung] cannot be applied to them. (SE 18: 28;
GW 13: 27f.)
Freud appeals to Kant‘s discussion of time and space as ―necessary forms of thought‖ in
the Critique of the Pure Reason or, as we will see, to the a priori role of time and space
for experience as such in the chapter on the ―Transcendental Aesthetic.‖ For Freud, as for
Kant, objects must be temporalized, or brought into time, to appear. What is not, or
cannot be, temporalized—what Kant calls the thing-in-itself—is unconscious for Freud.
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In respect to the psychoanalytic investigation into ―shellshock,‖ or the literal impression of war in
traumatized soldiers, Sandor Ferenczi‘s ―Two Types of War Neuroses‖ provides an interesting picture. The
piece opens by marking the large numbers of patients, too many, in fact: ―This number is too great, the time
for observation has been too short‖ (Ferenczi 1927, 124). Ferenczi then draws a picture of the conditions,
patients whom suffer ―violent tremors‖ all over their body, or have been struck by a ―rigidity, and
weakness‖ which gives rise to ―peculiar gaits‖ which are the source of his ―bewilderment‖ (Ferenczi 1927,
125). He then proceeds to describe to general symptoms: ―anxiety hysteria and conversion hysteria‖
(Ferenczi 1927, 141).
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For as Jean Laplanche has noted in his essay, ―A Short Treatise on the Unconscious,‖
―the adjective ‗atemporal‘ (zeitlos) does not refer to an accidental quality of the ‗other
thing‘ in us, but to its very being‖ (Laplanche 1999a, 101).78 The ―timeless‖ nature of the
unconscious, for Freud, is the condition for the possibility of the repetition compulsion in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. For the unconscious repetition of the trauma is the
continual attempt to bind stimulus—the attempt to conceptualize it as a part of the
subject‘s history. Thus, in this text, Freud explains trauma through the subject‘s failure to
conceptualize external stimulus, which he argues is also a failure to temporalize
stimulus.79 But what does it mean to place Freud‘s temporal distinction between the
conscious and unconscious next to Kant? What might a return to Kant tell us about this
temporal distinction, but also, perhaps, about the nature of the drives themselves in
Freud? Let us then follow Freud by turning to where Kant discusses the necessary role of
space and time in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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Jacques Press discusses the implications of the usage of the adjective zeitlos to describe the unconscious
in his essay “Temps et Pulsion.‖ He writes: ―Pour Freud, l‘Inconscient est ‗zeitlos,‘ littéralement: sans
temps. Le suffixe allemand –los s‘oppose au préfixe un-. Il importe ainsi de différencier dans la langue
allemande ‗unbewusst,‘ qui signifie inconscient au sens freudien, de bewusstlos—qui se dit de quelqu‘un
ayant perdu conscience. Or, il est remarquable que le ―un‖ allemand, comme Freud le fait remarquer luimême à propos de ‗unheimlich‘, porte le sceau du refoulement. Relevons de plus qu‘il n‘existe pas de terme
dans la langue allemande qui soit applicable à la non-temporalité de l‘Inconscient et qui utilize le préfixe
un. Il existe bien un mot unzeitig, mais il signifie ‗qui ne vient pas à temps, inopportune‘. D‘où sans doute
la perplexité des traducteurs, qui on oscillé entre ‗atemporalité‘ et ‗intemporalité‘ (Press 1997, 1707f).
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In 1933, a little over a decade after the publication of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud again returns
to the question of the temporal distinction between conscious and the unconscious in The New Introductory
Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Yet, unlike in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud‘s concern here is on the
antinomical character of the unconscious. Spurred by the fact that ―logical laws of thought do not apply to
the id‖ Freud writes: ―we perceive with surprise an exception to the philosophical theorem that space and
time are necessary forms of our mental acts. There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the idea of time
[Im Es findet sich nichts, was der Zeitvorstellung entspricht]; there is no recognition of the passage of time,
and—a thing that is most remarkable and awaits consideration in philosophical thought—no alteration in its
mental processes is produced by the passage of time‖ (SE 22: 74; GW 15: 80).
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Kant discusses the necessary role of space and time for thought in the
―Transcendental Aesthetic‖ where he seeks to explain the necessary conditions of sensory
experience, or the subjective conditioning of our immediate capacity for intuiting the
world and its objects. An intuition, according to Kant, ―refers to objects directly‖ (CPR
A19/B33). In order for the subject to intuit an object two things must be in place. First,
there must be an external stimulus that ―corresponds to sensation,‖ an ―empirical
intuition‖ corresponding to ―matter‖ (CPR A19/B34). In other words, one cannot intuit
what cannot be felt, what is not ―there.‖ Second, experience demands the organization of
the sensory apprehension of this matter, or what Kant calls the ―form‖ of intuition. Only
through the combination of the sensory reception of empirical objects and the formal
organization of this sensory reception can external objects appear to us. For Kant, the
formal organization of matter is a function of the subject not found in the sensual
reception of matter, and is thus the product of what Kant calls the ―pure intuition‖ (CPR
A21/B35). The pure intuitions organizing sensuous materiality, for Kant, are space and
time.
For the experience of ―this‖ or ―that‖ object to occur, for there to be appearances
of objects in the world at all, the object must first be ordered spatially and temporally.
Kant calls the a priori organization of sensuous materiality into space ―outer sense,‖
while he will call the a priori organization of appearances in time ―inner sense.‖ Although
both inner and outer sense are necessary for an object to appear for Kant, inner sense
takes logical precedence. For As Kant writes, ―[t]ime is the formal condition of all
appearances generally‖ (CPR A33/B50).80
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The first thing to note about inner sense for Kant, is that time cannot be a ―real‖
quality of objects. Time is neither ―self-subsistent [für sich selbst bestünde]‖ nor does it
―attach to things as an objective determination‖ that would ―remain if one abstracted
from all subjective conditions of our intuition of it‖ (CPR A33/B49). Rather, time is
solely the product of the subject; as Kant writes, ―apart from the subject [außer dem
Subjekte], time is nothing‖ (CPR A35/B52).81 Or as Jean Laplanche notes in
―Temporality and Translation,‖ Kant helped us understand ―the capacity which the
human being has of creating, of secreting—sit venia verbo—his own time‖ (Laplanche
1989, 243). Quite simply, for Kant time is part of the subject‘s attempts to apprehend the
world.82 Time is a subjective unfolding of inner sense that grasps the world by
temporalizing space. Thus, Kant writes ―[t]ime is a necessary presentation [Vorstellung]
that underlies all intuitions‖ (CPR A31/B46).83 Not only does time secure our immediate
grasp of the world, it also makes ―synthetic propositions possible a priori‖ (CPR
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Kant continues: ―Space is the pure form of all outer appearances. Not all presentations, whether or not
they have outer things as their objects, do yet in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong to inner
state; and this inner state is subject to the formal condition of inner intuition, and hence to the condition of
time‖ (CPR A34/B51). In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger argues that this means
that ―time takes take precedence [Vorrang] over space. As universal pure intuition, it must be the dominant
and essential element [führenden und Tragenden Wesenelement] of pure knowledge and hence of
transcendence as well, since it is pure knowledge which makes transcendence possible (Heidegger 1962,
52; 1951, 51).
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See also: Lorne Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic
(Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 1995). Specifically pages 287-309.
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It is because Freud‘s Kantian inheritance is not taken seriously that the radically subjective nature of time
in Freud‘s discussion of the timeless nature of the unconscious is often misunderstood. For example, in an
essay entitled ―Time and the Unconscious,‖ Marie Bonaparte argues ―[t]o say that the unconscious is
timeless may mean that the unconscious fails to perceive time, that it receives absolutely no impression of
it whatsoever‖ (Bonaparte 1940, 439). In this sense the unconscious is timeless because it is ignorant of an
externally imposed time, a time that exceeds the subjective grasping of the world through time.
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In an article entitled, ―Time, Space and Schematism‖ Gerold Prauss points out that Kant wavers between
the priority of time and space as that which constitutes the enduring, permanence of one‘s perception. As he
writes, ―[t]his unacceptable wavering between space and time can be understood as the consequence of not
having grasped the spatio-temporal ambiguity of co-existence‖ (Prauss 1981, 10f.).
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A39/B56). The necessity of inner sense‘s role in presenting the manifold of objects to the
mind is found in how time organizes this presentation.84
To demonstrate how inner sense temporally organizes the presentation of objects
we can turn to Kant‘s discussion of the synthesis of apprehension in the first edition of
the ―Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.‖ In this section Kant argues ―[n]o
matter from where our presentations [Vorstellungen] arise‖ they ―belong to inner sense,‖
thus ―all our cognitions are yet ultimately cast under [unterworfen] the formal condition
of inner sense, i.e., to time‖ (CPR A99; translation modified). For Kant, time molds, or
casts, the presentation of objects for us by ordering the impressions of sense experience
sequentially. As Kant writes, there would be no object as such ―if the mind did not in the
sequence [aufeinander] of impressions following one another distinguish time‖ (CPR
A99). The appearance of an object necessitates the sensual impression of the object. For
one to experience sense impressions of the object, these impressions cannot stand as
discrete moments ordered haphazardly. Rather, each discrete impression must have
already been brought together as a sequence of impressions that are ordered in
accordance to a linear concept of time. The object would not ―endure‖ in our
apprehension, if it this apprehension were not formally ordered in advance of the object
by the subject‘s inner sense. Or as Kant writes:
[f]or any presentation [Vorstellung] as contained in one instant can never be
anything but absolute unity. Now in order for this manifold to become unity of
84

In Heidegger, Kant & Time, Charles M. Sherover has argued although Kant‘s concept of temporality is
the ―keystone‖ for the synthesis of the categories and thus cognition as such, time ―remains, in the end, not
the pulsating heart of the dynamic being, but an abstract logical function which is continually pointed to as
necessary presupposition‖ (Sherover 1971, 248). Given the relationship between time in the
Transcendental Aesthetic and the determinations of time in the categories, I would argue that time, for
Kant, is not simply a static notion, but rather a linear notion that the categories order in more complex and
dynamic ways.
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intuition (as, e.g., in the presentation of space), it must first be gone through
[Durchlaufen] and gathered together [Zusammennehmung]. (CPR A99)
Inner sense orders material impressions successively; it runs them together, allows each
instant to become constellated with other instants in a sequential ordering of ―nows.‖ Or
one could say that the matter of sense impressions casts objects in the mold of time that is
a progressive sequence. Each impression, if it is to be more than a momentary flash
absolutely disconnected from other sense impressions, must first, as the very condition of
its appearance to the subject, be subject to a progressive ordering of time that links each
of these impressions together into one experience throughout this linear apprehension of
the object. Thus, inner sense synthesizes impressions by subjecting them to an a priori
successive model of temporality.
If inner sense organizes the manifold of intuition according to a progressive and
linear form of time, then it should be of no surprise that, for Kant, the concepts that
emerge from a higher order synthesis between the concepts of the understanding and the
manifold of intuition are also subject to a linear notion of time. And this seems to be the
full force of Kant‘s claim that time is the essential element in schematism, which bridges
the heterogeneous functions of the understanding and the intuition, or concepts and sense
experience.85 In other words, for concepts to apply to empirical objects there must be a
mediating element that is common to both. For Kant, this mediating element is time. As
Kant writes:
[t]ime, as the formal condition for the manifold of inner sense and hence for the
connection of all presentations [Vorstellungen], contains an a priori manifold in
85

In an article entitled, ―Making Sense of Kant‘s Schematism,‖ Michael Pendlebury argues that part of the
task of the schematism is to ―explain how intuitions could have the contents needed for them to be
subsumed under the naturalised categories (and other concepts)‖ (Pendlebury 1995, 797).
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pure intuition. Now a transcendental time determination is homogenous with the
category (in which it consists) insofar as the time determination is Universal and
rests on an a priori rule. But it is homogeneous with appearance [Erscheinung],
on the other hand, insofar as every empirical presentation of the manifold contains
time. Hence it will be possible for the category to be applied to appearances
[Erscheinungen] by means of the transcendental time determination, which, as the
schema of the concepts of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of
appearances under the category. (CPR A138f./B177f.)
Experience, or consciousness as such, is dependent on the formal ordering of the
sensuous apprehension of the object by the pure intuition of time and the temporal
underpinnings of the categories of the understanding. In fact because time structures both
the intuition and the understanding, the a priori status of time is the common meeting
point between sense experience and concepts.86 But here we should notice something
interesting about the relationship between the pure intuition of time and transcendental
time determination in the schematism. As we have noted, the pure intuition of time is
grounded in a linear notion of time that structures sense impressions along a progressive
model. If transcendental time determination is a higher order formalization of the
temporalization of the appearances of objects that are supported by this linear notion of
time, then the concepts of the understanding must also be grounded on a linear notion of
time. And this seems to be what Kant means when he argues that ―the schemata are
nothing but a priori time determinations according to rules [Die Schemate sind daher
nichts als Zeitbestimmungen a priori nach Regeln]‖ (CPR A145/B184). Concepts order
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See: Fiona Hughes, Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2007).
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impressions into different relationships of time that are originally constituted by the linear
model of time found in the pure intuition of time. They bring the appearances of the
intuition into a higher order structuring of the progressive linear model that supports
sense experience.87 Surely this is what Kant means when he writes ―Different times are
only parts of one and the same time‖ (CPR A32/B47).88 Since linear time founds our
sensory apprehension of the world, it is also the foundation of our conceptual judgments
about the world. And in this sense we can see that what lies outside of the subject‘s
ability to temporalize, will also lie outside of the ability of the subject to cognize. Thus,
consciousness, even rationality as such for Kant, fundamentally rests on a linear notion of
time.89 But what does Kant‘s reliance a on linear model of time in order to distinguish
87

See for instance, Michael Wood‘s argument in ―Kant‘s Transcendental Schematism,‖ Dialectica 37, no.
3 (1983): 201-220.
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In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger will take this to be indicative of the ontological
difference between Being and beings. Schematism, anchored in time itself schematizes particular ontic
determinations of time or, ―the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding ‗determine time‘‖
(Heidegger 1962, 109; 1951, 99). Having separated time from time determinations, Heidegger will go on to
argue ―As the sole, pure, universal image, time gives the horizon of transcendence a precursory
inclusiveness. This unique, pure, ontological horizon is the condition of the possiblity that an essent within
it can have this or that particular overt and ontic horizon. Time not only gives transcendence a precursory
unifying cohesion but as the pure self-giving offers it, in general, something on the order of a check. Times
makes perceptible to a finite being the ‗opposition‘ of ob-jectivity, which opposition belongs to the finitude
of that act of orientation by which transcendence takes place‖ (Heidegger 1962, 113; 1951, 102).
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In order to demonstrate this let us take as an example the schemata of time that form the concepts of
actuality, possibility, and necessity in Kant‘s category of modality. In order for any of these concepts to be
legitimately applied, there must first be an empirical object that can be sustained by the a priori linear
structuring of the time of sensory experience. As Kant writes the object falls under the concept of existence
if it exists ―within a determinate time [bestimmten Zeit]‖ or specific succession of instants that are
progressively strung together (CPR A145/B185). If the object does not fall under a determinate time, but a
rather can exist at ―at some time [zu irgendeiner Zeit]‖ then it falls under the concept of possibility (CPR
A145/B185). A possible object is, hence, an object that has not been brought into this succession of
moments, but has the capability of being brought into a future succession of moments. If the object must
exist ―at all time [zu aller Zeit]‖ then it falls under the concept of necessity, which means that the object not
only exists at this particular moment on the line but has existed on all the moments prior to this moment
and will exist in all moment to come after this one moment (CPR A145/B185). Thus, when the object
becomes conceptualized, at least in light of the category of modality, the object is brought into different
constellations of time that accord with the linear nature of the pure intuition of time. Just as the sensuous
intuition of the object demands the linear ordering of sense impressions, concepts themselves will be
different variations of the form of time this linear model of time.
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between the presentation and conceptualization of objects tell us about Freud‘s
invocation of Kant in order to make the distinction between the conscious and
unconscious?
When Freud appeals to Kant to distinguish conscious from unconscious, he
appeals to the productive role of the transcendental schema in presenting objects to the
subject. In as much as what is conditioned must be ordered sequentially, brought into a
temporal sequence, that which is not schematized lies outside of appearance and thus this
temporal sequence. Thus for Freud, what is unconscious is unschematized, hence the
unconscious‘s characteristic of timelessness.
If Freud, as we saw, envisions psychoanalysis as turning Kant‘s ―Copernican
turn‖ back in on ourselves, then to understand what remains unschematized we must ask
what do we mean by ―selves.‖ If we mean that there is a part of ourselves that escapes
our conceptualization of the self, such as the transcendental unity of apperception, then
the unconscious would be that which is left out of our secondary reflection on our self.90
In other words when presenting ourselves as an object of examination to ourselves, there
is something about ourselves that will escape that observation and will remain beyond the
limits of reason to think. It would be that which could not be temporalized because it is
not subject to the linear model of time that the schema presupposes.91 It would appear as
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For example see: Jean Laplanche and Serge LaClaire, ―The Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Study,‖ Yale
French Studies 48, French Freud: Structural Studies in Psychoanalysis (1972): 118-175.
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Others, such as Jacques Lacan, Jean Laplanche, and Alan Bass have argued that the unconscious has a
form of temporality. In the cases of Lacan and Laplanche these claims center on the fact they attempt to
reconcile Freud‘s claim about the a-temporal nature of the unconscious by ascribing it the role of the
progenitor of time. This of course is founded in thinking that the unconscious is analogous to Kant‘s
transcendental unity of apperception, but also to a specifically Hegelian reading of Freud‘s claim. Bass, as I
will take up shortly, argues that the temporality of the unconscious is discontinuous.
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the non-identical, that real part of our selves that appears a no ―thing‖ at all, from the
perspective of an already cognizing subject.92
Yet, I think that Freud‘s appeal to Kantian schematism in his claims about the
timeless nature of the unconscious is not only located on the level of a secondary
cognitive reflection on the subject itself, but has a more material and primary function in
Freud‘s genetic account of the development of the drives, the unconscious, and the ego.
In other words, I would like to suggest that just as Marx turns the dialectic to the ―real‖
objects that impress themselves on us, so too does Freud materialize Kant‘s
phenomenological investigation. In essence, I would like to ask, how envisioning Freud‘s
understanding of the drives through the light of Kantian schematism might help us to
understand the temporality of the drives, the formation of the ego, but also the
temporality of repression. In light of this question, I would like to suggest that by taking
Freud‘s Kant seriously we might be forced to renegotiate our understanding not only of
the timeless nature of the unconscious, but also the temporality of Nachträglichkeit.93

II.

Defensive Schematization: The Temporality of Freudian Repression
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This is akin to the argument Slavoj Žižek following Lacan, makes in Tarrying with the Negative: Kant,
Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology where he writes: ―[t]his gap which separates the empirical I‘s selfexperience from the I of transcendental apperception coincides with the distinction between existence qua
experiential reality and existence qua logical construction […] The status of Kant‘s I of transcendental
apperception is that of a necessary and simultaneously impossible logical construction […] in short: of the
Lacanian real‖ (Žižek 1993, 14). He also comments on this relationship in The Parallax View, specifically
pages 20-25.
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This sentiment is similar to one expressed by André Green in an article entitled ―Freud‘s concept of
Temporality: Differences with Current Ideas,‖ where he suggest that the move from the first topography to
the second topography is a move from the unconscious to the drives. He writes ―I think that, in the second
topographical model, the inclusion of the drive—in fact erotic and destructive drives in the psychical
apparatus under the instance of the Id—is replacing the unconscious. One has to consider the unthinkability
of the Id, the movements it provokes, and the possibility or the impossibility of transforming them‖ (Green
2008, 1039).
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Freud‘s appropriation of Kantian schematism is essential for not only
understanding the drives, but also for both the development of the ego and its defenses,
and specifically the temporality of repression.94 By following out Freud‘s materialist
Kantianism we will see that the drives themselves are phenomenal and that their
organizing principle, the ego‘s defense of repression, is based on the linear model of time
that Freud presupposes by leaning on Kant‘s schematism to think the phenomenal nature
of the drives.
In Freud‘s work the ego develops through the organization of the drives. Thus,
one of the central questions of Freudian psychoanalysis concerns how this organization
occurs. Framed another way, Freudian psychoanalysis takes as one of its cornerstones,
the fact that infants experience an originary helplessness (Hilflösigkeit) characterized by
an inability to distinguish between one‘s self and the external world.95 The question
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In some ways this is similar to Adrian Johnston‘s argument in ―Time Driven: Metapsychology and the
Splitting of the Drive, where he argues that the drives themselves are split between two differing
temporalities that correspond to the phenomenal divide. The fundamental thesis of Johnston‘s project is to
argue that the ―metapsychological structure of Trieb is split along the lines of two irreconcilable,
incompatible axes—an axis of iteration (source-pressure) and an axis of alteration (aim-object). These two
axes are roughly analogous to the Kantian distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal as utilized
in his exposition of why self-consciousness is shaped by its own internal conditions of (im)possibility:
Fully transparent self-consciousness is impossible‖ (Johnston 2005, 149). Yet, unlike Johnston, I am taking
a Freudian approach to this question, which necessitates valuing the materialist conditions that give rise to
conceptualization itself. This is different from Johnston‘s Lacanian approach that favors the symbolic and
represents a Hegelian reading of Freud. See Also: Andreas Hamburger. ―Zeitfenster: Für eine
Metapsychologie der Gegenwart,‖ Forum Psychoanalyse 25 (2009): 199-218.
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In his 1926 text Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety Freud claims all anxiety has its root in feelings of
helplessness, or a ―reaction to the felt loss of the object‖ (SE 20: 137). In this instance this felt loss of the
object is the mother. Freud, thus carries this loss further claiming that this felt loss of the object which gives
rise to anxiety is actually the presence of helplessness which confronts the child when the object is no
longer present. He writes, ―The reason why the infant in arms wants to perceive the presence of its mother
is only because it already knows by experience that she satisfies all its needs without delay. The situation,
then, which it regards as a ‗danger‘ and against which it wants to be safeguarded is that of non-satisfaction,
of a growing tension due to need, against which it is helpless‖ (SE 20: 137). Thus, whereas in other texts
which draw upon this original helplessness like The Future of an Illusion Freud ties the protective function
not to the father but to the mother. This anxiety sparked by the loss of the protective and nurturing object of
the mother is genetically related to the helplessness of the infant upon birth, upon being thrown into the
world and subjected to an excessive amount of stimulation that it cannot master. Freud writes ―What both
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becomes then, how does the infant move from this state to a form of consciousness
resting on this distinction. In other words, how does the infant come to orient itself in the
world? To shift registers once again, one could say the question driving Freudian
psychoanalysis is the following. If one concedes that the origin of concepts and
consciousness is material, then we must also concede that humans have neither concepts
nor a complete sense of self when they are born. If humans do not have these concepts
and the sense of consciousness organizing these concepts to begin with, then how do we
give a materialist answer for these developments that does not assume a naïve realism? I
would like to suggest that the way that Freud answers this question is by both attending to
Kant‘s ―Copernican turn‖ while simultaneously inverting Kantian schematism. This
inversion occurs through shifting the function of the a priori categories of the
understanding to the temporality of pleasure and bodily drives. And in fact, it is only in
understanding Freud‘s materialist modification of the synthetic role of Kantian
schematism, that we can fully understand not only the function of repression, but also the
temporality that repression assumes.
To begin with we must turn to the development of the ego. For Freud, this ego
emerges through the attempts of the infant to schematize both internal and external
stimulus. This development is grounded in the surface of the body. As he writes in his
1923 text The Ego and Id, the ego ―first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a

situations have in common is the economic disturbance caused by an accumulation of amounts of
stimulation which require to be disposed of‖ (SE 20: 137). Faced initially with the inability to master this
stimulation, both internal and external, the infant begins to understand that an external object, the mother,
takes care of these needs. Freud notes, ―the content of the danger it fears is displaced from the economic
situation on to the condition which determined that situation, viz., the loss of object‖ (SE 20: 138). Thus,
anxiety is a product of both mental and biological helplessness. This original anxiety, in terms of the loss of
object, becomes transferred and extended to other objects as the infant matures: from castration to the fear
of the loss of the love of the super ego
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surface entity but is itself the projection of a surface‖ (SE 19: 26; GW 13: 253).96
Consciousness, and the objects that can be represented to consciousness, arise from the
process of sorting out where our body ends and where the world begins. For what is the
body if not ―a place from which both external and internal perception may spring‖ (SE
19: 25; GW 13: 253)? Since the body is both the source of internal excitation and what
receives and processes external stimulation through the senses, its surface, (and
subsequently the ―projection‖ of the body that allows us to experience it as surface),97 is
the site of receiving this stimulus.98 Resonating with Nietzsche‘s argument in ―Truth and
Lies in a Non-moral Sense,‖ Freud seems to be claiming the sensory apprehension of the
world is a translation of both internal and external stimulus through the body.99 It is at
this first translation of stimulus through the body that Freud materializes Kantian
schematism.100 The body is the axis of translating our reception of stimulus into concepts
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Freud develops the concept of the ego in his 1923 text The Ego and Id, where he constructs the second
topography of the psyche. As opposed to the topography of the unconscious, pre-conscious, and conscious,
Freud offers the topography of the ego, id, super-ego in this text. This shift in topography is a response to
the fact that the ―Ucs. does not coincide with the repressed‖—that while ―all that is repressed is Ucs.‖ not
everything that is ―Ucs. is repressed‖ (SE 19: 18; GW 13: 244). The second topography allows Freud to
tend to this distinction by recognizing that the middle term, the ego, is actually an extension of the id, and
thus part of it is, ―and Heaven knows how important a part,‖ unconscious (SE 19: 18; GW 13: 244).
97

Freud‘s description of the ego as a bodily ego, and especially in relationship to the ―projection‖ of the
surface of the bodily ego, is exactly what Jacques Lacan will pick up on in his foundational essay ―The
Mirror Stage.‖
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An interesting correlation to this famous passage in The Ego and Id can be found in Freud‘s ―Findings,
Ideas, Problems,‖ where he writes ―Space may be the projection of the extension of the psychical
apparatus. No other derivation is probable. Instead of Kant‘s a priori determinants of our psychical
apparatus. Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it‖ (SE 23: 300).
99

I am specifically thinking about the first metaphor that grounds knowledge for Nietzsche in this essay:
―[t]he stimulation of the nerve is first translated into an image‖ (Nietzsche 1999, 144).
100

One might say that thinking the transcendental nature of materiality and the drives is the project of
Deleuze. For a discussion of Deleuze‘s relationship to Kant in terms of the appearance of objects and the
drives see: Michael J. Olsen, ―Transcendental Idealism, Deleuze and Guattari, and the Metaphysics of
Objects,‖ in Thinking Between Deleuze and Kant: A Strange Encounter, ed. Edward Willatt and Matt Lee
(New York: Continuum, 2009), 51-170.
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and thus the a priori reception of objects occurs not through cognition, but rather the
body‘s orientation and grasp of what besieges it. In other words, the categories are bodily
categories.101 Whereas the reception of this stimulus demands we render sense of this
stimulus, and in as much as the bringing into appearance of the object of these stimuli
demands these objects are temporalized, then, one might say this bodily ego, standing at
the threshold between internal and external excitations, translates stimulus by
temporalizing it. While, as we will see, Freud is concerned with external stimulus, the
primary focus of Freud‘s inverted ―Copernican turn‖ is internal stimulus: the drives. For,
as Freud repeatedly points out throughout his work while one can flee external stimulus,
―one cannot run away from oneself‖ (SE 20: 203; GW 14: 230).
Drives, for Freud, are constant internal excitations we cannot escape through
flight.102 Since these sources of stimulus must also be translated, they too have a
phenomenal status in Freud‘s work. Freud makes this clear in his essay ―The
Unconscious,‖ when he argues that ―drive can never become an object of
consciousness—only the idea that represents it can [nur die Vorstellung, die ihn
repräsentiert]‖ (SE 14: 177; GW 10: 275, translation modified).103 The drive-in-itself, if
you will, cannot appear for us except as a presentation, a Vorstellung. Drives are a form
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What Julia Kristeva calls this the semiotic in Revolution in Poetic Language is similar to this bodily
schematization that occurs prior to the formal ordering of the drives in light of the symbolic, or developed
ego. A schematization that not only orders prior to the institution of the symbolic, but remains the material
vehicle of language, or meaning. The course shaking of the vocal chords as the infant screams becomes
transformed in the curt sentence that demands. The spacing between sobs and laughs becomes the rhythmic
lilt of everyday speech.
102
While the drives become associated with objects, and thus an externality, this only occurs after they
have been organized by an ego that can determine the inside from the outside. Thus, before this ego fully
develops, the drives remain unfocused, unorganized, and internal.
103

In the Standard Edition there is the well-known problem of how Strachey translated the German word
Trieb. Normally translated as instinct in the Standard Edition, throughout the rest of this text I will translate
it as drive, as is now recognized to be a better translation.
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of internal material excitation; welling up from within our bodies, they can only appear,
or become conscious, as a presentation, as something bound to a temporal rule.104 In
other words, not unlike the fact that the manifold of intuition must be synthesized with
the concepts of the understanding in order to ―be‖ for us in any way, so too must the
drives become synthesized with ideas in order to become conscious. The conscious
appearance of the drive thus necessitates temporalization, but the materiality of the drivein-itself will always escape this temporalization, and thus conscious presentation. In light
of the phenomenal status of the drive Freud writes it ―appears [erscheint] to us as a
border-concept [Grenzbegriff] between the mental and the somatic‖ (SE 14: 121f.; GW
10: 214, translation modified). And in fact this splitting of the drive in the body‘s attempt
to temporalize stimulus represents the timeless nature of the unconscious. The
unconscious is nothing more than that which has failed to be schematized through the
rule of the body.
If the unconscious is composed of material drive-in-itself, the part of the drive
that remains outside time and presentation, and if these excitations demand
conceptualization, then the manner in which the drive-in-itself would become a ―drivepresentation‖ would be found in how the ego translates the drive into time. Freud
describes the egoic function as the following:
[i]ts psychological function consists in raising the passage [of events] in the id to
a higher dynamic level (perhaps by transforming freely mobile energy into bound
energy, such as corresponds to the preconscious state); its constructive function
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Jacques Derrida takes up the issue of the drives and synthesis in an essay entitled ―Resistances,‖ in
Resistances of Psychoanalysis, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Pascale-Anne Brault, & Michael Naas (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1996), 25-27.
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consists in interpolating [einschaltet], between drive-demand [Triebanspruch] and
the action that satisfies it, the activity of thought which, after taking its bearings in
the present and assessing earlier experiences, endeavours by means of
experimental actions to calculate the consequences of the course of action
proposed. (SE 23: 199; GW 17: 129, translation modified)
The bodily ego creates ―bound energy‖ by conceptualizing unconscious, and thus atemporal, drives. In doing so, it brings the drive into the ―present.‖105 By turning freely
mobile energy into bound energy, or essentially temporalizing the drive into a present
drive-presentation, the ego translates the drives into different symbolic possibilities of
being phenomenally expressed in consciousness. These possibilities are synthesized by
the ego as an act of schematization.106 The expressions are then organized according to
the subject‘s history and the ego‘s ability to calculate action in the future. The ego not
only binds the drive by bringing it into the present, but also performs a higher order
structuring of the drive by referencing it against the past and the future. One might say
that the ego schematizes the sensuous materiality of the drive with its representative
concept. It thus acts as a bridge between two heteronymous functions of the subject:
conceptualization and intuition of an internal material stimulus. Just as the transcendental
function of the pure intuition of time bridges concepts and the empirical manifold, so too
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In ―Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning‖ Freud makes a similar claim about the
relationship between drive and consciousness when he writes, ―It is probable that thinking was originally
unconscious, in so far as it went beyond mere ideational representations [Vorstellen erhob] and was
directed to the relations between impressions of objects [Objeckteindrücke] and that it did not acquire
further qualities, perceptible to consciousness, until it became connected with verbal residues [Wortreste]‖
(SE 12: 221; GW 8: 233f.)
106

In Coldness and Cruelty, Gilles Deleuze argues that these syntheses are forms of schematism supported
by the repetition of the death drive. He writes that ―To repetition that binds—constituting the present—and
repetition that erases—constituting the past—we must add a third, that saves or fails to save, depending on
the modes of combination of the other two‖ (Deleuze 1991, 115).
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will Freud write that all that becomes bound in the ego is placed in time, while all that
remains unbound to concepts or affects, remains in the unconscious, remains timeless.
While the development of the ego occurs by schematizing excitations the question
remains by what rule, by what concept does this translation occur? Whereas for Kant
these translations occur in accordance with the regimented temporal ordering of the
categories of the understanding, for Freud this translation first occurs through a temporal
schema that obeys the pleasure principle. Freud explicitly discusses the role of the rule of
pleasure in sorting out the distinction between stimuli, and thus the development of the
ego in his 1915 essay ―Instincts and Their Vicissitudes‖ and his 1925 essay ―Negation.‖
The question framing both of these discussions of the development of the ego is: how
does the ego establish the differentiation between itself and the world, that is how does
the ego establish a sense of spatiality. Freud writes:
[i]n so far as the ego is auto-erotic, it has no need of the external world, but, in
consequence of experiences undergone by the drives of self-preservation
[Icherhaltungstriebe], it acquires objects from that world, and, in spite of
everything, it cannot avoid feeling internal drive stimuli [Triebereize] for a time
as unpleasurable. Under the dominance of the pleasure principle a further
development now takes place in the ego. In so far as the objects which are
presented to it are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, ‗introjects‘ them
(to use Ferenczi‘s [1909] term); and, on the other hand, it expels whatever within
itself becomes a cause of unpleasure. (SE 14: 135f.; GW 10: 228)
The ego establishes a sense of itself as distinct from the world by first schematizing
stimuli, then spatializing it through the rule of pleasure and displeasure. Very concretely,
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for Freud, the ego moves from inner sense to outer sense by temporalizing stimulus in
accordance with the pleasure-unpleasure series. At the early stages of this process, the
infant has not fully distinguished between the inside and the outside, leading to this
spatialization taking the early forms of introjection and projection. The inside, that is
what we take as part of ourselves, that which we willingly take into ourselves, becomes
associated with that which appears as pleasurable. The outside, what we take as distinct
from ourselves, what we resist taking into ourselves, becomes associated with what
appears as unpleasurable. As Freud writes in ―Negation,‖ ―the original pleasure-ego
wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself everything
that is bad. What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with,
identical‖ (SE 19: 237; GW 14: 13). What the flesh recoils from appears as outside; what
the flesh welcomes appears as inside. If we are to read this essay in light of what I have
been arguing is Freud‘s reliance on Kant, then we can see that for Freud appearances are
conditioned by the logically prior temporal schematization of a stimulus that endures and
is then spatialized in accordance with the rule of the pleasure principle.107 And in this
sense we could then say that the body‘s enduring reception of stimulus informs what is
not yet, but will become the unity of consciousness based on the affective distinction
between inside and outside. While eventually the infant is able schematize in line with a
more stable sense of outside and inside, that is to institute the reality principle, this
originary role of pleasure‘s rule in schematizing stimulus remains, silently influencing the
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For a discussion of the consequences of this see Julia Kristeva‘s The Power of Horror and Jean
Hyppolite‘s ―Spoken Commentary on Freud‘s Negation‖ in the Appendix to Jacques Lacan‘s Seminar One:
Freud’s Papers on Technique.
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origin of our concepts, ideas, judgment, and even our very motility in the world.108 For
what else could the pleasure principle be but that rule by which the ego organizes not
only its drives but also the objects to which they eventually become attached? And what
else could the non-identical be except that which remains outside of this process of
schematizing both internal and external stimulus: the drive-in-itself that disrupts the
distinctions to which we so fervently hold.
Since schematism is bound by the rules of the categories for Kant, determinative
judgment does not discriminate between empirical objects. Yet, for Freud the synthetic
function of the ego is based not on the categories of the understanding, but the
schematization that occurs between the body‘s a priori temporalization and the
development of the spatiality of the pleasure-unpleasure series. Because the rule is not
first and foremost rational, but rather affective, once established the ego discriminates
between empirical excitations based on the pleasure and unpleasure they provide. Thus,
whereas the Kantian subject shapes appearance in advance through the categories of
understanding, the Freudian ego shapes appearance in advance through the bodily
temporalization of pleasure and unpleasure. Where for Kant this occurs without
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Since the ego manages not only the drives, but also one‘s relationship with externality reality, the ego
binds the drives to ideas in ways that broker both the demands of the id and the demands of selfpreservation. This allows for the discharge of the drives in a way that preserves the subject from harm.
Thus one can understand how, the ego organizes drive representations in accordance with the reality
principle. The function of repression emerges at the heart of the schematic function ego when the pleasure
of the drives threaten the subject and the ego must reorganize how this drive is translated into the linear
experience of time. The ego‘s translation of the drives into conscious phenomena relies on the ability to
defer, delay, displace and at times refuse the discharge of a drive at the behest of the reality principle. In
this sense the reality principle that informs how the ego organizes drive representations. As Freud writes,
the job of the ego is to bring ―the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies‖ (SE
19: 25; GW 13: 253). As we have seen the ego‘s relationship to the id is the translation of the id‘s
noumenal content into symbolic representations that can be consciously organized. We now can see that the
principle of this organization is the influence. It operates on deferring the pleasure of discharge until a later
time, or it operates by displacing, condensing, all of which demands the repression of the drives.
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discrimination, for Freud this occurs by discriminating against those stimuli causing
unpleasure. In other words, unlike Kant, for Freud the ego binds and brings before itself
the appearance of some excitations, while barring the entrance of others. And here we
should note that, if the ego creates drive-presentations out of the drive-in-itself by
synthesizing them through the spatiality of pleasure, a process that temporalizes and
splits the drive, then the manner in which the ego must creatively negotiate how it binds
internal excitations, would also occur at the level of the temporal structure of the
synthesis it performs.109 Thus, repression, one of the functions against letting certain
drives into consciousness, is the ego‘s manipulation of the temporal aspects of this
synthetic process, and as Adrian Johnston has noted in Time Driven ―Freud‘s concept of
repression (and its accompanying defense mechanisms) marks a break with Kant‖
(Johnston 2005, 109).
In his 1915 metapsychological essay ―Repression,‖ Freud argues that repression
defends against drive-presentations that are ―irreconcilable with other claims and
intentions‖ (SE 14: 147; GW 10: 249).110 In other words, the operation of repression
negotiates the potential conflict between drive-presentations that would ―cause pleasure
[Lust] in one place and unpleasure [Unlust] in another‖ if the ego were to allow them
access to consciousness (SE 14: 147; GW 10: 249). Repression, hence, manages this
potential conflict of the drives by reordering the egoic synthesis of the drive
representations in time. Drive-presentations are denied access to consciousness and thus
109

This seems to be what Freud means when he speaks of the conscious binding of drives in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle in relationship to the trauma of those excitations that cannot be bound by the pathways
already carved out in consciousness (SE 18: 34f.; GW 13: 35f.)
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Throughout his corpus Freud‘s use of the term repression vacillates between a more general concept that
encapsulates several different processes of defense and a more restricted use that deals with one specific
form of defense. See: Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 390. Here I am discussing
the repression as a specific mechanism of defense.
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entrance into the subject‘s history. Repression reorders this egoic synthesis of the
subject‘s experience of time, creating an ―outlaw [vogelfrei]‖ of the banned drivepresentation, placing it outside of the ―great organization of the ego‖ and subjecting it
―only to the laws which govern the realm of the unconscious‖ (SE 20: 153; GW 14: 185).
Repression bans the drive-presentation from the conscious experience of time in
two different phases: ―primal repression [Urverdrängung]‖ and ―repression proper‖ [die
eigentliche Verdrängung] (SE 14: 148; GW 10: 250). Primal repression is the ―first
phase‖ of repression where a ―psychical (ideational) representative of the drive‖ is
―denied entrance into consciousness [daß der psychischen (Vorstellungs-) Repräsentanz
des Triebes die Übernahme in Bewußte versagt wird]‖ (SE 14: 148; GW 10: 250). In this
instance, the drive-presentation, already the product of the temporal synthesis of the ego,
becomes discarded from the subject‘s history.111 The Vorstellung remains unconnected to
the subject‘s reflective experience of its own history. In order to keep the schematized
drive-presentation from becoming conscious, the psyche withdraws an expenditure of
psychical investment or ―cathexsis‖ from the drive-presentation, effectively unbinding it
from the temporal suturing of ―nows‖ forming the basis of the ego‘s experience of time
(SE 14: 181; GW 10: 280). In order to hold back the drive-presentation from
consciousness, the ego expends an amount of energy equal to that of the drivepresentation. Freud calls this counter-energy ―anticathexsis‖; it ―represents the permanent
expenditure [of energy] of primal repression, and which also guarantees the permanence
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In his Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, written from 1916-17 at the height of the First World
War, Freud analogizes this process with political censorship. He writes that ―Take up any political
newspaper and you will find that here and there the text is absent‖ (SE 15: 139). This is, obviously, ―the
work of the press censorship. In these empty places there was something that displeased the higher
censorship authorities and for that reason it was removed—a pity, you feel, since not doubt it was the most
interesting thing in the paper—the ‗best bit‘ (SE 15: 139).
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of that repression‖ (SE 14: 181; GW 10: 280). Held back by an egoic counter-force that
bars its entrance into time, the ―outlawed‖ drive-presentation ―persists unaltered‖ in the
―dark‖ timelessness of the unconscious (SE 14: 149; GW 10: 251). Thus, we can
understand that when Freud claims that the result of this first phase of repression causes a
―fixation‖ of the drive and its associated representation, he means that the drive although
schematized, has not been conceptualized and thus has become fixated in a certain
moment of time, while simultaneously being excised from the subject‘s linear
temporalization of experience as such.
Given that the unconscious primary processes aids these banned drivepresentations by way of displacement and condensation, the ego must employ a second,
higher order, form of repression to ensure that the drive-presentation does not enter into
the subject‘s history.112 The second phase of repression, what Freud calls ―repression
proper,‖ is ―actually an after-pressure [Nachdrägen]‖ that affects the ―trains of thought
[Gedankenzüge]‖ associated with the repressed drive-presentation (SE 14: 148; GW 10:
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As a result of this first phase of repression, unconscious processes are, ―attuned‖ as it is to the flux and
flow of drive tensions. They advocate for the release of the drive-presentations. As Freud notes in The
Interpretation of Dreams, the primary processes govern the regulation of drive-tensions in the unconscious
by manipulating the structure of the drives-representations: displacement and condensation. These two
processes are ―directed towards seeking the free discharge of the quantities of excitations‖ (SE 5: 599). On
the one hand, when faced with a drive-presentation that has been repressed, the unconscious condenses the
stagnant drive-presentations with those that are associated it, thus creating a ―composite idea‖ that is
―endowed with great intensity‖ (SE 5: 657, 595). This newly formed representation, as a composite of both
the banned drive and its associative representations, is thus said to be ―overdetermined.‖ It is the folding of
a whole train of thought into one singular idea. On the one hand, whereas condensation operates by forming
a composite idea that has the banned idea and drive folded into it, displacement involves the sliding the
banned drive from its current representation to a new ―intermediate‖ representation that is associated with it
but stands separate from it (SE 5: 657). In other words, in displacement the banned drive itself becomes
displaced amongst a train of associated ideas. As we can see both of these functions manipulate the fact that
the drive relies on ideas, or representations, to be discharged. It is in taking advantage of this split in
representation that the unconscious sneaks the barred drive past the ―anti-cathexsis‖ of primary repression
(SE 14: 148). Thus as result of primary repression, a system of substitution and exchange forms between
drives and representations so that these ―banned drives‖ can become bound and expressed in consciousness
(SE 14: 179). Under the institution of repression, this symbolic exchange ―acts as point of passage‖
between the unconscious and the conscious under the law of the reality principle (SE 14: 182).
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250). This second phase of repression is thus defined by its attempts to ―repulse‖ the
associative representations of the originally repressed drive-presentation. In this sense,
―repression proper‖ cuts out or censors these conceptual associations within the ―trains of
thought‖ that could become associated with the fixated drive representation of primal
repression. It is the re-organization of presentations in order to ensure the originally
repressed drive-presentation does not enter into the subject‘s history. One could even say
it is a reordering of the subject‘s history itself to ensure the ban placed on drivepresentation stays in place. Repression is, thus, the egoic manipulation of the entrance of
drive-presentations into the subject‘s history. It maintains an experience of linear time
free from the representations that threaten this reflective historical construction. The
question remains, does Freud‘s modification of Kantian schematism still assume a linear
rationality, especially in light of the defensive function of repression in this materialist
schematization?
Alan Bass takes up the temporality of repression in Freud by arguing that it is a
higher order form of temporality that imposes a linear model of time on a primary
unorganized temporality.113 In his essay ―Time and the Witch: Femininity,
Metapyschology, and the Temporality of the Unconscious,‖ Bass argues consciousness is
organized by a ―primary‖ and ―secondary‖ temporality ―in the same way as the primary
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Nishad Patnaik makes a similar distinction in the essay ―Fetishism and its Relation to Time.‖ There
Patnaik argues that Patnaik argues that ―we shall attempt to provide a ‗schematization‘ through time, by
developing Freud‘s ‗very obscure‘ remarks on the ‗Kantian theorem‘ (concerning the a priori character of
space and time). In the first Critique, we shall argue, there is a tendency towards the spatialization of time
(along with the corresponding temporalization of space), which simultaneously hides within it a pretemporal time, a non-moment or absolute particularity that is the very origin of conscious or phenomenal
time‖ (Patnaik 2006, 74). This pretemporal time, Patnaik argues, will be a ―‗fetishized time‘ that is the very
time of consciousness. Thus, the pervasive extent of the ‗disavowal of difference‘, as the very basis for
‗human reality‘, would begin to emerge‖ (Patnaik 2006, 75).
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process is related to the secondary processes (secondary elaboration), or primary
narcissism to secondary narcissism: the secondary formation is necessary obscuring of
the primary one‖ (Bass 1976, 890). For Bass primary temporality, like the primary
processes and primary narcissism, operates ―discontinuously‖ because it is rooted in the
death drive‘s continual act of differentiation (Bass 1976, 899). Because the temporality of
the unconscious is discontinuous it defies the logic of non-contradiction and acts as the
cause of the temporal irruptions of the return of the repressed. Secondary temporality,
according to Bass, represses the discontinuity of the primary temporality by instituting a
logical sense of linear time. Thus for Bass, linear time is a defense against the
differentiating primary temporality of the death drive. If we were to shift this claim more
directly into our register, we could say that for Bass, the temporality of Freud‘s
schematization of the drives is decidedly non-linear.
Although Freud materializes Kant‘s phenomenal distinction, and although his
concept of repression marks a large departure from Kant, I would like to suggest Freud‘s
concept of repression assumes a linear model of time. What is discontinuous in Freud‘s
account of the primary processes is not time, as Bass suggests, but rather the
spatialization of stimulus—the introjection and projection marking the imaginary and
fantastical attempts of the young ego to fully distinguish itself from the world. Repression
acts against the construction of the linear model of time not with it as Bass suggests. It is,
as we will see in Freud‘s account of trauma, a second order operation assuming the prior
bodily temporalization of stimulus. In fact, as I have shown, primary repression does not
create a linear model of time, but rather cuts holes into the sequentially of linear time.
Secondary repression then ensures that the subject‘s experience of time remains linear
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despite the missing ―nows‖ ripped from the progression of time. Repression defends
against unpleasurable stimuli by manipulating the process of schematization. It excises
stimuli that have already been temporalized, and thus, in some sense prepared for
conscious rationalization. Thus, Freud‘s concept of repression is based on the assumption
of the linear nature of temporality; for the very function of repression is to excise
schematized stimulus from sequentially of time according the demands of the pleasure
principle.
If we shift registers from the metapsychological level to the subjective experience
of analysis, we can see, perhaps more clearly, why repression assumes the linearity of
time and thus why it cannot be the non-identical. For the subject it is, of course, always a
problem of memory. In the analytic situation, one uses the language of both repressed
memories and unconscious memories to speak of these repressed presentations. These
memories become repressed when the affect attached to them comes into conflict with
the reality principle and thus call into action the censorship functions of the ego. The ego
censors the drive-presentation by manipulating how the drive is cast into the subject‘s
experience of time and conceptualization of its own history. In order to preserve this ban
on the outlawed drive-presentation, all other presentations associated with this memory
become barred as well. It is literally the attempt to erase the drive-presentation from
conscious and structuring all conscious associations to serve this erasure. Or as Jean
Laplanche argues, in ―A Short Treatise on the Unconscious,‖
[…] it is at the level of temporalisation, conceived of as narrativisation, as the
translation of enigmas coming from the other, as continual ‗self-theorisation‘, that
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repression is located: in as much as it involves precisely the failure of
temporalisation and the deposit of untranslated residues. (Laplanche 1999a, 101)
And what more is this failure to bring into time than the erasure of a moment in linear
time? What more is an erasure than a moment in time which has lost its home amongst
schematized ―nows‖ and is thus forced to wander along this chain of experience looking
for a new home, one which will welcome it under another name?
For Freud, the material of analysis is memory. In his 1914 essay ―Remembering,
Repeating, and Working Through,‖ he argues that ―[d]escriptively speaking‖ the aim of
analysis ―is to fill in gaps in memory; dynamically speaking, it is to overcome resistances
due to repression [Deskriptiv: die Ausfüllung der Lücken der Erinnerung, dynamisch: die
Überwindung der Verdrängungswiderstände]‖ (SE 12: 147f.; GW 10: 127). The aim of
analysis is to neutralize the effects of those drives that have been simultaneously bound
and repressed by the ego‘s schematizing synthesis, by making conscious what is
unconscious or filling in the gaps in memory. For Freud, the work of the analyst, as he
notes in numerous essays, is akin to work of the archaeologist—constantly unearthing
and attempting to reconstruct a moment in time that has been forgotten, defended against,
excised from our histories. To speak of ―gaps [der Lücken]‖ or of ―filling in
[Ausfüllung]‖ presupposes a lack in the conscious construction of one‘s history. And as
we have seen this lack is created by the egoic defense against certain drive-presentations.
The process of analysis rids the subject of these defensive gaps by lifting the structures of
forgetting when the analyst untangles the resistances of repression. This loosening of
egoic resistances allows the analysand to fill in these gaps in memory because it brings
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forth the missing memories that these resistances have held back.114 Thus, if the task is to
bring forth what has been forgotten by disentangling the resistances that prevent the
memory from being recognized, and this ―bringing forth‖ is the same as subjecting this
memory, or this drive-presentation, to its place within the subject‘s linear experience of
time. By attending to the priority of bodily temporality in Freud‘s work, we can begin to
shift the metapsychological axis of investigation into the non-identical from model of
linear and non-linear temporality to the axis of time and timelessness. But in order to
complete this shift in emphasis, we must first investigate the relationship between the
timeless nature of the unconsciousness and linear time that defines the more radical forms
of temporality in psychoanalysis: the ―return of the repressed‖ and ―repetition
compulsion.‖

III. Working through Nachträglichkeit

The repressed always returns, defining what many have argued is the radical
temporality of the psychoanalytic critique of the modern subject.115 The psychoanalytic
premise of not only the ―indestructibility‖ of the repressed, but also its continual
influence on the present stands in stark contrast with the assumptions of a rationality
grounded in linear notion of time (SE 5: 577; GW 2&3: 583). The subject of
114

In thinking about this specific function of analysis and reification Joel Whitebook argues ―the goal of
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psychoanalysis is positioned as out of joint, out of time. The repressed past, having never
been, is never past; it constantly trips up the subject, foiling its plans, sabotaging its
speech. As Marcuse notes in Eros and Civilization, by ―undermining the notion of the
individual of self-mastery‖ psychoanalysis ―undermines one of the strongest ideological
fortifications of modern culture—namely the notion of the autonomous individual‖
(Marcuse 1974, 57). The subject, caught in the thrall of the unruly drives and an
unmasterable past, is divided from himself or her self and simply cannot master himself
or herself. Already always belated, the subject of psychoanalysis experiences the nonlinearity of time.116
Nonetheless, if Freud‘s adherence to Kantian schematism exposes the linear
model of time underlying both the drives and repression, then this would force us to
rethink the radical implications of the temporality of the repressed. Perhaps, the radical
temporality of Nachträglichkeit still assumes a linear model of time, thus making the
repressed subject to conscious rationalization.117 Is not this same subject, the subject of
repression, the subject of belatedness, not also the same subject of analysis? Is not the job
of analysis to rationalize, to bring into grammar of speech, and thus into a temporal order,
these repressed moments, desires, drives? While we have examined the temporality of the
function of repression, its excision of a schematized excitation from the linearity of time,
we have yet to discuss the temporality of the repressed itself, the very temporality that
defers and repeats for the subject, the temporality of an intractable fixation within the
116

For example, in ―Temporality and Translation‖ Laplanche argues that psychoanalysis, ―after Freud‖ can
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In Perversion and Utopia Joel Whitebook makes a parallel claim. He argues ―rather than subverting the
Enlightenment, the decentration of the subject is an essential moment in the project of enlightenment that is
consistent with its own concept‖ (Whitebook 1996, 92). In other words, as Whitebook writes the
―dispossession of a naively centered ego is a necessary propaedeutic to the repossession of a more adequate
ego‖ (Whitebook 1996, 93).
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subject‘s development. In other words, we must now turn to the temporality of trauma
and its relationship to the phenomenal nature of the drives and repression.118
Although one can find the temporality of trauma throughout Freud‘s work, from
the discussion of the belated nature of trauma one finds in Studies on Hysteria to the
discussion of the traumatic reverberations of the murder of the father in Totem and
Taboo, Freud most explicitly examines this temporality in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
As already briefly mentioned, this text is the result of Freud‘s attempt to render sense out
of the ―traumatic neuroses‖ that were the result of the ―terrible war,‖ World War I (SE
18: 12; GW 13: 9). These neuroses, he notes, ―have the characteristic of repeatedly
bringing the patient back into the situation of his accident, a situation from which he
wakes up in another fright‖ (SE 18: 13; GW 13: 10). Before the war, psychoanalysis
assumed the rule of the pleasure principle—which ―the mental apparatus endeavors to
keep the quantity of excitation in it as low as possible‖ (SE 18: 9; GW 13: 5). Yet, with
these returning veterans, the mental apparatus did not seek the avoidance of intense
excitation, but rather repeated it, over and over again.119 As Freud writes:
[…] we come now to a new and remarkable fact, namely that the compulsion to
repeat [Wiederholungzwang] also recalls from the past experiences which include
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no possibility of pleasure [die keine Lustmöglichkeit], and which can never, even
long ago, have brought satisfaction even to drive impulses [Triebregungen] which
have since been repressed [verdrängten]. (SE 18: 20; GW 13: 18)
In the face of this fact, Freud is forced to admit that the ―most that can be said, therefore,
is that there exists in the mind a strong tendency towards the pleasure principle, but that
that tendency is opposed by certain other forces or circumstances‖ (SE 18: 9; GW 13: 5).
While the ego tends towards the schematization of excitation in accordance with the rule
of the pleasure principle, there exists other tendencies that not only contradict the
pleasure principle‘s attempt to quell excitation, but also do so on another temporal model:
repetition.
The experience of this repetition does not necessitate horrors of war. For who
among us does not feel as though we are ―pursued by some malignant fate or possessed
by some ‗daemonic‘ power‖ continually asserting itself silently, causing us to repeat a
past that we cannot recognize, not to mention divest ourselves of (SE 18: 21; GW 13:
20).120 From the ―benefactor who is abandoned in anger after a time by each of his
protégés‖ to ―the man whose friendships all end in betrayal,‖ the compulsion to repeat
represents the opposing force to the pleasure principle (SE 18: 22; GW 13: 20). In as
much as the compulsion to repeat challenges the rule of the pleasure principle, and in as
much as it is characterized by an iterative temporality, then does not the compulsion to
repeat represent a radical form of temporality, that is the temporality not of the function
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of repression, but of the repressed itself and its continual incursion into the subject‘s
experience of linear temporality? If this is the case, then is not the repressed subject the
opposite of rational subject? And if this is the case, then is not the repressed, perhaps, the
non-identical? To answer this we must turn, again to Freud‘s description of the synthetic
function of the ego under traumatic conditions.
Freud‘s ―far fetched speculation‖ in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is not limited
his Kantian musings alone. Indeed, in order to explain the development of the ego as a
defensive mechanism organizing bodily excitations, Freud asks us to ―picture a living
organism in its most simplified possible form as an undifferentiated vesicle of a
substance that is susceptible to stimulation‖ (SE 18: 26: GW 13: 25). This ―little fragment
of living substance‖ would be, Freud writes, ―suspended in the middle of an external
world charged with the most powerful energies‖ (SE 18: 27: GW 13: 26). Due to the
constant barrage of stimulus from the external world, this receptive ―little organism‖
would have to form a ―crust [Rinde]‖ which
[…] would at last have been so thoroughly ‗baked through‘ [durchgebrannt] by
stimulation that it would present the most favourable possible conditions for the
reception of stimuli and become incapable of any further modification. In terms of
the system Cs., this would mean that its elements could undergo no further
permanent modification from the passage of excitation, because they had already
been modified in the respect in question to the greatest possible extent: now,
however, they would have become capable of giving rise to consciousness. (SE
18: 26; GW 13: 25f.)
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Conscious perception of the world is the result of the ―permanent modifications‖ made on
the external part of the organism as it continually receives and processes stimulus. As the
organism is charged with receiving and responding to this stimulus, as it is subjected to
the similar forms of stimulus over and over again, the very psychical mechanisms
translating the bodily reception of stimulus recognize patterns and subject all other forms
of stimuli to those patterns. Specifically here, we can see Freud, again, materializing the
Kantian categories. As we saw for Kant the mental temporal patterns, or concepts
apprehending the world, are part of the subject from the beginning. They are specific
rules applied to the pure intuition of time, thus forming the basis of experience itself. For
Freud, although the pure intuition of time is located in the body and not the
understanding, it remains linear. Nonetheless, because the body is the site of the pure
intuition of time, the relationship between the body and stimulus is determinative for the
development of the rules applied to the pure intuition of time. In as much as this
relationship is varied, then so too will the concepts organizing the different rules of time
vary. In this way Freud inverts the priority not of the pure intuition of time in Kant, but
the concepts that organize the different experiences of the pure intuition of time. In other
words, whereas for Kant the concepts organizing time are a priori, for Freud the concepts
organizing time are the representation of the historical relationship between the body and
the forms of stimulus to which it is subjected. The temporal structures of the concepts
presenting objects are grounded in the repetitious bodily reception of similar forms of
external stimulus. Thus consciousness, the experience of the reception of these stimuli,
arises from these permanent modifications in the reception of bodily stimulus—it is no
more than the rind that forms outside of the organism itself.
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As with any rind, consciousness is not only the hardened outside that defends
against the outside, but is simultaneously a protection of what lies beneath. As Freud
writes ―Protection against stimuli is an almost more important function for the living
organism than reception of stimuli‖ (SE 18: 27; GW 13: 27). For the organism cannot
take in all of the stimuli it is subjected to; it must sort out stimuli, create convenient
patterns to abbreviate the constant onslaught of stimuli that surrounds it. In other words it
must become an inflexible ―shield‖ both excluding stimulus while simultaneously
translating it (SE 18: 28: GW 13: 27).121 What is schematized is brought into time, while
what is not schematized remains timeless. ―By its death‖ Freud argues, the outer layer of
the organism, thus saves ―all the deeper layers a similar fate‖ (SE 18: 27; GW 13: 27).
Trauma is the result of ―excitations from outside that are powerful enough to
break through the protective shield‖ of the egoic schematization of stimulus (SE 18: 29;
GW 13: 29). It disrupts the patterns and schemas forming the basis of perception and
understanding. It is too much, too different, too quick. It cannot be sorted by the
schematic bodily categories that have been established. As such the traumatized subject
fails to synthesize, and thus protect, the deeper layers from the force of this excitation.
For the moment, Freud argues, the pleasure principle is ―put out of action‖ (SE 18: 29;
GW 13: 29). At this moment there ―is no longer the possibility of preventing the mental
apparatus from being flooded with large amounts of stimulus, and another problem arises
instead—the problem of mastering the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of
binding them‖ (SE 18: 30; GW 13: 29). Not only is the event overwhelming for the
subject of trauma, but also during the event itself, there is an abdication of the rule of the
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What becomes of what is left behind at this stage is not the repressed, but will in fact be what the
disavowed as I will show in the next chapter.
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pleasure principle—the very schema organizing perceptive experience is shut down. As a
result, there is a flood of stimulus, a breaking of the dam. Normal things, things
schematized on a daily basis, flood in without interpretation, and flood in without
cognitive recognition. Having impacted the deeper layers, they scar them. These scars
insist, demanding interpretation and thus rational mastery.122
The task of mastery is the task of binding excitations, and the case of the internal
scars of external trauma only highlights this function for Freud. If we take this model of
external trauma, Freud argues, and turn it in on itself, we get an interesting picture of how
the force of the drives might institute ―disturbances comparable [gleichzustellen] with
traumatic neuroses,‖ because the protective shield is not turned inward (SE 18: 34; GW
13: 35). In other words, our ―little organism‖ with its ―crusted over‖ exterior is also
subject to the force of internal excitations. Just as with external stimulation the ―task of
the higher strata of the mental apparatus‖ would be to ―bind the drive excitations‖ that
―press toward discharge‖ (SE 18: 34; GW 13: 35f.). And just as a failure to schematize
external stimulation results in the internal scars that insists on mastery, a
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unconscious. For Laplanche the unconscious emerges from the inability of children to translate ―enigmatic
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on the individual and on the ego of the constant stimulation exerted from the inside by the repressed thingpresentations, which can be described as the source-objects of the drive‖ (Laplanche 1999b, 129).
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[…] failure to effect this binding would provoke a disturbance analogous to a
traumatic neurosis; and only after the binding has been accomplished would it be
possible for the dominance of the pleasure principle [die Herrschaft des
Lustprinzips] (and of its modification, the reality principle) to proceed
unhindered. (SE 18: 35; GW 13: 36)
Before the drives can be organized by the rule of the pleasure principle, they must first be
bound by a prior mechanism. As we have already seen, excitations are initially
apprehended, and thus bound, through the body‘s temporalization of that reception. Once
a sense of self, grounded in this bodily schematization, begins to develop these drives are
spatialized in accordance with the rule of the pleasure principle. Thus the ―task of
mastering or binding excitations‖ operates prior to the pleasure principle (SE 18: 35; GW
13: 36). When this primary task of temporalizing the drives fails the drive remains
timeless and thus a-rational.123 In other words, in as much as the drive never becomes
temporalized, it never attains the status of the phenomenal drive-presentation that
becomes further organized in accordance with the pleasure principle. The drive thus
remains unconscious, an a-temporal specter bending time, haunting the present, working
itself out outside of the temporal dimensions of consciousness itself. Constantly subject
to this non-bound drive, the prior mechanisms of schematizing internal excitations
continually repeat their attempts to bind this drive, to master it by binding it, thus
bringing it into consciousness by subjecting it to the rule of the pleasure principle. These
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In an essay entitled ―Le Rythme et la Raison‖ Jean-Claude Rolland describes the iterative temporality of
the primary synthesis. He writes ―La repetition qui, dans le système préconscient, œuvre au cœur du travail
représentatif, au cœur de l‘activité de pensée don‘t on sait qu‘elle est virtuellement infinie, cette repetition
serait donc la marquee au sein meme du moi, du ça et de sa pulsion, et cela de la meme façon que, comme
Freud le dit dans le beau texte qu‘il lui consacre, la negation est dans le moi la marquee du refoulement,
l‘équivalent du made in Germany‖ (Rolland 1997, 1627).

115

primary mechanisms are the source of its iterative temporality: it tries to bind a past
drive, over and over, in the present otherwise—it is a temporality defined by repetition
and difference. As André Green notes, the ―repetition compulsion was the difference of
the timelessness of the unconscious and the timelessness of the unconscious is a way to
keep, to conserve beyond the experience of reality, the deception. The repetition
compulsion is in fact the murder of time‖ (Green 2008, 1037). Non-schematized drive
returns otherwise. Indeed this would seem to be the very kernel of the unconscious, that
part of our selves that is non-identical. If this ―thing‖ that the primary mechanism of
schematizing fails to bind is the non-identical, then would not the trauma of the external,
the internalization of an un-schematized external excitation be the non-identical as well?
Would it not be the phantom which haunts us, sending us on errands that are not our
own?124
Yet, is the ―thing‖ of trauma repressed, and is the repressed equivalent to the
unconscious?125 If it were then the repressed would be the source of what appears to be
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the radical temporality of Nachträglichkeit. But, as we have seen, the repressed is
unconscious, but cannot be the unconscious itself, and thus cannot be the source of the
iterative temporality of Nachträglichkeit. If we take Freud‘s Kantian distinction between
the conscious and the unconscious seriously, then the distinction is between time and
timelessness. The unconscious is the in-itself of the phenomenal presentation of both
internal and external excitations that have been subjected to bodily schematization. In
contrast to this timelessness, as we have seen, primary repression prevents drivepresentations, drives that have already been schematized, from becoming conscious.
Thus, all repressed drive-presentations are unconscious, but not everything that is
unconscious is repressed. And this distinction can also be articulated as that which has
already been schematized but defended against, and that which has never been, nor can
be, brought into consciousness.
Furthermore, the unconscious, as non-schematized materiality, cannot be the
source of this iterative temporality. Unlike Lacan, who will argue that the unconscious is
outside of time, because it is the source of time itself, for Freud the unconscious is itself
timeless. As existing without time—not outside of time—the unconscious is not the
source of time, but rather what has been excluded from schematization. One can only
argue that the unconscious is the source of iterative temporality from the perspective of
linear time. In other words, one can only conceptualize the deferred effects of both the
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repressed and the unconscious itself from the perspective of concepts that are already
ordered by the assumption of a sequential chain of sutured ―nows.‖ And indeed, what
would it mean to speak of the ―deferred‖ or ―belated‖ temporality of trauma without the
prior assumption that what has been deferred, should have been located at another
moment in time, and has been moved down the chain of linear time to another moment, a
moment that happens after, later? What more is a belated being, but one that feels the
wavering edges of one‘s experience as the past comes crashing into the present, again,
and again. Thus the unconscious is not the ―source‖ of this temporality, but rather the
temporality of Nachträglichkeit is only a higher ordering, a different ordering, of an a
priori schematization that assumes a linear model of time. What is unconscious is
timeless. What is conscious has been schematized according in line with a linear model
of time. The belated temporality of Nachträglichkeit is not located in the timeless
unconscious, but is located in the experience of a disorder of linear temporality that must
logically assume the linear model of temporality. Thus, if ―belatedness‖ is a radical
challenge to the rational temporality of modern subject, it is only because it assumes and
reorders that model of temporality. Yet, it seems that the radical nature of the nonidentical is located in its timelessness, not in the schema‘s attempt to rationalize it. It is a
radicality that would still remain, because it is the resistance to rationalization itself. This
is why the non-identical cannot be the repressed: the subject can rationalize the repressed.
The repressed can be overcome. And this is, of course, the goal of analysis itself.126
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IV. Beyond Repression: Toward the Navel of Analysis
When one turns back to Freud‘s Kantian construction of not only of the
unconscious, but also the drives and repression, the temporality of the unconscious
becomes quite clear. Freud‘s appeal to Kant to describe, and in some senses legitimate,
the unconscious positions the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious as a
phenomenal one. This distinction is fundamentally one that separates what appears for us
and what does not appear for us, in terms of what has been schematized and what resists
or fails to be schematized. In other words, the distinction between what appears and what
does not is a distinction between what has been temporalized by the subject along a linear
model of time and that part of the object, or experience, that has not and thus remains
timeless. In as much as the unconscious is ―timeless‖ it does not appear, cannot appear.
Thus, the unconscious remains that thing, which is but does not appear, that which exists
beyond rationality itself.
As I have shown, Freud‘s appeal to the ―timeless‖ nature of the unconscious
means neither that the unconscious is time itself, nor that the unconscious is the nonschematized portion of our conscious reflection on our self. Rather, the unconscious for
Freud is the result of the phenomenal nature of the drives themselves. In turning Kant‘s
―Copernican turn‖ in our selves, Freud materializes Kant‘s schematism, rooting the
phenomenological distinction not in cognitive reflection on the self, but rather in the
bodily translation of internal stimulus, the drives. All one ―knows‖ of the drives is what
has been conceptualized, the drive-presentation, or what has been schematized. While
primary process scene—so that it can subsequently [nachträglich], in accordance with the reality principle,
be structured thought, understood, and perhaps also mastered‖ (Dahl 2010, 741).
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this schematization occurs on the level of the a priori synthesis of the categories of
understanding for Kant, for Freud the body schematizes through the patterns established
by the body‘s continual subjection to internal and external stimulus. And while they place
the locus of schematization in different places: rationality for Kant and the body for
Freud, they both rely on a linear model of time to explain the temporality that underlies
the phenomenological divide.
In as much as the unconscious is formed through the phenomenological split in
the drives themselves, repression will become a way to manipulate this process and it too
will thus assume a linear model of time. We have, thus, seen that the Freudian concept of
repression is rooted in a temporal structure that favors the rationality of the subject. The
subject of knowing and historical narration structures the analytic situation. In fact,
analysis, one could argue, is no more than reconstructing the subject‘s experience of time,
of the subject narrating its own history and overcoming the resistances to that narration.
And while the form of these resistances may look different for Freud depending on
whether that resistance is a primary or secondary function of the ego, analysis has the
same goal: to allow the subject to rationalize its own history by side-stepping those
resistances and bringing the repressed into a linear model of time, even if belatedly. Since
the repressed has already been schematized the repressed can be brought into the
subject‘s experience of time. In fact, techniques of analysis structured by the dynamics of
repression seek to do just that, to work through resistances so that what has been made
unconscious can become conscious. And the repressed can become conscious, or
historically narrated, because it is already structured by the temporality of consciousness,
i.e., it has been schematized. Just as for Kant, the concepts of the understanding and the
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materiality of the intuition come together through the transcendental time determination,
so too can the repressed become schematized by the subject‘s narration of their own
history, because it shares with the subject‘s sense of history a linear structure of time.
Thus, when political thought appeals to Freud‘s concept of repression, or even Freud‘s
concept of Nachträglichkeit, political thought is not confronting the non-identical, but
rather a form of alienation that can be rationalized in end, that can fundamentally be
overcome.
It is the spirit of Kant that haunts the political turn to Freud. For in as much as
political thought heralds the repressed and its temporality as the non-identical, it remains
in the thrall of a hidden desire that overvalues the power of rationality. In Freud‘s appeal
to Kant you find this rationality tucked away in the linear model of time that forms
cognition itself. This is what Adorno means in his lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason when he writes
Kant‘s critique of reason would not conceivable in the absence of this idea of the
social and political emancipation of the human subject that has ceased to act out a
submissive role towards the world and instead discovered in the freedom and
autonomy of the subject the principle which alone enables the world to be known.
(Adorno 2001, 135)
Is not this dream of emancipation and subjective mastery located in a model of
temporality that operates successively, the model of temporality that makes the concept
of change itself comprehensible?127 Is this not this dream abstracted into a model of
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Indeed on can see this same spirit in Eva Schaper‘s essay entitled ―Kant‘s Schematism Reconsidered,‖
where she argues that Kantian schematism can be understood as part of one‘s ―active‖ and ―productive‖
engagement with the world (Schaper 1964, 290).
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temporality, the very same dream that underlies Freud‘s concept of the repressed in as
much as he appeals to Kant‘s model of temporality?128 If political thought wanted to
think the non-identical, if it wanted to confront the limits of its own rationality, and thus
curb its desire for the illusion of radical change premised on the power of rationality,
would it not have to look elsewhere, toward the timeless itself, toward that which is
fundamentally non-schematized?
In an essay entitled ―Resistances,‖ Jacques Derrida draws our attention a footnote
in The Interpretation of Dreams. In this footnote, Freud, frustrated with his analysis of a
dream, muses over the fact that every dream has a ――navel, as it were, that is its point of
contact with the unknown [gleichsam einen Nabel, durch den er mit dem Unerkannten
zusammenhängt]‖ beyond which analysis cannot go (Freud, SE 4: 110fn; GW 2: 116fn.).
For Derrida, Freud‘s navel represents ―a night, an absolute unknown that is originarily,
congenitally bound or tied (but also in itself unbound because ab-solute) to the essence
and to the birth of the dream‖ (Derrida 1998, 10f.). This ―navel‖ is, as Derrida continues,
a ―scar‖ that ―is knot against which analysis can do nothing‖ (Derrida 1998, 11). Beyond
this knot one will not find the repressed, but rather the non-schematized no ―thing‖ that
resists the rationality of analysis, and perhaps it is toward this that we should now turn.
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Although without reference to Kant, Marie Moscovici captures this sentiment nicely in ―La dictature de
la raison,‖ Nouvelle Revue de Psychoanalyse 27 (1983): 65-84.
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Chapter Three

At the Limits of Rationality:
Freud’s Concept of Disavowal
In other attacks, however, the pathogenic material consisted of pieces of the patient‘s childhood
memory, which had not come to light while I was analyzing him and which now came away—the
comparison is unavoidable—like sutures after an operation, or small fragments of neurotic bone.
--Freud, ―Analysis Terminable and Interminable‖

In 1933 the Nazi party comes into power, formally constituting the Third Reich.
Four years later and under the protection of the Catholic Church, Freud writes and
publishes ―Analysis Terminable and Interminable‖ and the first two sections of Moses
and Monotheism. These texts are remarkable for their focus on both the limits of the
techniques of analysis as well as politics. These limits, one might think, could be the
result of Freud‘s growing pessimism given his historical conditions. And, of course, there
is support for this when one reads Freud confiding to Ernest Jones in 1934 that ―[t]times
are bleak and life is no longer easy‖ (Paskauskas 1995, 735); or speaking of the
impending Nazi incursion into Austria in 1937 that ―[t]he only hope remaining is that one
will not live to see it oneself‖ (Paskauskas 1995, 757).129 While it would, of course, be
easy to reduce the tone of Freud‘s late work solely to historical context, one could just as
easily ask if the historical context revealed limits already endemic to psychoanalysis. In
fact, these limits of analysis and politics in Freud‘s late work blur the line between theory
and history, between his forthcoming exile to England and the theorization of the Jewish
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One might be tempted to look at Freud‘s last confession in light of Adorno‘s claim in Minima Moralia
that ―Only a human to whom death has become as indifferent as its members, that has itself died, can inflict
it administratively on innumerable people. Rilke‘s prayer for ‗one‘s own death‘ is a piteous attempt to
conceal the fact that nowadays people merely snuff out‖ (Adorno, MM 248).

123

Diaspora in Moses and Monotheism, between his concern for the permanency of political
censorship and the very limits of analysis itself. Each time these thresholds of analysis, or
politics, emerge in Freud‘s writing, so too does the concept of disavowal (Verleugnung).
By 1938 Verleugnung is not a new concept in Freud‘s thought. In fact, one can
find the term as early as Freud and Breuer‘s 1895 Studies on Hysteria,130 Freud‘s 1901
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life,131 and his 1913 Totem and Taboo.132
Nonetheless, it is widely recognized that Freud does not develop the conceptual
framework of disavowal as a distinct form of psychical defense until the early 1920‘s, a
few years after the introduction of the death drive and the second topography of the
psyche.133 When Freud begins to develop this concept it indicates, according to
Laplanche and Pontalis, the subject‘s ―refusal to recognize the reality of a traumatic
perception—most especially the perception of the absence of the woman‘s penis‖
(Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 118). It is a refusal to accept a ―reality‖ by bifurcating
one‘s belief; it is a refusal of the logic of non-contradiction itself, the very basis, and one
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In Freud‘s chapter ―Psychotherapy of Hysteria‖ in Studies on Hysteria, Freud uses the term Verleugnen
to describe a specific instance of resistance to therapy. This case seems remarkably similar to his later
description of Verneinung in his 1925 essay ―Negation.‖ In ―Psychotherapy of Hysteria‖ Freud claims that
―There are cases, too, in which the patient tries to disown [verleugnen] it [a pathogenic recollection] even
after its return. ‗Something has just occurred to me now, but you obviously put it in my head.‘ Or, ‗I know
what you expect me to answer. Of course you believe I‘ve this or that.‘ A particularly clever method of
disavowal [Verleugnen] lies in saying: ‗Something has occurred to me now, it‘s true, but it seems to me as
if I‘d put it in deliberately‘‖ (SE 2: 280; GW 1: 282).
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In a chapter entitled ―Forgetting of Impressions‖ from the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud
examines how forgetting acts a defense against intolerable memories or associations. He calls this defense
both ―disowning [Ableugnen]‖ (SE 6: 144; GW 4: 160) and ―disavowal [Verleugnung]‖ (SE 6: 145; GW 4:
161).
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In the last chapter of this text Freud uses the term Verleugnung to describe the self-deceptive
displacements that propel the development of the instantiation of law after the murder of the father. Freud
argues that this final displacement, this final distancing not only of the memory of the deed, but also the
responsibility for the deed, represents the ―most extreme disavowal [Verleugnung] of the great crime which
was the beginning of society and of the sense of guilt‖ (SE 13: 150; GW 9: 181, translation modified).
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See Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 118-121.
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might say, of reason and logic itself. During the following years the concept of disavowal
becomes more and more important not only as an intractable resistance to both analysis
and politics, but also a primary function of the psyche equal in stature to the ―cornerstone [Grundpfleiler]‖ of psychoanalysis: repression (SE 14: 16; GW 10: 54).134
Freud‘s focus on this concept in his late work highlights the limits of rationality.
If disavowal indicates the limit of analysis, and if analysis is predicated on articulating
and rationalizing the repressed by bringing it into time, then disavowal would pose the
limit of analysis because it would indicate the intractable nature of the non-rational
character of the subject. This non-rational character, unlike repression, would not operate
on linear model time, because it would not operate within time. It would be that which
escapes, but effects, consciousness because it escapes the schematizing functions of time.
In other words, by turning to disavowal we are turning the non-identical, and by turning
to the non-identical we are turning to the functions of consciousness that operate nonsynthetically. Taking up disavowal as the non-identical forces both psychoanalysis and
political theory to grapple with that part that not only escapes consciousness, but also
seeks to undermine it, that part that not only alienates the subject from itself, but also
guarantees and secures this alienation.135 Disavowal poses the limit marking the
boundaries of a critique of political rationality. In as much as political theory must also
go beyond the confines of what can be rationalized, conceptualized—or brought into a
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For an excellent analysis and tracing of this concept and form of defense see: Michael Franz Basch,
―The Perception of Reality and the Disavowal of Meaning,‖ The Annual of Psychoanalysis 11 (1983): 125153.
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For an example of the limits posed by the death drive and the timeless nature of the unconscious, things
that are all bound up with the concept of disavowal see: Oliver Flournoy, ―Le temps, l‘inconscient et la
pulsion de mort,‖ Revue Française de Psychanalyse 61, no. 5 (1997): 1863-1872.
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model of linear time that promises the overcoming of alienation—it can only do so by
taking the concept of disavowal as seriously as Freud took it in his late writings.
While, as we will see, disavowal becomes central to Freud‘s thinking of analysis
and politics, the development of the concept is not without its own vicissitudes, slowly
becoming modified and shifting around the framework of analysis. Thus, this chapter has
two interrelated goals. First, the chapter will disentangle the concept from the shifts and
associations it gathers along this trajectory, specifically in terms of fetishism. Second, it
will follow the chronological development of the concept in order to argue that by the
end of his life Freud not only saw this concept as a primary function of the psyche.
Finally, I will conclude by arguing that disavowal defends against schematization and
thus indicates the non-identical in psychoanalytic thought. This will set us up for an
investigation into how disavowal presents the limits not only of the analytic situation, but
also of the political in the following chapter.

I. The Brambles of Fetishistic Disavowal

When one considers the concept of disavowal, the concept of fetishism is fast on
its heels, often overtaking it. There is good reason for this. The closest Freud comes to a
metapsychological definition of disavowal is in his 1927 essay ―Fetishism.‖ In this essay,
he differentiates disavowal from repression through the example of fetishism. In light of
this, this essay sets up the prevalent association between disavowal and fetishism in the
psychoanalytic, philosophical, and political literature alike. In this section I will explore
the concept of fetishistic disavowal so that I may differentiate it from disavowal. I will
argue that the discourse of fetishistic disavowal entwines the concept of disavowal within
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a framework of masculine desire and paranoid fears of castration by turning disavowal
into a defense at the Oedipal stage. Instead of subsuming the concept of disavowal under
the auspices of these paranoid fears, I will suggest in the next section that disavowal is a
primary mechanism of the psyche, representing the non-synthetic functions of the ego
equal in stature to repression.136 In other words, if disavowal cannot be extricated from
fetishism, the structure of disavowal would be based in the fully formed egoic defenses of
the Oedipal complex. If disavowal is a strictly Oedipal defense, then it cannot be
separated from the masculine and patriarchal assumptions characterizing Freud‘s
description of this phase. Moreover, and this is my fundamental point, the story of
fetishistic disavowal occludes, as I will show in the next section, the more interesting
story of disavowal as a primary defense that constitutes the ego itself. For, the move to
distance the concept of disavowal from the concept of fetishism is a move to distance the
concept of disavowal from what Deleuze and Guattari have called the ―imperialism of
Oedipus‖ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000, 54). What is at stake in this move, as with
Kristeva‘s discussion of the semiotic, is an attempt to wrest the concept way form the
dominance of the symbolic, and specifically a symbolic order structured by the erasure of
women, and toward the material instantiations of meaning that are not pre-, or antiOedipal, but perhaps, just non-Oedipal. By highlighting the non-Oedipal possibilities of
the concept, I want to examine not only the formal aspects of disavowal but also the
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As Deleuze and Guttari argue, the sovereign rule of Oedipus in the mythology of psychoanalysis
excludes ―the free syntheses where everything is possible: endless connections, non-exclusive disjunctions,
nonspecific conjunctions, partial objects and flows‖ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000, 54). For an overview of
this position see: Alphonso Lingis, ―Oedipus Rex: The Oedipus Rule and its Subversion,‖ Human Studies
7, no. 1 (1984): 91-100. While I do think that Deleuze and Guattari, help us to think what the primary
processes would look like out from under the shadow of Oedipus, I agree with Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel
and Béla Grunberger‘s critique of Deleuze and Guattari‘s focus on possibility and liberation in Freud or
Reich?: Psychoanalysis and Illusion, which they attribute to latent fidelity to Wilhelm Reich (ChasseguetSmirgel and Grunberger 1986, 13).
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extreme polymorphous mobility of its material instantiations. And it is in the interest of
setting the concept of disavowal free, that we must first understand how it becomes
entangled with the mechanism of fetishism.
From ―evil-smelling feet‖ (Freud, SE 7: 155fn; GS 5: 28fn) to totemic practices,
to the ―glance of the nose‖ (SE 21: 152; GW 14: 311), Freud was always interested in
fetishistic practices. Examples of fetishism pepper his texts and often take center-stage in
them, as one can see in Totem and Taboo. But what is it about the practice of fetishism
that so fascinates Freud? To answer this, we should turn to Freud‘s description of the
central feature of fetishism in his 1905 text Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Here
he describes fetishism as the substitution of a sexual object for
[…] some part of the body (such as the foot or hair) which is in general very
inappropriate for sexual purposes, or some inanimate object which bears an
assignable relation to the person whom it replaces and preferably to that person‘s
sexuality (e.g. a piece of clothing or underlinen). Such substitutes are with some
justice likened to the fetishes in which savages believe that their gods are
embodied [Dieser Ersatz wird nicht mit Unrecht mit dem Fetisch verglichen, in
dem der Wilde seinen Gott verkörpert sieht]. (SE 7: 153; GS 5: 26)
The fetishist displaces his or her sexual aim from an ―appropriate‖ object to an
―inappropriate‖ object, presumably, for Freud, from people to things. These objects bear
a metonymic relationship to the person, but slowly become the object of sexual pleasure
for the fetishist. The fetishist, in this sense, converts the object of his or her sexual aim
from people to things that are associatively linked to the former person of their sexual
aim. This associative displacement of sexual aim—from the person to objects that touch
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the person‘s genitals, to objects that touch the objects that touch the person‘s genitals,
etc.—is similar to the ―savages‖ who embody their belief in transcendent forces to
material objects. For Freud, both ―savages‖ and the fetishist take the thing to not be
representative of the concept, but rather take the thing to be the concept or person. Thus,
a fetishist, in some sense, denies the representative and associative, thus symbolic,
character of the object of their sexual aim; he or she mistakes the thing for the
representation.137
For Freud, fetishism is not in and of itself pathological. For all symptoms, one
consistently finds in Freud‘s texts, are only exaggerations of universal psychical
mechanisms. And thus, for Freud, there is a touch of fetishism in all of our sexual lives.
From carrying an object belonging to your lover, to the smell of a lover‘s shirt when one
puts it on, our sexual lives are filled with minute displacements of sexual pleasure.138
While not pathological in itself, the displacement of fetishism can become pathological
for Freud
[…] when the longing [das Streben] for the fetish passes beyond the point of
being merely a necessary condition attached to the sexual object and actually
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The denial of the symbolic in fetishism is, one could argue, what originally draws him to makes the
association between disavowal and fetishism. This makes sense given, as we will see in the next section,
that the early formulations of disavowal were meant to explain the genetic root of psychoses as opposed to
the repressive roots of the neuroses. It is only after the essay on fetishism, again as I will show in the next
section, where Freud begins to distance his concept from both neurosis and psychoses, by focusing more on
its character of ―splitting‖ and the denial not of reality by contradiction. One could trace this via Klein to
Kristeva who argues that abjection concerns neither neurosis nor psychosis, but the borderline personality,
the pervert who neither denies the symbolic nor retreats into it, but rather manipulates it. For the
relationship, or challenge, that Kristeva‘s account of abjection can make to Freud‘s concept of fetishism
see: Tina Chanter, ―Abjection, or Why Freud Introduces the Phallus: Identification, Castration Theory, and
the Logic of Fetishism,‖ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004): 48-66.
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In ―The Evasion of Gender in Freudian Fetishism,‖ Donovan Miyasaki argues that ―the non-pathological
fetishist evades the construction of gender in terms of sexual roles‖ thus this form of non-pathological
fetishism can ―serve as a critique of Freud‘s masculine model of sexual instinct and relation‖ (Miyasaki
2003, 289).
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takes the place of the normal aim, and, further, when the fetish becomes detached
[loslöst] from a particular individual and becomes the sole sexual object. (SE 7:
154; GS 5: 27)
Only when the object becomes separated from its association with the person, when the
object becomes a sexual object in itself, does the normalized displacement become a
symptom of something deeper, collapsing the symbolic significance of the ―normal‖
function of fetishism. That is to say, if the everyday form of fetishism involves displacing
one‘s sexual aim onto an object associated with a person, then the object retains a
symbolic value. It is a material thing representing the other of one‘s desire. When
fetishism becomes a symptom it disassociates the person from the object, thus collapsing
the symbolic value of the object. The object becomes a good in itself for the fetishist,
representing nothing other than itself; it is the ―sole‖ object of the fetishist‘s desire.
Twenty-two years after Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud writes the
seminal essay ―Fetishism.‖ In this essay he argues the symbolic collapse of the object of
desire is a defense against the idea associated with the object. One defends against its
associations by ―zooming in,‖ as it were, on the material instantiation of the idea‘s
representation, allowing sensuous materiality to overtake the idea.139 This, for Freud,
represents the difference between repression and disavowal. Repression, as we have seen,
manipulates the schematization of the drives, excising certain drive-presentations from
the subject‘s reflective experience of its history. Repression thus concerns the vicissitudes
of ―affect‖ in psychical life: how these affects become bound to time, excised from time,
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See: Alan Bass, Disavowal and Difference: The Trauma of Eros (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2000); Alan Bass, ―The Problem of Concreteness,‖ Psychoanalytic Quarterly 66 (1997): 642-682;
Lawrence Brown, ―On Concreteness,‖ Psychoanalytic Review 72 (1985): 379-402.
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roam around outside of linear time, seeking some form of historical expression, even if
only in displaced and condensed manners (SE 21: 153; GW 14: 313). In contrast,
disavowal represents ―the vicissitude of the idea [das Schicksal der Vorstellung]‖ (SE 21:
153; GW 14: 313). And this is, Freud argues, exactly what we see in fetishism. It is not
the materiality of the drive-presentation that must be defended against, but rather the
Vorstellung of the drive-presentation. The object associated with the drive-presentation
disassociates itself from the drive-presentation. It appears not as something good for its
relationship to the idea (or person), but rather as a good in itself, something to be desired
on its own.140 Thus, in fetishism‘s dissociative substitution of the idea for the object,
Freud finds the Vorstellung of the drive is disavowed, becoming severed from the desire
for the object while still retaining this desire for the object. This allows the fetishist to
both deny and affirm the idea associated with the material representation of the idea at
the same time. Thus, what one sees in fetishism is the disavowal of an idea that must be
both acknowledged in practice and denied it in thought. What is the idea that the fetishist
defends against?
For Freud, at heart, fetishistic disavowal defends against the idea of castration.
During the Oedipal stage, a young boy, according to Freud, will have had a chance to
view female genitals—perhaps walking in on his mother, perhaps with playmate, etc.
Upon this chance encounter, the boy is confronted with sexual difference. Yet, the boy
has a problem registering this difference because, as Freud writes in his 1923 essay ―The
Infantile Genital Organization (An Interpolation into the Theory of Sexuality),‖ he
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This is, again, the difference between Marx‘s concept of fetishism and Freud‘s concept. Where in Marx
the fetish covers over material social relations with the idea, for Freud the fetish covers over the idea with
materiality.
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assumes ―all other living beings, humans and animals, possess a genital like his own‖ (SE
19: 142; GW 13: 295). Attributing everyone with a penis, what Freud calls the ―primacy
of the phallus [Primat des Phallus],‖ the boy is ―shocked‖ to find that not everyone has a
penis and moreover that the difference between men and women is marked by the
difference in genitalia (SE 19: 142; GW 13: 294).141 This perception becomes more
incompatible and threatening to the boy associates this difference with the threat of
castration. According to the boy‘s expectations the girl should have penis. Faced with the
fact that she does not, the boy must make sense of this fact in light of his expectations.
The conclusion the boy comes to, the one that is intolerably threatening to him, is that the
girl once had a penis and that it must have been taken away; the boy comes to believe
girls and women have been castrated. The perception of sexual difference, thus, becomes
the idea of anticipated castration, which the boy defends against through the fetish.142
Faced with a conflict between his expectations of the primacy of the phallus and the
representation of sexual difference as the threat of castration, little boys, Freud writes:
[…] disavow the fact and believe that they do see a penis, all the same [Sie
leugnen diesen Mangel, glauben doch ein Glied zu sehen]. They gloss over the
contradiction between observation and preconception by telling themselves that
the penis is still small and will grow bigger presently; and they then slowly come
141

For Lacan, the function of the Freudian ―primacy of the phallus‖ is strictly symbolic. It represents,
neither the anatomical distinction between the sexes for Lacan, nor is it an ―object (part-, internal, good,
bad, etc.)‖ (Lacan 2002e, 579). Instead, Lacan gives the phallus the status of master signifier; it is, he
writes, ―a signifier whose function, in the intrasubjective economy of analysis, may lift the veil from the
function it served in the mysteries. For it is the signifier that is destined to designate meaning effects as
whole, insofar as the signifier conditions them by its presence as signifier‖ (Lacan 2002e, 579).
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Speaking of both his presentation of women in his account of fetishism and disavowal, as well as in case
studies (i.e. Dora), Nancy Chodorow argues in Femininities, Masculinities, Sexualities: Freud and Beyond
that ―Freud‘s account of the male psyche represents women, and especially the mother, not only explicitly
but implicitly, or latently, as object‖ (Chodorow 1994, 25).
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to the emotionally significant conclusion that after all the penis had at least been
there before and been taken away afterwards. (SE 19: 143f.; GW 13: 296)
The little boy disavows this ―lack,‖ believing he sees a penis where there was none
before. Yet, there is no actual lack; there is only the lack produces by the boy‘s
misguided expectations, the pre-conceptions supported by a specific symbolic
framework. In this context, disavowal ‗glosses over‘ a contradiction produced not by
reality and thought, but rather produced solely within the symbolic framework‘s inability
to grasp reality. Instead of covering over this internal short circuit of the symbolic,
disavowal allows the contradiction to exist by allowing the subject to believe both
perceptions are true.
Given this story of the boy‘s Oedipal encounter with sexual difference, fetishism
emerges as a defense against the idea of castration. The fetish allows the boy to hold both
contradictory beliefs. Instead of the contradiction propelling the boy toward resolution—
as one would expect from a form of rationality based on the logic of non-contradiction—
the fetish emerges as a stop gap allowing the symbolic contradiction to persist. The fetish,
thus, replaces the idea of ―the woman‘s (the mother‘s) penis that the little boy once
believed in and—for reasons familiar to us—does not want to give up‖ (SE 21: 153; GW
14: 312). The fetish, Freud writes, is the ―memorial [Denkmal]‖ that ―the horror of
castration [der Abscheu vor der Kastration]‖ has set up for itself ―in the creation of
substitute‖ (SE 21: 154; GW 14: 313). The material instantiation of the idea of the
woman‘s penis allays the young boy‘s anxiety over the fantastical threat of castration.
Since this penis does not actually exist, because it is a semi-hallucinatory response to the
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―trauma‖ of an imaginary threat, the boy could not sustain this belief alone.143 Thus, the
young boy preserves the idea of the woman‘s penis by concretizing it in the fetish. This
act of concretization allows the young boy to rationally deny he believes women have
penises, while still preserving this belief, and thus what it wards off, in a material
object.144 The shoe, the foot, the nose, the strand of hair, thus are each fetishistic
substitutes for the imaginary female penis; they concretize the idea, turning it into a thing,
setting up the structure of disavowal as that which wards off the threat of castration.145
Through the lens of Freud‘s narration of fetishism, the concept of disavowal
appears as a mechanism that supporting the displacement of the imaginary female penis.
In other words disavowal is the result of the fetish. If disavowal were the result of the
fetish, then disavowal would also be dependent on the story of castration and sexual
difference that sets the need for the fetish in motion. And if this were the case then the
concept of disavowal would be inextricable from a narrative logic oriented toward the
telos of the Oedipal complex, and thus the erasure of women by constituting female
sexuality as a lack which then becomes subjected to a field of signification oriented by
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In The Ego Ideal, Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel argues the idea behind the creation of the fetish is two-fold
One the one hand it is the denial of sexual difference, but also it is the ―refusal to acknowledge the
difference between generations‖ which can only be maintained by the boy‘s attempt to ―pass of his small
pregenital penis as genital penis by idealizing it‖ (Chasseguet-Smirgel 1985, 104). This idealized penis
becomes a fetish that covers over the generational difference between father and son, instituting a regime of
temporal misrecognition that the son will internalize.
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In an article entitled ―Aphasia, Fetishism and Constructions in Analysis,‖ Maurits Katan makes an
provocative suggestion concerning the temporality of the fetish. He argues that the ―fetishist repeats the
pre-traumatic situation when his sexual excitement was not yet threatened by the traumatic observation that
followed‖ (Katan 1969, 552). In this sense the fetish is a memorial that continually reenacts the time before
trauma; it is a ―recollected memory‖ that defends against what follows (Katan 1969, 552).
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In a 1922 essay entitled ―Medusa‘s Head‖ Freud brings this point home when he writes that ―[t]he
snakes on Medusa‘s head ―serve actually as a mitigation of the horror [der Milderung des Grauens], for
they replace the penis, the absence of which is the cause of the horror‖ (SE 18: 273; GW 17: 47). The sight
of this ―horror,‖ he claims ―makes the spectator stiff with terror [macht starr vor Schreck], turns him to
stone‖ (SE 18: 273; GW 17: 47).
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the phallus.146 Luce Irigaray has brought this critique to bear on the Oedipal story and its
centrality to the mythos of psychoanalysis. Freud‘s narration of the Oedipal drama,
structured on the hallucinatory paranoia of the boy‘s ―overestimation‖ of the value of his
penis, captures all sexuality in the projective fears of the young boy.147 She argues that in
this structure
[w]oman‘s castration is defined as her having nothing you can see, as her having
nothing. In her having nothing penile, in seeing that she has No Thing. Nothing
like man. That is to say, no sex/organ that can be seen in a form capable of
founding its reality, reproducing its truth. Nothing to be seen is equivalent to
having no thing. No being and no truth. (Irigaray 1985a, 48)
What does the young boy ―see‖? No ―thing.‖ It is from this perceived no ―thing,‖ that the
boy constructs some ―thing‖—the fetish.148 How does this ―nothing to be seen‖ turn into
no ―thing,‖ which through the boys affective response turns into some ―thing?‖ Is the
fetish an ideological construction, the result of a prefiguring of appearance in light of not
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As Tina Chanter has argued in The Picture of Abjection, the logic of fetishism constructs women as men
by ―endowing women with fetishes‖; it is a logic that institutes the law of equivalence and sameness,
making all women like men, so that men can tolerate the existence of sexual difference (Chanter 2008,
166). For it is only after the fetishistic displacement that disavows sexual difference that the boy can fulfill
his expectations of the universality of the male genitals, can he rest at ease, can he ward off the threat of
castration. It is as if, Chanter argues, ―the boy is saying that another human being must of necessity be the
same as himself, and if this turns out not to be the case, he will simply make it the case‖ (Chanter 2008,
167). Fetishistic disavowal, thus, abstracts sexual difference and interprets it through the phallus of
masculine desire and anxiety, creating of women nothing more than beings of lack who have been
symbolically appraised in light of the phallus, preparing them for exchange within an economy of
masculine desire. As Chanter notes, this might force one to ask what would happen if one brought Marx‘s
analysis of commodity fetishism to bear on Freud‘s concept of fetishistic disavowal (Chanter 2008, 162).
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It is worth noting that, in this sense, for Freud, as well as much of the psychoanalytic literature, women
cannot be fetishists.
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The idea that the fetish a thing created from nothing is central to Alan Bass‘s argument in an article
entitled, ―Fetishism, Reality, and ‗The Snow Man‘,‖ American Imago 48, no. 3 (1991): 295-328.
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just the material conditions that structure labor, but perhaps also sex?149 Furthermore,
what are the material conditions informing the symbolic structure of the young boy‘s
expectations? Why does he expect to see penises everywhere, such that the boy could
render the appearance as absence in Freud‘s narrative? 150 Is the schematization of
appearance already structured toward the phallus, and if so then what does this say about
Freud‘s construction of the social context that surrounds the boy? Is the prefiguring of
appearance itself structured by the spell of the phallus thus fetishistically restraining
appearance in its inability to recognize what is different than the phallus? Perhaps, a turn
toward Marx‘s concept of commodity fetishism would be helpful in thinking about
construction of the symbolic structure that allows Freud to imagine the young boy
conjuring something from no ―thing‖?
Luce Irigaray makes just this move This Sex Which is not One, where she argues
the symbolic order has been structured in advance by the erasure of women. She bases
this argument on the exchange of women, vis-à-vis Claude Lévi-Strauss, in patriarchal
societies.151 The law of masculine desire not only subjects women to a process of
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Catharine A. MacKinnon makes this argument in ―Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory.‖ She writes ―Sexuality is to feminism what work is Marxism: that which is most one‘s
own, yet most taken away‖ (MacKinnon 1982, 515). In other words women, just like workers, are
alienated. In the same way that the worker is alienated from the product of his or her activity, women are
alienated from sexuality and desire. Whereas the worker‘s alienation serves the surplus value that supports
capital, for MacKinnon women‘s alienation of sexuality serves the unequal distribution of power between
the sexes under the system of patriarchy. Thus, one could argue, just as ideology is the moment that the
worker confronts the products of his or her labor as alien, as not belonging to him or her, so too one could
say that ideology is the moment in which women confront their objectified sexuality.
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The patriarchal and heterosexist nature of the structure of the fetish itself in psychoanalysis has caused
some, like Marjorie Garber, to argue that the concept of the fetish cannot divest itself of its complicity in
these structures. In an article entitled, ―Fetish Envy‖ she writes ―Penis envy is phallus envy; phallus envy is
fetish envy. It is not clear that it is possible to go ―beyond ideology‖ here; the ideology of the fetish is the
ideology of phallocentrism, the ideology of heterosexuality‖ (Garber 1990, 46).
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See also: Gayle Rubin, ―The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‗Political Economy of Sex,‖ in The Second
Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, edited by Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge 1997): pgs. 27-62.
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exogamous exchange, but also creates a symbolic system that excludes the other of
masculine desire in this exchange. This concludes, she argues, in a system of sexual
signification only recognizing one sex. Referring to Freud‘s claim that the fetish protects
men from becoming homosexual (SE 21: 154; GW 14: 313), she argues that in as much
as the phallus organizes the systematic abstraction and exchange of women amongst men
through the signifier of the phallus, women become the material upon which this
displaced ―hom(m)o-sexuality‖ plays out. She writes,
[t]he use of and traffic in women subtend and uphold the reign of masculine
hom(m)o-sexuality, even while they maintain that hom(m)o-sexuality in
speculations, mirror games, identifications, and more or less rivalrous
appropriations, which defer its real practice. Reigning everywhere, although
prohibited in practice, hom(m)o-sexuality is played out through the bodies of
women, matter, or sign, and hetero-sexuality has been up to now just an alibi for
the smooth workings of man‘s relations with himself, of relations among men.
(Irigaray 1985b, 172)
Women, as commodities, are abstracted from the materiality of their own desire and are
only allowed to interpret desire through a symbolic field anchored in the phallus of
masculine desire and anxiety. Thus, one can apply Marx‘s concept of commodity
fetishism to the mythos of the Oedipal drama underpinning Freud‘s account of the fetish.
When one does this, one sees that the fetish, the woman‘s phallus, secures the selfreferential and narcissistic nature of masculine desire. The phallus as master signifier
subjects everything and everyone to the same symbolic system, capturing sexuality and
sex in advance, valuing it in terms of the phallus, so that it may be exchanged. In other
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words, women, like the commodity, would be abstracted and exchanged under the aegis
of the phallus as what organizes the symbolic field. In fact it is because women are
subjected to the law of the phallus, that Irigaray will argue that ―[a]ccording to a certain
ideology, the little girl can thus have no value before puberty‖ (Irigaray 1985a, 25). If one
were to carry Marxist critique further, then fetishism might appear as the ideology that
secures this system of phallic exchange that grounds the symbolic, and as ―a cardcarrying member‖ of this ideology, Freud ―never questions‖ it (Irigaray 1985a, 28).152
If disavowal were no more than a function of fetishism, then it too, would be
implicated in a logic of sameness that levels all things to exchangeable forms of
masculine sexuality. It would perhaps be the ideological fortification of the phallic
structuring of the symbolic itself in Freud‘s narrative.153 But, as I will attempt to show in
the next section, to understand disavowal only through the story of fetishistic disavowal
occludes the more primary function that Freud ascribes it in his late work. For Freud, all
instances of fetishism are Oedipal in nature. All instances of fetishism involve the
mechanism of disavowal. Thus, all forms of fetishistic disavowal participate in a
symbolic structure grounded in the structure of the Oedipal complex. Yet, in Freud‘s
work not all instances of disavowal are fetishistic. In contrast to an interpretation that
finds that disavowal is no more than function of fetishism, and thus part of a symbolic
economy grounded in phallogocentrism, I will argue that disavowal is primary defense
mechanism that constitutes the psyche. And in fact, if disavowal is not necessarily
152

She goes on to argue ―all the social regimes of ‗History‘ are based upon the exploitation of one ‗class‘ of
producers, namely, women. Whose reproductive use value (reproductive of children and of the labor force)
and whose constitution as exchange value underwrite the symbolic order as such, without any
compensation in kind going to them for that ‗work‘‖ (Irigaray 1985b, 173).
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In The Enigma of Woman: Woman in Freud’s Writings, Sarah Kofman argues that the development of
penis envy in women is Freud‘s defensive construction that preserves the masculine narrative of the
Oedipal complex.
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Oedipal, then perhaps the concept of fetishism could be freed from the overarching
patriarchal narrative of the Oedipal Complex. Specifically, if one concedes that Freud‘s
narrative of the introduction of the law and thus the symbolic is constrained by
patriarchal ideological constructions, this does not negate the existence of fetishism itself,
for fetishism exists despite Freud‘s narrative constraint. Thus, just as we will ask what
does it mean to think disavowal outside of the Oedipal narrative, so too, after having
separated disavowal from fetishism, we should ask the question would fetishism look like
outside the constraints of the Oedipal narrative.154

II. Disavowals and Their Vicissitudes

If disavowal is not only fetishistic, and thus part of the Oedipal narrative pinned
to the anxiety and overvaluation of the phallus, then what exactly is it? When taking up
the task of elucidating the concept of disavowal, it is necessary to point out that there is
no definite theory of disavowal in Freud‘s work. Nonetheless, as Laplanche and Pontalis
point out in The Language of Psychoanalysis, there is ―a definite consistency in the
evolution of this concept in his work‖ (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 118). But as with all
―evolutions‖ this involves shifts and modifications of the concept. It is precisely these
shifts that I plan to follow out in this section in order to help clarify the concept of
disavowal present in Freud‘s late works. It is a concept, I will argue, that, like repression,
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This I take to be Julia Kristeva‘s project in The Power of Horror and Tina Chanter‘s project in The
Picture of Abjection. While I am sympathetic to these projects, my aim here is centered solely on
investigating disavowal as a primary form of defense, I take this work to be outside the scope of my
project. One can also, perhaps see this in the idea of the transitional object in the work of Winnicott. See
also: Philippe Réfabert, ―Une Matrice Psychique Transitionnelle: Proposition pour penser clivage et
fétichisme,‖ Psychanalystes: Revue de Collegé de Psychanalystes 44 (1992): 61-69; David L. Ralphling,
―Fetishism in a Woman,‖ Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 37, no. 2 (1989): 465-492.
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is a primary function of the psyche. Yet unlike repression, which preserves the synthetic
functions of the psyche, disavowal indicates the non-synthetic functions of the psyche. In
as much as disavowal will indicate the non-synthetic functions of the psyche, it will take
us back to the egoic function of schematization and the a-temporal nature of the
unconscious, and thus toward the non-identical.
What is at stake in separating disavowal from the Oedipal narrative? By
separating the concept of disavowal from the Oedipal Complex and castration theory I
hope to demonstrate that disavowal is a primary function of the psyche. There are many
significant facts that would follow from this addition to, or reorientation of, the psyche.
Repression favors synthesis and the preservation of the unity of the psyche. And while
one will find this is also the case of Freud‘s early of disavowal, by the end of Freud‘s
work disavowal comes to represent an intractable non-synthetic function splitting the
psyche. If disavowal was a primary function like repression, and was not a secondary
defense emerging from castration theory, then the psyche would not be premised solely
on the tendency toward synthesis. If the defenses constituting the psyche were not
focused on preserving the illusion the unity of self, then the self would be, at times,
irredeemably fractured, thus indicating the limit of rationality itself. And in as much as
the self would be fractured by that which remains outside of the subject‘s schematizing
functions, then this and not repression is what we would want to retranslate back into the
political if we were interested in performing a critique of political reason. In hopes of
reaching the political stakes of this discussion, let us now turn toward the development of
Freud‘s concept of disavowal.
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From 1923 until 1927 Freud‘s concept of disavowal is tied, as we have seen to the
discourse of the ―trauma‖ of sexual difference and the imaginary threat of castration
forming the kernel of the Oedipal drama. Yet, during the same years, the concept is also
essential to Freud‘s project of differentiating the psychical origins of neurosis and
psychosis—a project that had occupied him at least as early as his 1913 essay ―The
Disposition to Obessional Neurosis: A Contribution to the Problem of Choice of
Neurosis.‖155 These origins, Freud argues in two essays published in 1924, can be traced
back to the psychical functions of repression and disavowal. In ―Neurosis and Psychosis‖
Freud begins parsing out the ―genetic difference‖ between the two when he writes,
―neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and its id, whereas psychosis is the
analogous outcome of a similar disturbance in the relations between the ego and the
external world‖ (SE 19: 149; GW 13: 387). When a drive has been repressed the ego
comes into conflict with the id. The drive constantly seeks conscious expression through
displacement and condensation. The ego thus, ―finds its unity threatened and impaired by
this intruder, and it continues to struggle against the symptom‖ (SE 19: 150; GW 13:
388). The ego‘s continued fight against the repressed drive produces symptoms that paint
the ―picture of neurosis‖ (SE 19: 150; GW 13: 388). In essence what one finds at the
heart of ―every transference neurosis‖ is the fact that ―the ego has come into conflict with
the id in the service of the superego‖ through the mechanism of repression (SE 19: 150;
GW 13: 388).
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In this essay Freud is concerned with examining the origin of different neuroses, over and beyond the
question of whether the neurosis is constitutional or accidental. Specifically, he is interested in answering
the question why certain neuroses develop and not others. This question is a nascent version of the question
we find in his essays from 1924.
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In contrast to the ego‘s conflict with the id forming the basis of neurotic
symptoms, Freud argues psychoses can be traced back to a conflict ―between the ego and
the external world‖ (SE 19: 152; GW 13: 390). Psychosis, he argues, ―consists in a
frustration, non-fulfillment, of one of those childhood wishes which are so deeply rooted
in our phylogenetically determined organization‖ (SE 19: 151; GW 13: 390). In this case
the drive is stronger than the ego‘s attachment to reality. The ego cannot preserve its
unity by repressing the drive, so the ego tears itself away from reality as a last ditch effort
to preserve its unity. Whereas the ego sides with reality and the super-ego against the id
in neurosis, in psychosis the ego sides with the id against reality and the super-ego. And
where Freud attributes the function of repression to the origin of neurosis, disavowal
forms the genetic origin of psychosis (SE 19: 153; GW 13: 391). Freud makes this point
quite simply in ―The loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis,‖ when he writes
―neurosis does not disavow the reality, it only ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries
to replace it [Die Neurose verleugnet die Realität nicht, sie will nur nichts von ihr wissen;
die Psychose verleugnet sie und sucht sie zu ersetzen] ‖ (SE 19: 185; GW 13: 365). Thus,
the concept of disavowal is not only woven into the narrative of the Oedipal drama, but is
also a key element in another narrative: the metapsychological distinction between
neurosis and psychosis.
In 1924 Freud explicitly begins to think of disavowal not only outside the fear of
castration and fetishism, but also as a psychical function that precedes the Oedipal phase,
when he links it to the early functions of the ego. In arguing that disavowal is the genetic
root of psychosis, where the ego sides in favor of the id and against the perception of a
troubling perception, Freud already positions disavowal as a defense of equal importance
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to the functions of the ego as repression. And in as much as Freud positions the function
of disavowal, and repression for that matter, before the advent of the Oedipal Complex in
these accounts, then the realities the young ego responds to is neither necessarily imbued
by the threat of castration nor the primacy of the phallus. This is to say the disavowed
reality in these instances is not yet culturally coded by normative roles. Despite the fact
that Freud‘s search for a genetic account of disavowal makes it a primary function in the
psyche, in this account disavowal still preserves the unity of the ego by aligning one‘s
perception of external reality with the id. Thus, in this account, the concept of disavowal,
just like repression, is a mechanism employed by the besieged ego in order to maintain its
unity. During these years the concept of disavowal, like the concept of repression, favors
the synthetic functions of the ego. It erases, realigns, and reforms one‘s perception to side
step the threat the id poses to the ego. As we will see, when Freud develops the concept
of disavowal further, as he moves it away from the psychoses, the defense becomes more
stark, tending to favor the non-synthetic functions of the ego, thus exposing the
intractable split that lies at the heart of subjectivity.
Freud‘s 1927 essay ―Fetishism‖ represents a turning point in the concept of
disavowal.156 In this essay Freud not only formally defines disavowal for the first time,
but also plays down disavowal‘s relationship to psychosis, and thus its synthetic function.
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During the same year Freud also uses will use the term disavowal in The Future of an Illusion in a way
that seems to foreshadow his use of the term in Moses and Monotheism. Attempting to discuss the what
truth religion may offer, even though it is supported by illusions and wish fulfillment, Freud writes
―religious doctrine tells us the historical truth—though subject, it is true, to some modification and
disguise—whereas our rational account disavows [verleugnet] it‖ (SE 21: 42; GW 14: 366). Here, Freud
attempts to articulate the difference between the historical truth from the rational account. This has formal
similarities with his attempt to distinguish the practices of traditions (and the traces of historical truth
within them) and the rational account of historical narrative that disavows what remains in tradition. Yet,
he will go on to use the term slightly differently, and more akin to his 1923-1926 understanding of the term
one page later when he writes that ―[i]f one the one hand, religion brings with it obsessional restrictions,
exactly as an individual obsessional neurosis does, on the other hand it comprises a system of wishful
illusions together with a disavowal of reality [Verleugnung der Wirklichkeit], such as we find in an isolated
form nowhere else but in amentia, in a state of blissful hallucinatory confusion‖ (SE 21: 43; GW 14: 367).
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In light of the unique symptom that the fetish presents and the mechanism that makes it
possible, Freud formally redefines the distinction between repression and disavowal. He
writes:
[t]he oldest word in our psycho-analytic terminology, ‗repression‘ [Verdrängung],
already relates to this pathological process. If we wanted to differentiate more
sharply between the vicissitude of the idea [Vorstellung] as distinct from that of
the affect, and reserve the word ‗Verdrängung‘ for the affect, the correct German
word for the vicissitude of the idea [der Vorstellung] would be ‗Verleugnung‘.
(SE 21: 153; GW 14: 313)
Whereas repression concerns the developments, displacements, and condensations of
affect, disavowal concerns the developments, displacements, and condensations of an
idea. In a slight modification of the concept, Freud‘ concept of disavowal now concerns
how an idea, the representation of a perception, becomes transformed as the ego
develops.157 The disavowal of a perception is no longer its repudiation of reality, as in
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Edith Jacobson makes this distinction in her 1957 essay ―Denial and Repression‖ when she writes:
―repression countercathectic ego formations safeguard the repression of unacceptable drive representations.
In the case of denial [disavowal], a wishful id fantasy that tends to distort reality is used as a defense
against an opposite frightening idea, which likewise distorts reality‖ (Jacobson 1957, 78). While both
defenses negotiate the same conflict, each defense focuses on a different side of the conflict in order to
resolve it. In repression the drive representation is barred from consciousness. This banishment from the
ego is maintained by counter formations that ward off the irruption of the drive that has been primally
repressed. Whereas repression bars the drives, disavowal distorts one‘s perception of external reality.
Disavowal uses the fantasies of the id as a defense against the incompatibility of the drives and reality. Yet,
instead of effecting the drive itself disavowal distorts reality through the projection of fantasies from the id.
While, Jacobson‘s work on disavowal is helpful in distinguishing this concept from repression, she is
writing it in the context of examining psychosis. This connection is not unfounded, and in fact Freud makes
this connection in several places throughout his work. Yet, the concept of disavowal that I am interested in
this chapter does not concern disavowal‘s relationship to psychosis, but a more subtle form of disavowal
that still effects reality, but still maintains a relationship to that reality. I am interested in disavowal, not in
the extremities of its defense which might be psychosis, but rather in the more modest, and perhaps
problematic articulation of the concept, which concerns maintaining a contradictory relationship to reality.
For other variations of this argument see: Alan Bass, Difference and Disavowal: The Trauma of Eros.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Elizabeth Rottenberg, Inheriting the Future: Legacies of
Kant, Freud, and Flaubert (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); J.A. Brook, ―Freud and
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psychosis,158 but rather the manipulation of this perception so that the subject can both
acknowledge and deny it—like displacing the idea on to an object as in the fetish.
Disavowal becomes a ―compromise‖ in resolving the ―conflict between the weight of the
unwelcome perception and the force of his counter-wish‖ (SE 21: 154; GW 14: 313). It
resolves the conflict by disconnecting two perceptions that should be contradictory,
allowing them to exist simultaneously. In this sense one retains both perceptions while
the implications of holding these two contradictory ideas at once is cut off at the start.159
These ideas are maintained because disavowal preserves a distance between what would
be contradictory ideas; it separates them from each other and ensures that they do not
come into contact with one another, giving deference to both the reality principle and
pleasure principle simultaneously. In this essay, disavowal operates by dividing
consciousness between the two ideas, allowing the subject to maintain two contradictory
beliefs without feeling any of the emotional or intellectual dissonance one might

Splitting,‖ The International Review of Psycho-Analysis 19 (1992): 335-350; Michael Franz Basch, ―The
Perception of Reality and the Disavowal of Meaning,‖ The Annual of Psychoanalysis 11 (1983): 125-153;
E. E Trunnel, W.E. Holt, ―The Concept of Denial or Disavowal,‖ Journal of the American Psychoanalytic
Association 22 (1974): 769-784; Sol Altschul, ―Denial and Ego Arrest,‖ Journal of the American
Psychoanalytic Association 16 (1968): 301-318;, Channing T. Lipson., ―Denial and Mourning,‖ The
International Journal of Psychoanalysis 44 (1963): 104-107.
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Referring to his two 1924 essays Freud writes: ―Recently, along quite speculative lines, I arrived at the
proposition that the essential difference between Neurosis and psychosis was that in the former the ego, in
the service of reality, suppresses a piece of the id, whereas in a psychosis it lets itself be induced by the id
to detach itself from a piece of reality. I returned to this theme once again later on. But soon after this I had
reason to regret that I had ventured so far‖ (Freud, SE 21: 155; GW 14: 315).
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This characteristic of disavowal has been noted by both Eugene Trunnel and William Holt in their essay
―The Concept of Denial or Disavowal.‖ Here they write that in a state of disavowal or denial ―Perception is
accurate and unimpaired, but there is a defensive failure to appreciate fully the implications of that
perception‖ (Trunnel and Holt 1974, 783). Perhaps, more importantly for my purposes it has also been
noted by Hanna Segal in her essay ―Silence is the Real Crime‖ in a political context. In speaking of the
threat of nuclear war and its real possibility for total annihilation, or achievement of the aims of the death
drive, Segal writes that ―governments both envisage a nuclear war and deny the reality of what it would
entail‖ (Segal 1997, 145). She goes on to write ―in this split we retain intellectual knowledge of the reality,
but divest it of emotional meaning‖ (Segal 1997, 145f.).
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otherwise.160 Whereas, in 1924 disavowal simply meant the repudiation of external
reality in favor of the id, in this essay disavowal now comes to represent a compromise
between neurosis and psychosis. Instead of either repressing the id or reality, the ego
disavows and thus favors both the id and reality.161 Disavowal thus becomes a psychical
mechanism that defies the ―either or logic‖ and institutes a regime of ―both and,‖ even at
the expense of the logic of non-contradiction, and thus a rationality that presupposes a
linear model of temporality in which contradicting things cannot exist at the same time.162
Not only is disavowal a subtler defense than Freud had speculated three years earlier,
but he also gestures toward making disavowal a mechanism that supersedes the context
of the ―traumatic‖ discovery of sexual difference. At the end of the essay Freud discusses
two young men‘s disavowal of their father‘s death. He characterizes this defense as an
oscillation between two beliefs engendered by a split in consciousness. The brothers both
acknowledged their father‘s death, yet simultaneously refused to believe in it. Concerning
the young men‘s disavowal of their father‘s death, Freud writes that, ―it was only one
current in their mental life that had not recognized their father‘s death; there was another
160

W. R. Bion argues that this separation results from a delinking process. See: W.R. Bion, ―Attacks on
Linking,‖ The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 40 (1959): 308-315.
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Myrta Casas de Pereda gives a dialectical account of this distinction in an essay entitled ―Verleugnung,
strukurelle Wirkung und pathologishe Dimension,‖ where she writes ―Das ‗Nein‘ der Verdrängung,
verantwortlich für die unbewußte Spur, kann als ‗Ich sollte nicht‘ formuliert werden und impliziert die
Beteiligung eines Dritten, der darüber entscheidet, ‗was ich tun kann oder nicht.‘ Das ‗Nein‘ der
Differenzierung, in der sich die Verleugnung bemerbar macht und die dyadische Situationen erzeugt, kann
als ‗Ich glaube nicht nicht‘ bzw. ‗Ich kan nicht nicht glauben‘ formuliert werden‖ (Casas de Pereda 1997,
36).
162

In his 1940 essay An Outline of Psychoanalysis Freud writes that the ―primary processes‖ which the id
has available to it ―differ widely from those which are familiar to us through conscious perception in our
intellectual and emotional life; nor are they subject to the critical restrictions of logic, which repudiates
some of these processes as invalid and seeks to undo them‖ (SE 23: 198). What is extraordinary about
disavowal is that it is able to bypass the defensive nature of logic in consciousness, by splitting belief in the
existence of the object. As Freud writes in his 1927 essay ―Fetishism‖ the little boy ―has retained that
belief, but he has also given it up‖ (SE 19: 154).
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current which took full account of the fact‖ (SE 21: 156; GW 14: 316). The recognition
of the fact runs along a different stream than the implications of the existence of the fact,
both intellectually and emotionally. This split in the ―currents‖ of recognition allowed
―the attitude which fitted in with the wish and the attitude which fitted in with reality‖ to
exist ―side by side‖ (SE 21: 156; GW 14: 316). The perception of fact and the perception
founded on the ―counter-wish‖ would normally contradict each other and demand
resolution. Disavowal creates a ―split [Spaltung]‖ between the two beliefs (SE 21: 156;
GW 14: 316). Thus, to disavow a fact is not to repress it, but rather is to not recognize the
conflict that a fact might pose with one‘s wishes or anticipations by maintaining a split
between two beliefs.163 It is not to contradict oneself in one‘s belief structure, but rather
to not even recognize the contradiction or its implication. The subject who defends
against this ―unwelcome perception‖ oscillates between recognition and non-recognition
of the fact without ever feeling the dissonance of intellectual contradiction or the emotive
or affective implications. The concept of splitting becomes essential for Freud‘s late
formalization of the concept of disavowal, which will represent a stark irreconcilability
lodged in the young ego.
From 1939 to 1940 Freud produces two texts highlighting the constitutive role of
splitting, and thus disavowal, in the development of the psyche: An Outline of
Psychoanalysis and ―The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence.‖ For Freud, the
young, developing ego is ―fighting on two fronts [kämpft also auf zwei Fronten]‖ (SE 23:
200; GW 17: 130). This continual struggle of what is already a ―weak and immature ego‖
forces it to develop separate mechanisms in order to fend off both the threat from internal
163

This leads Eugene E. Trunnell and William E. Holt to argue that ―Disavowal or denial as originally
described by Freud involves, not the absence or distortion of an actual perception, but rather a failure to
fully appreciate the significance or implications of what is perceived‖ (Trunnell and Holt 1974, 771).
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stimuli, the drives, and the threat from external stimuli, reality (SE 23: 200; GW 17: 130).
On the one hand, as we have already seen, repression repulses the drives at the behest of
reality; it is the egoic defense against unruly drives. On the other hand, the ego must
defend against the excessive stimuli of the ―external world.‖ When the ego cannot
harness the force of one against the other, the external world against the drives or the
drives against the external world, the ego takes a third option, splitting itself to allow for
the contradictory demands to exist simultaneously. In as much as the repression of the
drives is essential to the constitution of the synthetic functions of the ego for Freud, so
too is the mechanism of splitting essential for the non-synthetic functions of the ego.
Thus, Freud argues that the splitting of disavowal is as constitutive for the development
of the ego as repression.164 He writes that:
[…] the childish ego, under the domination of the real world, gets rid of
undesirable instinctual demands [Triebansprüch] by what are called repressions
[Verdrängung]. We will now supplement [ergänzen] this by further asserting that,
during the same period of life, the ego often enough finds itself in the position of
fending off some demand from the external world which it feels distressing and
that this is effected by means of a disavowal of the perceptions [Verleugnung der
Wahrnehmungen] which bring to knowledge this demand from reality. (SE 23:
203f.; GW 17: 134)
Freud supplements the ―cornerstone‖ of psychoanalysis, primary repression, with another
defense mechanism, disavowal. The process of disavowal becomes one of the
mechanisms by which the ego defends itself against the demands of stimuli, aiding the
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This splitting has been characterized, in a clear analogy with the two modes of repression, primary
disavowal by Alan Bass in Difference and Disavowal: The Trauma of Eros.
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constitution of the psyche. In this sense, we can see that disavowal is one of the
mechanisms, along with repression, that gives rise to ego.165 The young ego is thus
founded on not only the repression of the drives, but also the disavowal of threatening
perceptions; when confronted with the conflict of the drives and the demands of the
reality principle, disavowal allows the ego to choose neither side by splitting the belief in
the existence of the external perception that conflict with the drives into two currents: one
which acknowledges the perception, the other which denies it. It is the rift between these
two perceptions, and not the repudiation of the perception that defines the constitutive
psychoanalytic concept of disavowal. Disavowal, where ―two attitudes persist side by
side throughout their lives without influencing each other‖ Freud claims ―may rightly be
called ‗splitting of the ego‘‖ (SE 23: 203; GW 17: 134).With this understanding of
disavowal developed in Freud works, the psyche becomes oriented not only toward
defensive synthesis, but also toward an intractable splitting.
With the ―new‖ status of the concept of disavowal, Freud argues that one should
not overvalue the ―synthetic value of the ego‖ in his 1940 essay ―The Splitting of the Ego
in the Process of Defense‖ (SE 23: 276; GW 17: 60).166 Both neurosis and psychosis
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Melanie Klein picks up on the foundational nature of this splitting in her work on early child analysis.
This splitting for Klein is the manner in which the infant attempts to negotiate the ambivalence of the
drives, specifically the threat that the death drive poses for the infant. As she argues in ―Envy and
Gratitude,‖ although the infant will gradually work towards the integration of experience, there is a
tendency within the early to ―split itself and its objects‖ because ―the ego largely lacks cohesion at birth,
and in part because it constitutes a defence against the primordial anxiety, and is therefore a means of
preserving the ego‖ (Klein 1975a, 191). In an attempt to negotiate the threat of the drives, the infant
projects this ambivalence onto an object, thus effectively splitting its perception of the object. But this split
in the object, between what she calls the good and bad parts of the object, also affects a correlative split in
the ego. As she argues in ―Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms,‖ ―I believe that the ego is incapable of
splitting the object—internal and external—without a corresponding splitting taking place within the ego‖
(Klein 1975b, 6).
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strive to maintain the unity of the ego by repressing or repudiating contradictions in
consciousness; they both serve to maintain rationality, even if that logic is disconnected
from reality. But along with the tendency towards synthesis, the ego is also constituted by
non-synthetic, non-rational, forms of defense. As a process of defense, splitting opts for
neither a repression of the drive in favor of reality (neurosis) nor the withdrawal from
reality in favor of the drives (psychosis); rather in this case, ―the child takes neither
course, or rather he takes both simultaneously, which comes to the same thing‖ (SE 23:
275; GW 17: 59). While this is an ―ingenious solution‖ to the problem presented to the
ego, Freud finds that the relief provided by the splitting of the ego which occurs in
disavowal is ―paid for in one way or another, and this success is achieved at the price of a
rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on‖ (SE 23: 276; GW
17: 60). Thus, when disavowal, as a form of splitting, becomes primary for the
development of the ego, so too does the non-synthetic nature of the ego; it is a defense
that splits the ego, but where this chasm remains within the ego, a permanent scar
resulting from the ego‘s battle on two fronts.

III. Both/And: Disavowal at the Threshold of Rationality

Freud‘s concept of disavowal comes late. Perhaps its belated appearance and its
unsettled nature in Freud‘s work is the source of the tension in the concept. For surely
when one surveys the concept, it is obvious that it oscillates between a narrative of
castration and narrative of the non-synthetic characteristics of egoic development. In the
166

Joel Whitebook argues that the non-synthetic aspect of the ego has been overvalued in anti-humanist
engagements with Freud in the second chapter of Perversion and Utopia. Instead of overvaluing the nonsynthetic, Whitebook argues that synthesis remains the goal of analysis and the psyche for Freud.
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end, although Freud develops this concept outside of the castration narrative, perhaps
there will always remain a touch of fetishism in disavowal. Nonetheless, the trajectory of
Freud‘s development of the concept from 1923 until 1939 suggests that the concept of
disavowal is a primary defense mechanism preceding the introduction of the symbolic
and the law in not only the Oedipal narrative, but also for whatever mythological
structure comes to represent the moment of the symbolic and law in psychoanalysis. One
might even suggest, although this is beyond the scope of this chapter, that Freud tries to
reign in the threat of disavowal in by entangling it within the Oedipal narrative.
As I have shown, disavowal is as primary for the ego as repression. As we saw in
chapter two, repression aids the egoic organization of the drives by excising drivepresentations. Repression sides on the favor of reality against the id, thus maintaining the
unity of the ego against the threats that the drives pose. It operates by negating driverepresentations that set the ego at odds with itself by negating drive-presentations forcing
the ego into contradiction. Repression, thus, favors the unity of the ego, preserving this
unity by instituting and maintaining the logic of non-contradiction. In contrast to the
unifying functions of egoic repression, disavowal sides with neither the id nor reality, but
rather chooses both. In choosing both the drive and reality, it preserves contradiction by
giving up the unity of consciousness; it preserves contradiction by negating the unity of
consciousness behind the logic of non-contradiction. In as much as disavowal negates
this unity, then consciousness cannot recognize contradiction; without the unified sense
of self, contradiction just becomes difference. Because disavowal does not recognize the
logic of non-contradiction it represents the non-synthetic function of the psyche. If the
synthetic functions of the psyche are supported by the defense of repression, and if
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repression presupposes the linear model of time and thus rationality, then one might
wonder if disavowal, as non-synthetic and thus opposed to this form of rationality, would
also be founded on the linear model of time.
The introduction of a primary non-synthetic function of the ego in Freud‘s late
work forces one to reevaluate the primacy of the synthetic function of the ego. If the
synthetic function of the ego is, as I have shown in the second chapter, the schematization
of appearance as such, then disavowal‘s constitutive status also forces us to reevaluate the
role of linear time in consciousness. Objects, things, stimuli, appear by virtue of a bodily
schematization that brings them into a linear model of time. Repression serves the logic
of non-contradiction in the synthetic temporal apprehension of stimuli. It negates
contradiction by manipulating affective attachments to certain drive presentations, thus it
excises certain affects and presentations from the temporal grasping of the world. A
model of consciousness based solely on repression is, thus, structured by fetishizing the
vicissitudes of drive-presentation and thus operates primarily from the axis of linear and
non-linear temporality. In as much as non-linear forms of temporality assume a linear
model—for it is nothing other than a second order reshuffling of the linear progression
past-present-future—to operate from this axis is to remain caught within a framework of
what can be rationalized, what can be brought back into and reordered in light of the
successive march of time. Thus, when one assumes the repressive model of the psyche,
one occludes the effect of the non-synthetic forms of defense operating from the gap
between what is brought into time and what is not. This is to say, a model of the psyche
based solely on repression, represses, as it were, the noumenal side of appearance—the
axis between what appears and what does not, the axis between time and timelessness.
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But if, as we have seen in Freud‘s late writings, disavowal is as fundamental to
the development of the ego as repression, then the ego must also be composed of nonsynthetic functions that we must also examine in terms of schematization of stimuli. That
is to say, that in as much as the ego schematizes sensuous materiality and concepts by
removing drive-presentations from consciousness, the very constitution of the ego itself,
the very introduction of appearance itself preserves the bar between the phenomena and
noumena in the split of disavowal. And in as much as repression presupposes a linear
model of time, then so too would the introduction of a primary non-synthetic function in
the ego would simultaneously introduce a different temporal axis into consciousness.
This would not be an axis split between linear and non-linear time, but rather an axis
between time and timelessness. Disavowal as a primary function of the ego preserves the
distance between what can be conceptualized and what cannot, between what can be
brought into time and what cannot. And in this sense, in as much as one would speak of
the egoic schematizing of stimuli, one would also have to speak of the egoic disschematizing of stimuli. Consciousness would simultaneously bind and unbind; it would
constantly split the world it comes to know. In splitting the world the subject it self
becomes divided. In the very grasping of the world through time, the subject splits itself
through the gap between time and timelessness. The constitution of the ego would thus
consist in schematization and dis-schematization. And, as perhaps it always had been
since Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the very becoming of the phenomenal would consist
of a simultaneous binding and unbinding of stimulus, the pulsations of the life and death
drives.
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Disavowal, then, speaks to the splitting of appearance enforcing the phenomenal
divide of consciousness itself—a split that enforces the temporal division of rationality
itself. And while disavowal explains how fetishism occurs, while it might very well be
the genetic root of fetishism, fetishistic disavowal is no more than a specific instantiation
of a more primary process of splitting that constitutes the split between what is
temporalized, and thus subject to rationality, and what is not temporalized, and thus not
subject to rationality. Where disavowal will form the limit to the synthetic, and thus
rational, functions of the ego, disavowal will also indicate the limit of analysis.
I would like to suggest that disavowal operates at the threshold of temporality. I
make this claim not because I believe that disavowal gives rise to a troubled or
―disordered‖ experience of temporality—although it might—but because disavowal, like
repression, must partake in the phenomenological, and thus temporal, distinction between
conscious and unconscious. In as much as the repressed is schematized, and in as much
as disavowal is as primary as the repressed, it must also operate on the same level of the
relationship between stimulus and conceptualization, stimulus and its temporalization.
And in as much as disavowal indicates the non-synthetic functions of the ego it must
represent what which is not schematized, or that which is fundamentally timeless. As
timeless, what has been disavowed in the primary functions of the psyche have not been
brought into time, and like the drives that resist the primary synthetic functions of the ego
in trauma, this gives rise the repetition compulsion, a compulsive and absolutely
unconscious re-enactment of the attempts to master the non-identical, to master what has
escaped our ability to conceptualize it. In other words, what has been disavowed is
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timeless because it is what remains un-schematized and thus the mechanism of
disavowal, unlike repression, represents the non-identical.
Given the late development of the concept the concept of disavowal as a primary
form of defense, it should be not surprise that disavowal represents a limit to the standard
model of analytic treatment.167 Whereas, the model of analysis is designed toward
repression, when faced with a situation in which ―the compulsion to repeat [Zwange zur
Wiederholung]‖ comes to replace ―the impulsion to remember [Impuls zur Erinnerung],‖
what it means to negotiate the symptoms present in analysis becomes a problematic, if
not interminable, task when that task is structured on repression and the linear model of
time it presupposes (SE 12: 151; GW 10: 130).168 This is especially the case when the
mode of analysis is still structured on retrieving a forgotten—repressed—memory which
treats this repetition as only a resistance to unlocking and bringing forth a memory to fill
in a gap in one‘s conscious history. Freud struggles with the compulsion to repeat and
disavowal in his late theoretical work,169 but will neither fully integrate the concept of
disavowal nor its symptom—the compulsion to repeat—into the analytic model.170
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See: Humphrey Morris, ―Narrative Representation, Narrative Enactment, and the Psychoanalytic
Construction of History,‖ The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 74 (1993): 33-54.
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Freud writes in Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through‖: ―the patient brings out of the
armoury of the past the weapons with which he defends himself against the progress of treatment—
weapons which we must wrest from him one by one‖ (SE 12: 151).
169

See Freud‘s 1937 essays ―Analysis Terminable and Interminable‖ and ―Constructions in Analysis.‖
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In his 2000 text Difference and Disavowal: The Trauma of Eros, Alan Bass argues that the primary
status of disavowal ought to transform how the analyst engages in the interpretative process in analysis
when faced with patients whose symptoms are rooted in primary disavowal and not primary repression.
Since in these cases the analyst is faced with a patient whose defense mechanism ―dedifferentiates‖ the past
and the present, that is it resists the integration of difference, Bass argues that the aim of analysis becomes
the ―redifferentiation of perception and memory, past and present, in order to reverse the effects of primary
disavowal‖ (Bass 2000, 269). The analytic aim in repression is to excavate and reconstruct the memories
that are absent from the present, because the history of the present is marked by lack and absence. Because
the problem in disavowal is not a lack in the present, but an excessive present that does not differentiate
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Disavowal—as non-schematized, non-identical, and thus timeless—is the limit to
rationality in psychoanalysis. Thus, if psychoanalysis can act as a critique of the
overvaluation of rationality in political thought, then one must turn political thought
toward the psychoanalytic concept of disavowal. But what would it mean to translate this
concept into the political, how would disavowal indicate the limit not only of rational
thought itself, but of the rationality of the political as such? To answer this question we
must turn to Freud‘s understanding of the relationship between the psyche and the
political as well as his deployment of the concept of disavowal in his last text on the
political Moses and Monotheism.

between the past and the present, the aim is not excavation, but rather relieving the present of this excess
through differentiating the past from the present; it exorcises the ghosts that haunt the present
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Chapter Four
Constitutional Disavowal:
Psychical Inscriptions of Law and Punishment
From this, we can only conclude that the institution of slavery carries an obscurity even blacker
than the obscurity of poverty […]
--Hannah Arendt, On Revolution

This project has been founded on the assumption that as a body of thought
dedicated to thinking the non-identical psychoanalysis is an essential resource for
thinking limits from which to critique political rationality. That is to say, by attending to
the limit of political rationality, one might be able to critique the illusions that are its
necessary byproduct. In following out this suggestion we have differentiated the
metapsychological structures of the psychoanalytic concepts of repression and disavowal,
arguing that disavowal and not repression represents the non-identical in psychoanalytic
thought and can thus act as the point from which to engage in this critique. This
differentiation was necessary because when political thought does take up the tools of
psychoanalysis to think the non-identical it often turns to the concept of repression. And
why not? After all, repression is the cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. One can hardly
imagine psychoanalytic theory without it, both in its general sense of psychical defenses
as such and in its more restricted sense as a specific psychical defense. This is to say
nothing of the temptation to equivocate between psychical and political repression.
Indeed, does not Freud constantly use political metaphors to describe repression in the
psyche? While there is an affinity between the political and repression and while the
concept of repression is central to the very foundation of psychoanalysis, as I have argued
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in the second chapter, the repressed is neither the non-identical nor is it the limit of
rationality in psychoanalysis. This is not to say that the repressed is not a powerful
concept for political thought, this is only to say that it does not represent the limits of
political thought because it participates in the very rationality it intends to subvert. Within
the psychoanalytic framework, the repressed can be rationalized, worked on, worked
through, slowly chipped at and altered by the power of recognition and reason.
The gambit of this project has been that turning political thought toward the nonidentical through the lens of psychoanalysis means taking up the concept of disavowal
developed in Freud‘s late work. As I have argued in the previous chapter, disavowal is
not tied to castration theory; rather it denotes the unschematized aspects of our lives,
those aspects remaining outside of appearance and thus the logic conditioning appearance
itself. As that which escapes schematization, we cannot escape disavowal; it is a force so
strong that consciousness splits before it. For what has been disavowed, if it is the nonidentical, forms the kernel of appearance itself; it is the negative impression at the heart
of the logic forming the principles of schematization. Taking up disavowal, and thus what
has been disavowed, means examining not only what resists reason, but also the nonsynthetic mechanisms constituting the ego that do not recognize the demands of a reason
grounded in the logic of non-contradiction and linear temporality. And in as much as the
disavowed has been excluded from the very logic constituting the becoming of
appearance itself, then it is what appearance cannot recuperate. Thus, whereas the illusion
of ideology represents a deception that we can overcome, the oscillations of political
disavowal denote a foundational, or structural, illusion we cannot escape. For what else
would mark the boundaries of political rationality other than that which is but does not
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appear, the non-identical alien lodged within political rationality yet not recognized by
this rationality itself?
In this chapter I will argue that turning political thought toward the non-identical
means examining the constitutional structures giving rise to political subjectivity. More
specifically, I will argue that the trace of the disavowed operates within the political
complex of law and punishment. Yet, before we can take this up directly, it is first
helpful, and perhaps necessary, to briefly examine the relationship between the psyche
and the social in Freud‘s work. The link between the psyche and the social, I will suggest,
is epitomized by the relationship between ontogenesis and phylogenesis, a relationship
demonstrating the historical origins of consciousness in Freud work. After having
established the historical origins of consciousness in Freud‘s work, I will then turn to
Freud‘s deployment of the late concept of disavowal in Moses and Monotheism to argue
the psychical origin of disavowal is rooted in the non-synthetic moment at the origin the
of the political realm, a moment that concerns the development of law and the modes of
punishment. In this way, I will suggest that whereas for Marx consciousness is structured
by the modes of production, for Freud, we might say that it is structured by the modes of
punishment. Finally, I will further the investigation into the constitutional nature of this
concept by turning to Angela Davis‘ discussion the 13th amendment, prisons, and slavery.
I will argue that the relationship between slavery and the constitution is best understood
as an example of political disavowal, and that a confrontation with the limits of political
thought might mean a confrontation with the manner in which the modes of punishment
schematize the appearance of political subjectivity.
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I. The “Witch Prehistory” Phylogenesis: Totem and Taboo

In order to truly understand the political nature of the concept of disavowal
Freud‘s work, it is necessary to ask if the constitutive defenses of the psyche are ahistorical and universal? One might reframe this question by asking if the Oedipus
complex is universal and necessary in its form, or if it is a specific constellation reflecting
certain historical conditions? If the features of the psyche were universal, then its political
expression would be no more than iteration—slight variations played on the utterly
coercive facts of the human condition. And indeed, when Freud seems to universalize the
Oedipal narrative and generalizes the pathologies emerging from it, the character of the
psyche appears stable, universal, and a-historical. Yet, if one looks more closely at the
relationship between history and the psyche in Freud‘s work, and specifically the
relationship between phylogenesis and ontogenesis, I believe one can find another story,
a story not premised on the assumption of the universality of the Oedipal complex, but
rather a story privileging the historical and material nature of the psyche. By re-framing
the relationship between the psyche and the social away from the mythological structure
of the Oedipal complex and toward the relationship between phylogenesis and
ontogenesis, I will suggest that the defensive mechanisms of the psyche are historical and
political in Freud‘s work.171 This, of course, will be essential for examining how
disavowal points back toward the complex of law and punishment.
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Although it may seem that I am bringing Freud closer to Marx in this argument, it is necessary to note
that Freud has many reservations about both Marx‘s theory and its application. Freud most explicitly
criticizes Marx in the 35th lecture of the New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, where he argues
that ―[t]heoretical Marxism, as realized in Russian Bolshevism‖ is a political illusion (SE 22: 179). He
finds that the ―strength of Marxism‖ lies ―in its sagacious indication of the decisive influence which the
economic circumstances of men have upon their intellectual, ethical, and artistic attitudes‖ (SE 22: 178).
Driven by the science of economics, Marxist theory dispels certain illusions that cover over the material
ground of the political and social world and Freud readily agrees with this attempt to correlate economics
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One can discern two ways in which the psyche is political in Freud‘s work. First,
there are many places where one find‘s that the psyche is constituted by and through its
relationship to others. Certainly, this is clear in Freud‘s The Ego and Id where he argues,
―the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned [Niederschlag der aufgegebenen]
object-cathexes‖ (SE 19: 29; GW 13: 257).172 Freud further confirms this in the opening
pages of Group Psychology where he argues individual psychology is ―at the same time
social psychology‖ (SE 18: 69; GW 13: 73).173 In this sense, what we take to be most
internal, what we take to be the very core of our identity, is nothing more than the marks
others have left on us, the remainder of affective attachments that have long dissolved.
Second, and more important for my purposes here, Freud views the psyche as social
because it is the reflection of social and political history—or phylogenesis.174 In other

with the development of society. Nonetheless Freud finds that ―it cannot be assumed that economic motives
are the only ones that determine the behavior of human beings in society‖ (SE 22: 178). Thus, according to
Freud, while Marx‘s theory unveils the important correlation between economic and social structures its
singular focus does so at the expense of other important psychological influences on the development of
society. For as Freud writes it is ―incomprehensible how psychological factors can be overlooked where
what is in question are the reactions of living human beings,‖ reactions that are driven by ―their selfpreservative instinct, their aggressiveness, their need to be loved, their drive towards obtaining pleasure and
avoiding unpleasure [ihren selbsterhaltungstrieb, ihre Aggressionslust, ihre Liebesbedürfnis, ihren Drang
nach Lusterwerb und Unlustvermeidung]‖ (SE 22: 178; GW 15: 194). As we can see, for Freud, Marx
reduces the complexity of the material development of society when Marx positions this development
through the singular principle of economics, thus forsaking what Freud understands to be the perennial
influence of the psyche on human life, the development of civilization, and also the source of the problems
of society.
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It is because of this sense in which the ego develops through its relationship to the external world that
some, like Jean Laplanche have argued against primary narcissism Life and Death in Psychoanalysis and
others, such as object relations theorist D. W. Winnicott to posit the vicissitudes of primary narcissism onto
the child‘s first object in ―Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena.‖
173

For a discussion of the relationship between development of the ego in Freud‘s work in light of the
Marx and Adorno see: Joel Whitebook, ―The Urgeschicte of Subjectivity Reconsidered,‖ New German
Critique 81 (Autumn 2000): 125-141.
174

It is because of both of these relations between the political and psyche that allows Freud to
continuously make the analogy between the political and the psyche. According to Freud there is ―an
almost complete conformity in this respect between the individual and the group: in the group too an
impression of the past [der Eindruck der Vergangenheit] is retained in unconscious memory-traces‖ (SE
23: 94; GW 16: 201). The group, like the individual, is affected by the early stages of its development,
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words, the other marking my sense of self is not just other people but also the historical
organization of society structuring the psyche. Thus, if we want to understand the
political and historical nature of disavowal in Freud‘s work, then we must briefly turn to
phylogenesis.
Phylogenesis is one of Freud‘s most controversial concepts.175 It explains, for
Freud, how individual development, ontogenesis, mimics the evolution of the species as a
whole.176 This hypothesis allows Freud to access transgenerational traits in the human
species without the need to reference a trans-historical universal. In this sense, our initial
helplessness, the struggle to differentiate the inside from the outside, the drama of the
Oedipal conflict and its resolution with the introjection of the law of the father are all
specific instantiations in individual development of the historical development of the
species according to the phylogenetic hypothesis.177 In his 1914 preface to the 1905 text
Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud describes this relationship:

fixations, impressions, and disturbances that are retained unconsciously. These impressions of the past
continue to persist in the present and affect the individual or the group without the individual or group
necessarily being aware of it. Thus, the text turns on the claim that just as the individual has an unconscious
that affects the subject in ways that it does not understand, that remains the singular force that alienates the
subject from itself, so too does a group, community, or one could even say state. Freud makes this
comparison explicitly in his analysis of the historical reconstructions of the Rat Man‘s childhood in his
1909 case study Notes upon a cse of Obessional Neurosis. He writes in a footnote that ―[i]f we do not wish
to go astray in our judgement of their historical reality, we must above all bear in mind that people‘s
‗childhood memories‘ are only consolidated at a later period, usually at the age of puberty; and that this
involves a complicated process of remodeling, analogous in everyway to the process by which a nation
constructs legends about its early history‖ (SE 10, 206).
175

For example, in Freud and the Politics of Psychoanalysis José Brunner argues phylogenesis is an
unfortunate Lamarkian loyalty in Freud‘s work that will eventually subtends the racist violence of
totalitarianism (Brunner 1995, 163).
176

Herbert Marcuse‘s Eros and Civilization is one of the few places where the materialist nature of Freud‘s
phylogenetic gambit is taken seriously.
177

For a detailed discussion of this, and specifically the thesis of recapitulation see: Stephen Jay Gould‘s
Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 1977).
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[o]ntogenesis may be regarded as a recapitulation of phylogenesis, in so far as the
latter has not been modified by more recent experience. The phylogenetic
disposition can be seen at work behind the ontogenetic process. But disposition is
ultimately the precipitate of earlier experience of the species to which the more
recent experience of the individual, as the sum of the accidental factors, is superadded. (SE 7: 131; GS 5: 3f.)
When looking at Freud‘s description of this relationship one can easily conclude that
history frames the individual in advance. While psychoanalysis gives more preference to
the ―accidental factors‖ involved in individual development than the historical disposition
of the individual, Freud finds psychoanalysis must constantly assume this inherited
disposition to make sense of the accidental factors in the development of the individual.
In other words, as Freud describes it in a letter to Lou-Andreas Salome, the historical
origin of individual development is a ―witch prehistory‖ that must be conjured to explain
the individual‘s primal fantasies and its entrance into the law (Pfeiffer 1966, 80).
Methodologically, the role of phylogenesis in Freud‘s work is interesting. On the
one hand, it seems to be no more than a methodological ―remainder,‖ as Robert Fliess has
noted, no more than a necessary assumption that grounds the technique of analysis (Fliess
1956, 46). On the other hand, it indicates the material and historical origins of
consciousness, as Marcuse has noted in Eros and Civilization.178 While it might be the
case that phylogenesis is the necessary, yet mystical, historical assumption that anchors
the specificity of individual development in Freud‘s work, I would like to ask what it
would mean to take Freud‘s reliance on phylogenesis as an indication of his
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See Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pages 55-60.
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commitments to understanding the historical inscription of the psyche? What if we took
what was at stake in phylogenesis seriously, not as a biological theory rooted in Lamarck,
but rather a description of the historical and material nature of the psyche itself? How
might this shift in emphasis force us to reconsider not only the psyche and its relationship
to the social, but also the relationship between disavowal as a psychical experience and as
a social phenomenon? In order to flesh out the relationship between the psyche and the
social so that we may understand the relationship between disavowal and historical
conditions, we must first examine the one text that Freud dedicates to exploring the
historical origin of the psyche: Totem and Taboo
Written in 1913 Totem and Taboo represents Freud‘s narration of the historical
basis of the psyche.179 Desires and inclinations, he argues, drives and psychical
mechanisms can all be traced back to an event so momentous it ―left ineradicable traces
in the history of humanity [unertilgbare Spuren in der Geschichte der Menschheit
hinterlassen]‖ (SE 13: 155; GW 9: 186). This event, for Freud, was the murder of the
Urvater. Freud‘s narrative structure of this event leans on Darwin‘s theory of the
evolution of human exogamy. The story of the murder of the primal father is so important
for Freud it appears in every political text Freud writes afterwards, acting as the source of
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One can also think of Totem and Taboo as it resonates with and resists certain tendencies within the
social contract tradition of political thought. In Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, Philip Rieff argues that
Freud presents a unique social contract theory in that the ―the social contract appears as a counterrevolutionary response to the over throw of patriarchal government‖ (Reiff 1979, 223). More recently José
Brunner, argues that one should read Freud‘s ―story of the primal horde as part of a rhetorical strategy
which is well-known from the writings of social contract theorists‖ (Brunner 1995, 157). While there is
much to be said about what it would mean to read Freud‘s origin story in line with the tradition of social
contract theory, I find that this interpretative strategy helpful in exploring how Freud attempts to think the
relationship between the social and the psyche and how this origin remains present, haunting the present in
ways that one might not notice. I, thus, turn to Freud‘s story for what Marcuse has called its ―symbolic
value‖ (Marucse 1974, 60) and would prefer to treat it as what Jose Brunner has called a story of political
contract (Brunner 1995, 156f.). See also Rajana Khanna‘s discussion in Dark Continents: Psychoanalysis
and Colonialism.
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religion, unconscious guilt, the law and its internalization, the catalyst for a mob
mentality that desires the emergence of a great leader,180 and most importantly the
historical kernel of the Oedipal complex.181
In Totem and Taboo Freud argues that the murder of the primal father is the
source of the Oedipal complex. In other words, the ontogenetic entrance into the law and
the symbolic, the very law that conditions appearance and meaning itself, is nothing more
than the recapitulation of historical conditions carried forth by material practices of
previous generations. The foundational thesis of this text seems to upend the very
universality of Oedipal Complex by giving it a historical origin. In this sense, Freud‘s
story of the violent, incestuous, and cannibalistic nature of the origin of society in Totem
and Taboo is simultaneously the story of the violent, incestuous, and cannibalistic desires
that structure the psyche and the drives. Because the development of the individual is the
recapitulation of the historical development of the species for Freud, and because the
murder of the primal father represents a decisive turning point in this history, Freud
argues that it has ―not allowed mankind a moments rest [die Menschheit nicht zur Ruhe
kommen läßt]‖ (SE 13: 145; GW 9: 175). What is the methodological structure of this
moment for Freud? What can we derive from this structure that assumes that the
historical organization of society is repeated each individual‘s own development?182 In
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See: Todd Dufresne, Tales from the Freudian Crypt: The Death Drive in Text and Context (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), Chapter three; Phillip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
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There are many retellings of this story throughout Freud‘s work and each retelling focuses on different
aspects given Freud‘s rhetorical need and argument within the text. For other retellings of this story see:
(SE 14: 293); (SE 17: 262); (SE 18: 122-128); (SE 20: 67-68); (SE 21: 132).
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My argument is neither focused on the content of Freud‘s narrative nor on whether or not the series of
murders of the Urvater actually took place or not. Rather I am solely interested in examining what Freud‘s
investigation tells us about how he understands the relation between the psyche and the social. If interested
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other words, what might happen if we put aside the content of Freud‘s narrative to the
side, and focus on what Freud‘s argument can tell us about the relationship between the
historical and the psyche, between the material organization of society and the structure
of consciousness? In order to answer this, let us turn to the narrative.
Freud begins with Darwin‘s hypothesis that our pre-human ancestors ―lived in
comparatively small groups or hordes within which the jealously of the oldest and
strongest male prevented sexual promiscuity‖ (SE 13: 125; GW 9: 152). The oldest and
strongest male, the Urvater, ruled this loose band of individuals through sheer physical
domination. The primeval father kept all of the females for himself, which not only
―prevented sexual promiscuity‖ but, according to Freud, must have forced the younger
and weaker males to look for other hordes, in which they would challenge the ―oldest and
strongest male‖ in order to vie for the sexual domination of the group.
Freud‘s contribution to Darwin‘s narrative begins with the imaginative leap that
the brothers, forced out of the horde by the primal father, banded together and killed the
Urvater. He writes
[o]ne day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and
devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde. United, they
had the courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible
for them individually [Eines Tages taten sich die ausgetriebenen Brüder
zusammen, erschlugenund verzehrten den Vater und machten so der Vaterhorde

in the debates about the actual status of the ―primal crime‖ see: Robert A. Paul, ―Yes, the Primal Crime did
take place: A Further Defense of Freud‘s Totem and Taboo‖ Ethos: Journal of the Society for
Psychological Anthropology 38, no. 2 (2010): 230-249; Rober A. Paul, ―Did the Primal Crime take
Place?,‖ Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 4, no. 3 (1976): 311-352.
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ein ende. Vereint wagten sie und brachten zustande, was dem einzelnen
unmöglich geblieben wäre]. (SE 13: 141; GW 9: 171)
This event marks a transition that gives rise to a social formation ―based on complicity in
the common crime‖ (SE 13: 146; GW 9: 176). Forced into to the bond of exile, the
brothers returned to end the rule of the Urvater and incorporate his power by
cannibalizing his flesh.183 Yet, as Freud claims in An Autobiographical Study the brothers
were not immediately ―able to take over their heritage‖ since they ―stood in one another‘s
way‖ (SE 20: 68). For what would stop others from doing the same as they did? It was
only, as Freud claims, through the ―influence of failure and remorse [Mißerfolges und der
Reue]‖ that they began to ―band together‖ though the institution of the law of totemic
regulations (SE 20: 68; GW 14: 94).184 For Freud, these totemic regulations represent a
fetishized ―deferred obedience‖ to the law of the murdered father.185 What are we to
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For arguments that analogize this moment in Freud‘s work with the phenomenon war see: Franco
Fornari, The Psychoanalysis of War, trans. Alenka Pfeifer (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press,
1966); Edward Glover War, Sadism, and Pacifism (London: Unwin Brothers, 1933).
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In Eros and Civilization Marcuse argues this represents the counter-revolutionary and self-destructive
failure of the initial liberation (Marcuse 1974, 64-5). Others, such as Mark Blackell have argued that
Freud‘s mythical retelling of the deferred obedience represents the institution of ambivalence in the
political realm. See Mark Blackell, ―Democracy and Ambivalence: Totem and Taboo Revisited,‖ Journal
for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 6, no. 1 (2001): 45-57.
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For Freud the memory of the murder of the father and the delayed obedience to the law of the father first
becomes displaced onto the totem animal, which Freud claims promises the security of the social order. In
light of the spectral father who now possessed more strength than the real father through the displacement
of his memory onto the totem animal, the brothers ―revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the
totem, the substitute for the father [Sie widerriefen ihre Tat, indem sie die Tötung des Vaterersatzes]‖ (SE
13: 143; GW 9: 173). Thus the law acts to stop the repetition of the violence that founds the political by
recognizing this violence in its very prohibition. Yet, the same gesture that denies the deed simultaneously
reenacts the deed. The reenactment of this violence occurs in the tradition of the communal sacrifice of the
totem animal. Freud writes that the communal sacrifice of the totem animal during the totem meal, which
reinforces the bond of the community, is in fact ―a repetition and a commemoration of this memorable and
criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many things—of social organization, of moral restrictions
and of religion‖ (SE 13: 142). It is a double gesture of denial and reenactment; this tradition simultaneously
fends off unwelcome perceptions while preserving the ambivalence the brothers‘ maintained toward the
father. The social order, for Freud, emerges in this double gesture of preserving the memory of the violence
and denying it.
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make of this story of revolutionary violence and its relationship to the structure of the
psyche?
When examining Freud‘s story one can come to the conclusion that he leaned on
anthropological assumptions and methods tinged by the colonial project and racism. One
could also say that, having already worked out both the dynamics and importance of the
Oedipus complex, Freud molds Darwinian and Lamarckian science of his day to mirror,
and thus historically legitimate, the narrative of psychoanalysis. Furthermore, it is
important to note that this is story only about brothers, father‘s, and the intergenerational
transmission of power amongst males. And, there is truth to these critiques. Yet, if one
confronts both the problematic imaginaries constructing the narrative as well as Freud‘s
dire need for corroboration from the ―respected‖ sciences one still must confront the fact
that in this text Freud‘s argument assumes the social priority of the psyche, and that this
social priority is located in the development of the law as a guilt reaction to some
foundational deed.
In as much as Freud‘s narration of this event is a simultaneously an attempt to
uncover the particularities of the phylogenetic ―witch prehistory‖ analysis must assume,
then this narration describes the historical, and thus, material foundation, for the psyche.
More specifically, if the psyche is structured by historical constellations resulting from
political action—the brother‘s revolutionary coup d‘état—and if these constellations are
the development of law as the spirit of the action or as a reaction against the deed, then
the phylogenetic influence on the psyche is located in the historical organization of the
law itself. And indeed, this is the crux of Freud‘s narration in Totem and Taboo,
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demonstrating how the complex of punishment and law affect the development of
consciousness and its material, intergenerational transmission.
Despite the more controversial aspects of this story, in Totem and Taboo Freud
narrates the relationship between the development of the law and the internalization of
this law in the form of self-lacerating punishment forming the complexes that structure
the psyche. The tripartite structure of the drives, the ego, and the super-ego, the very
fracture from ourselves and the meticulous self-monitoring in light of the law, the selfdisparaging whispers of the melancholic, are all the reflection of the revolutionary and
the counter-revolutionary construction of the law. It is the creation of a symbolic system,
as we will see in the next section, excluding the appearance of the deed acting as its
catalyst. In as much as the law is reaction to this deed, then the law carries it within itself,
negatively. In this respect, the deed becomes the non-identical moment of the law. It is
the non-schematized, non-symbolic, moment within the appearance of the political itself,
within the constitutional disposition of the political. In order to see exactly what this has
to do with Freud‘s late concept of disavowal must turn to Freud‘s last text Moses and
Monotheism.

II. Before the Law: Moses and Monotheism
Quoting Goethe Freud ends Totem and Taboo: ―In the beginning there was the
deed‖ (SE 13: 161). As the quotation indicates, and as I have been arguing, Freud‘s
understanding of the psyche begins with the political and social, the material conditions
embracing our activities. If Freud anchors the structure of the psyche in the historical
conditions of the modes of punishment, and if disavowal is a fundamental structure of the
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psyche, then the constitutive nature of disavowal must also have its origins in the modes
of punishment. In light of this, it is not an accident that as disavowal becomes part of the
structure of the psyche in Freud‘s late work it also becomes part of his understanding of
the historical conditions. Nowhere is this demonstrated more clearly than in Moses and
Monotheism. In other words, Moses and Monotheism, I would like to suggest, is Freud‘s
attempt to retranslate the psychical structure of disavowal back into the historical
conditions giving rise to it in his late work.
Before turning to Moses and Monotheism, it will be helpful to briefly examine the
recent attempts by Slavoj Žižek and Homi Bhabha to follow on the materialist origins of
disavowal in the psyche. They both draw explicit lines between disavowal as a form of
consciousness and the material conditions of the political and social. On the one hand,
Žižek anchors the existence of disavowal in the modes of production, and most explicitly
commodity fetishism. As he argues in The Sublime Object of Ideology, only under the
conditions of an ―exchange process‖ premised on the fact that ―the individuals partaking
in it are not aware of its proper logic‖ could fetishistic disavowal as a form of ideology
emerge (Žižek 1989, 15).186 Žižek, thus, plays on what he sees as the similarities between
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In The Plague of Fantasies Žižek discusses disavowal as the distance that supports the transcendental
function of fantasy by appealing to Full Metal Jacket. The first half of the film documents the brutality of
breaking down recruits in order to create them into killing machines. During the first half of the film one is
introduced to two characters: one who fully identifies with the fantasy that structures militaristic dogma and
one who maintains an ironic distance from this dogma. The character whom fully identifies with the
phantasmatic framework ends up killing himself and his drill sergeant before being shipped off to Vietnam.
Žižek claims that ―the radical, unmediated identification with the phantasmatic superego machine
necessarily leads to a murderous passage à l’acte‖ (Žižek 2008, 27). In contrast to the this ―radical‖
identification with the fantasy that underwrites the symbolic structure, the character who maintains a
distance from this fantasy acts according to this implicit framework. This is exemplified in the second half
of the film where he shoots and kills a wounded Vietcong solider. Thus, Žižek claims that it is this subject
who maintained a distance from the fantasy that is actually the ―fully constituted military subject‖ (Žižek
2008, 27). Hence for Žižek there must be a distance between the fantasy and the symbolic structure it
orders if the fantasy is to function. When this distance has been traversed the fantasy dissipates and short
circuits. In other words, he claims that one must disavow the fantasy which orders the symbolic, that instills
the law, if this order is to maintain itself. This distance he claims, is not a ―secondary function‖ in the
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Marx and Freud‘s concept of fetishism in order to align the emergence of disavowal as a
form of thought with the material conditions that produce it. On the other hand, Bhabha
argues the colonial projects of modernity have created contradictory spaces and
temporalities. These spaces and temporalities give rise not only to racial stereotypes as a
form of fetishism, warding off the threats to the white European illusions of modernity
subjectivity, but also the experience of a hybridity grounded in a ―disjunctive
temporality‖ by the post-colonial subjects themselves (Bhabha 1994, 245). Bhabha
argues the fundamental ambivalence of this disjunctive temporality allows for the
iterative re-signification of identities that will allow the disavowed post-colonial subjects
to emerge for the first time (Bhabha 1994, 5).187 By highlighting the material conditions
of capital or the project colonialism both thinkers follow a form of fetishistic disavowal
rooted in Freud‘s work back to a contradiction in the social and political spheres.188 Yet,

operation of fantasy, but rather its ―disavowed foundation, its ‗constitutive crime‘, its founding gesture
which has to remain invisible if power is to function normally‖ (Žižek 2008, 35).
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Bhabha defines this ―disjunctive temporality‖ in terms of the timeless as well, as a lack. He writes
―[w]hat may seem primordial or timeless is, I believe, a moment of a kind of ‗projective past‘ whose
history and signification I shall attempt to explore here. It is a mode of ‗negativity‘ that makes the
enunciatory present of modernity disjunctive. It opens up a time-lag at the point at which we speak of
humanity through its differentiations—gender race, class—that mark an excessive marginality of
modernity‖ (Bhabha 1994, 238).
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I choose both Žižek and Bhabha because they draw most explicitly not only on Freud‘s work to describe
the political implications of disavowal, but also specifically the materialist tendencies in Freud‘s work to
talk about it. For other variations of the political deployment of Freud‘s concept of disavowal see: Gayatri
Spivak uses the (Lacanian) concept of disavowal as psychotic foreclosure in A Critique of Postcolonial
Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999);
Aida Alayarian, gives an account of political disavowal in light of Freud‘s understanding of the concept as
repudiation in his work from 1923-1924, Consequences of Denial: The Armenian Genocide (London:
Karnac Books, 2008); Stanley Cohen uses the 1927 version of the concept as a split recognition to explore
the denial of human rights abuses in States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002); and Nicole Loraux uses disavowal as a foundational mechanism to
explore the founding of the polis in The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens, trans.
Carinne Pache and Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2006); for other variations see: Jean Wyatt,
―Signifying Contortions: Disavowal, the Enigmatic Signifer, and George W. Bush‘s Credibility after 9/11,‖
International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies3, no. 2 (2006): 194-205; Derek Hook, ―The Racial
Stereotype, Colonial Discourse, Fetishism, and Racism,‖ Psychoanalytic Review 92, no. 5 (2005): 702-734;
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as I have been suggesting, disavowal is not necessarily fetishistic, nor are the modes of
production the complex forming the structure of the psyche in Freud‘s work. Rather the
historical formation of the law defends against a historical idea by the modes of
punishment. In order to highlight this understanding of the historical conditions that make
disavowal a constitutive feature of the psyche, we must turn to Moses and Monotheism.
In 1939, after the outbreak of World War II and after having been displaced multiple
times, Freud publishes the full text of Moses and Monotheism from his new home in
London. This would be Freud‘s last text on the political and his first political text where
the concept of Verleugnung plays a dominant role. And just as Edward W. Said notes in
Freud and the Non-European, Moses and Monotheism is a ―classic example‖ of ―late
style,‖ which like ―the bristlingly difficult‖ late works of Beethoven, ―seems to be
composed by Freud for himself‖ (Said 2004, 28). Despite its ungainly construction and
its complicated publication history, the central premises of Moses and Monotheism are
drawn from Totem and Taboo written 26 years earlier in 1913. Freud, thus, envisions
Moses and Monotheism as both an application and restatement of his claim that the law is
a defensive construction set against the ―deed‖ acting as the catalyst for the structure of
politics. Yet, unlike Totem and Taboo, the story of Moses and Monotheism incorporates
the concept of disavowal.
Despite the fact that the text of Moses and Monotheism is dominated by a discussion
of the ―return of the repressed,‖189 Freud also uses the language of disavowal to work out

Adrian Johnston, ―The Cynics Fetish: Slavoj Žižek‘ and the Dynamics of Belief,‖ Psychoanalysis, Culture
& Society 9 (2004): 259-283.
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Richard Bernstein provides a wonderful analysis of the function of tradition and repression in Moses and
Monotheism in the second chapter of Freud and the Legacy of Moses (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
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the premises of Moses and Monotheism. Despite this fact, disavowal‘s prominent role in
this text is rarely, if ever, noted. If it is true that that disavowal is a separate defense from
repression, and if disavowal is a constitutive defense highlighting the non-synthetic
nature of the ego, then one could examine this text as demonstrating the non-synthetic
nature of the development of communities as opposed to the synthetic narratives of
repression.190 And indeed, this is how Freud uses the concept when he highlights a split
in the law, represented between history and tradition, which occludes and defends against
the non-schematized violence founding the state.
As is well known, Freud‘s thesis in Moses and Monotheism is two-fold. On the one
hand, it reworks the premises of the historical development of Judaism by arguing Moses
was ―not a Jew but a well-born Egyptian […] and a zealous supporter of the monotheistic
faith‖ (Pfeiffer 1966, 204).191 When this new religion lost the support of the political
structure with the death of Pharaoh Amenhotep IV, Freud claims that ―this ambitious and
aspiring man [Moses] had lost all his hopes and had decided to leave his fatherland and
create a new nation which he proposed to bring up in the imposing religion of his master‖
(Pfeiffer 1966, 204). After Moses‘ flight from his ―fatherland‖ and his attempt to found a
new ―nation,‖ Freud claims that he, like the Urvater of Totem and Taboo, was ―probably

190

If disavowal is genetically different from repression in that it represents the non-schematized which is
not subject to the temporal underpinnings of rationality, then political disavowal as opposed to political
repression would challenge the sentiment of overcoming the past that one finds in myriad of books. For
example in Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History Norman O. Brown examines both
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Becoming‖ (Brown 1959, 19).
191
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killed‖ in a ―popular uprising and his teachings abandoned‖ (Pfeiffer 1966, 204).192 Like
the deferred institution of the law of the father by the rebellious brothers, Moses‘
teachings would also form the foundation of Judaism in a moment of deferred
obedience.193
On the other hand, Freud pushes past the framework of Totem and Taboo in Moses
and Monotheism making the theoretical argument that Judaism consolidated its identity
through the mechanism of disavowal.194 Freud argues Jewish history disavows not only
its Egyptian influence but also the murder of Moses. Disavowal consolidates the Jewish
people as a people and as a concept. In fact, the deferred guilt and obedience evidenced in
the institution of the law of Moses is founded on this very disavowal. Thus, just as
disavowal is constitutive for the development of the ego in Freud‘s late work, so too does
Moses and Monotheism position it as constitutive for the formation of a people and the
law that makes this people intelligible as a people.
Because disavowal concerns the schema engendering political appearance, Freud‘s
text is filled with an examination of the formation of historical texts central to a group‘s
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self-understanding. If examined psychoanalytically these texts reveal the same defensive
structures as the speech of the subject for Freud. Just as speech exhibits symptoms, so too
may we
[…] count upon finding what has been suppressed and disavowed [Unterdrückte
und Verleugnete] hidden away somewhere else, though changed and torn from its
original context [abgeändert und aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen]. (SE 23: 43;
GW 16: 145)
The very texts that bind the people as a people are the very same texts disavowing the
non-schematized aspects of its history. These texts retell the nation‘s founding,
continually binding one back to the legends that surround the origin of a people.195 These
conscious articulations of a group are beset by two opposing tendencies for Freud. On the
one hand, there is the tendency expressed in the text that ―falsifies [verfälscht],‖
―mutilates [verstümmelt],‖ and changes things into their opposite. On the other hand,
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In Freud‘s earlier works, he will often claim that there is a ―remarkable analogy‖ between the psychical
forces which affect one‘s recollection of childhood memories and the manner in which a ―nation preserves
in its store of legends and myths‖ (SE 6: 48). He alludes to direct correlation twice in his 1901 text The
Psychopathology of Everyday Life (SE 6: 48, 148). He will also deploys this analogy in a footnote to the
―Rat Man‖ case in his 1909 ―Notes upon a case of Obessional Neurosis,‖ where he claims that if “we do
not wish to go astray in our judgement of their historical reality [childhood memories], we must above all
bear in mind that people's „childhood memories‟ are only consolidated at a later period, usually at the age
of puberty; and that this involves a complicated process of remodeling, analogous in every way to the
process by which a nation constructs legends about its early history” (SE 10: 206fn). Freud will develop
this correlation more distinctly in his 1910 work ―Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood.‖ In
this text he writes that the nature of childhood memories “is perhaps best illustrated by a comparison with
the way in which the writing of history originated among the peoples of antiquity. As long as a nation was
small and weak it gave no thought to the writing of its history. Men tilled the soil of their land, fought for
their existence against their neighbours, and tried to gain territory from them and to acquire wealth. It was
an age of heroes, not of historians. Then came another age, an age of reflection: men felt themselves to be
rich and powerful, and now felt a need to learn where they had come from and how they had developed.
Historical writing, which had begun to keep a continuous record of the present, now also cast a glance back
to the past, gathered traditions and legends, interpreted the traces of antiquity that survived in customs and
usages, and in this way created a history of the past. It was inevitable that this early history should have
been an expression of present beliefs and wishes rather than a true picture of the past; for many things had
been dropped from the nation's memory, while others were distorted, and some remains of the past were
given a wrong interpretation in order to fit in with contemporary ideas” (SE 11: 83).
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there is the tendency in the text that seeks ―to preserve everything as it is‖ without care
for consistency (SE 23: 43; GW 16: 145). The results of these two tendencies is the fact
that ―almost everywhere there are noticeable gaps, disturbing repetitions, and obvious
contradictions‖ which ―reveal things to us which it was not intended to communicate‖
(SE 23: 43; GW 16: 145). In other words, as Freud provocatively claims ―[i]n its
implications the distortion of a text resembles a murder: the difficulty is not in
perpetrating the deed, but in getting rid of its traces [Es ist bei der Entstellung eines
Textes ähnlich wie bei einem Mord. Die Schwierigkeit liegt nicht in der Ausführung der
Tat, sondern in der Beseitigung ihrer Spuren]‖ (SE 23: 43; GW 16: 145). The historical
narratives that bind a people together busily attempt to erase the appearance of the deed
that set them free. All that remains of this deed is the negative impressions within the text
as the text attempts to erase the deed itself. The very articulation of the political is, thus, a
defense against the deed that set the political in motion. And nowhere is this more evident
than in the law forming the boundaries the political.196
At first glance, the defensive construction of the law appears as the symbolic
escape from a traumatic recognition.197 If it were then the law would be the material form
of the apparatus of secondary repression that ensures primary repression, or in this case
the deed at the origin of the political. And of course, if the law is a symbolic break from
the deed, then it can subsume and master the deed.198 Yet, if the law emerges from

196
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disavowal, and not repression, then this forces us to rethink the development of the law
not as a form of symbolic break, a gaining distance from the deed, but rather a break
toward the concrete, a bringing closer of that which does not appear in order to assure the
conditions of its non-appearance. In other words, if the law emerges from disavowal, if
the very conditions of the political and what can be rendered sensible and visible within a
certain construction of the historical, then the law does not represent a symbolic break
from trauma, but rather a traumatic break from the symbolic. And in as much as mastery
and distance are premised on this symbolic break, then so far as disavowal represents a
break from the symbolic it also represents a break from the distance needed for
recognition and mastery. Far from an entrance into psychosis, the state where symbols
become things themselves, this would mean the onset of a borderline disorder where what
is but does not appear exists simultaneously with what is and appears, often
contradicting, disrupting, and undermining the very conditions of appearance itself.
In Moses and Monotheism, this disrupting split appears in two different forms of
collective articulation history and tradition. There is split between the
[…] written record and the oral transmission of the same material—tradition.
What had been omitted or changed in the written record might very well have
been preserved intact in tradition. Tradition was supplement but at the same time
a contradiction to historical writing. (SE 23: 68; GW 16: 172)
On the one hand, the deed does not appear in the historical account, the account that is
conscious of itself. On the other hand, tradition registers the non-schematized violence at
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This is of course the central premise in Noëlle McAfee‘s Democracy and the Political Unconscious,
where she argues for a public sphere that can sublimate its affect and discord in the symbolic nature of
speech. One also finds this premise operating, although more ambivalently, in Shoshana Felman‘s The
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the origin. It preserves it. It repeats it. It is another form of memory, one that cannot
appear but is nonetheless manifest. Tradition, then, becomes a social reservoir where the
unconscious memory traces are registered. While these traces are preserved, that to which
they refer exist outside of the current political and social symbolic constellation
engendering appearance in the political.199 Disavowal occurs between the historical
narrative and tradition, allowing a group to simultaneously recognize and not recognize
the foundational deed of the political. The political realm emerges between the stories of
history and the practices of tradition, the simultaneous and non-synthetic recognition of
the deed.
Freud‘s political use of the term disavowal seems to include two main
characteristics. First, the symbolic expression of political and social history, the
foundational texts and laws that bind them together, both exclude the non-identical while
bearing its negative impression. Arising after the fact, both the laws of prohibition and
the texts that consciously preserve the history of the nation are defensive constructs that
foreclose the conditions for appearance for the unschematized deed at the origin of the
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This understanding of tradition is one of the main lines of Freud‘s argument in Totem and Taboo. In this
text Freud constantly wonders how the meaning and origin of the tradition of totemism and the taboo
restrictions that define it have been lost, such that people engage in these practices without understanding
their meaning. This can be seen most clearly in Freud‘s second essay in Totem and Taboo, ―Taboo and
Emotional Ambivalence,‖ which is a sustained meditation on the development taboo. This development,
though, cannot be fully narrated because taboo emerges from an ―unknown origin [unbekannter Herkunft]‖
(SE 13: 18). Something gives rise to marking a certain act or object taboo. What is prior to the observance
of this prohibition is not and cannot be known. Something comes before taboo; there is an origin. Yet, what
the origin is remains unknown. Freud calls the concealed nature of this origin a ―riddle [Rätsel]‖ (SE 13:
22). One knows ―it‖ is there, but can neither fully reveal nor comprehend what ―it‖ is. The origin is thus a
―riddle,‖ simultaneously revealing and concealing itself. In fact when one reaches this point in the essay,
Freud takes the time to ―assure‖ the reader that not only is the present difficulty of the origin of taboo
murky, but that ―the whole subject is highly obscure [undurchsichtig]‖ (SE 13: 21). Freud‘s affected
modesty does not last long, for he is quick to point out that while the problem of the origin of taboo is
difficult for the historian and the anthropologist, the psychoanalyst might be able to shed some light on this
problem. Psychoanalysis can ―throw light onto‖ this obscure origin (SE 13: 22). It can inflect, fill out, and
thus come to the aid of history.
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nation. In other words, the consolidation of identity, the binding together of meaning,
forecloses in advance the unschematized from appearance itself. Secondly, the
schematized split engenders both a historical record and tradition. It creates the
conditions for both the unconscious registration and historical negation of the deed
propelling the construction of the law. It thus creates a ―contradiction.‖ On the one hand
the deed is ―recognized‖ in it unconscious repetition in tradition. On the other hand, the
deed is not recognized in the defensive construction of conscious history and law. Thus
the crux of the logic of non-contradiction operating at the heart of the construction of
political organization lies in the non-synthetic nature of the origin of the political
engendering the split between history and tradition. The deed is disavowed, not
repressed or repudiated. That is to say that these ―facts and ideas‖ are ―not lost‖ but rather
their practice ―persisted in traditions which survived among the people‖ (SE 23: 63; GW
16: 166). In this sense the social acts and observances become unarticulated memorial to
what has been severed from the official history of the nation. The traces remain,
providing for the dissonant and contradictory space of both the unarticulated memory and
the historical texts that attempt to shore up borders that form a people as a people in their
official narrative.
In playing out Freud‘s understanding of the political and historical origins of
disavowal by examining both Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism, we have
come to two important insights. First, Freud‘s materialist commitments focus on the
influence of the modes of punishment, not the modes of production structure
consciousness. Second, looking at the modes of punishment illuminates the political
instantiation of the non-identical within the symbolic tensions of the law. It sets into
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motion the simultaneous recognition and non-recognition of what does not appear in the
political—a dissonant oscillation sparked by the presence of that which is but is not
schematized. Thus we can begin to see the limits of political rationality as the limit of the
ability to recognize contradictions as contradictions, as the impression and the effect of
the non-schematized on the development of law and history. Next, I would like to extend
the discussion of political disavowal by briefly taking up Angela Davis‘ work the
relationship between the United States Constitution, prisons, and slavery. Angela Davis‘
work on the constitutional link between slavery and incarceration in the United States
demonstrates how the historical condition of the law affects the appearance of political
subjectivity. It is thus an excellent place to take account of the political implications of
the concept of disavowal.
III. The Constitutional Disavowal of Chattel Slavery: A Case Study
In many respects Davis‘ work is driven by critical theory‘s attempt to think the
non-identical. For Davis this specifically takes on the form of reflecting slavery‘s
impression on the modes of punishment in the United States. In this section, I will take up
Davis‘ argument that the prison is the modern echo of chattel slavery affecting the
construction of political subjectivity. It is an echo that I would like to claim the Freudian
concept of disavowal helps to identify as the reverberation of the negative impression of
the non-schematized elements at the origin of the nation.
Yet, before we begin down this road, it is helpful to ask the question of what it
means to speak of slavery as outside the schematization of the political? As I have argued
throughout what lies outside of schematization lies outside of appearance as such; it is
what remains radically unconscious, radically timeless. If slavery remains unconscious,
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we might ask, can slavery even appear as an object of knowledge for the state? Moreover,
if slavery is non-schematized then can it be articulated by the state or is it resigned to
silence on this subject? To speak of slavery as non-schematized in the political does not
mean it cannot appear, that it was a trauma surpassing comprehension and thus mastery—
though in some sense this might be the case.200
In contrast, to say slavery is a non-schematized element of the political means it
does not appear in the founding code of law—the constitution. As Davis points out ―[n]ot
even the term ‗slavery‘ was allowed to mar the sublime concepts articulated in the
Constitution‖ (Davis 1998b, 53).201 It is thus not brought to legal articulation in the
founding symbolic matrix constituting the condition for the possibility of appearing in the
political. And in this sense, perhaps Hannah Arendt is right when she argues that at the
time of the founding of the United States, ―the institution of slavery carrie[d] an obscurity
even blacker than the obscurity of poverty; the slave, not the poor man, was ‗wholly
overlooked‘‖ (Arendt 2006, 61). While excluded from the founding grammar of political
appearance, slavery remained a constitutive practice or tradition within the United States.
Thus, one might say slavery is the non-identical at the heart of political schematization in
the United States. Remaining outside of political articulation, it still remains, bumps up
against, bleeds into, and affects the political. It is what does not appear, but nonetheless
remains. This relationship between of the law and tradition in terms of slavery is most
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explicitly seen in the retroactive insertion of the concept of slavery into the constitution in
the Thirteenth Amendment.
It is with a touch of irony that Angela Davis‘ argument begins with the
constitutional abolition of chattel slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment states:
[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. (Constitution of the United
States)
As is quite clear, in the retroactive attempt erase the tradition of slavery the 13th
Amendment simultaneously performs two contradictory actions. On the one hand, it
abolishes slavery. On the other hand, it preserves slavery within the modes of
punishment. A clause, tucked between the nouns to be abolished and the verbs that would
do that work, literally interrupts the action of abolition in the amendment. Quite simply,
the Thirteenth Amendment sidesteps the very erasure it was meant to employ, providing a
clear instance of the Freudian concept of disavowal, declaring: ―I know very well that
slavery will still exist in the form of the prison, but all the same I am abolishing slavery.‖
The Thirteenth Amendment‘s disavowal of slavery leads Davis to conclude that ―the
abolition of slavery corresponded to the authorization of slavery as punishment‖ (Davis
1998e, 99); or again, the exceptional clause in the Thirteenth Amendment ―would render
penal servitude constitutional—from 1865 to the present day‖ (Davis 1998d, 76). This
simultaneous nationalization and abolition of the tradition of slavery is etched into the
foundation of political law, thus transforming what was once the ―the particular
repressive power of the master‖ into what Davis, and many others, conclude was ―far
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more devastating universal power of the state‖ (Davis 1998e, 100). In other words the
Thirteenth amendment transforms both the modes of punishment and the law through the
incorporation (I am tempted to say introjection) of the practice of slavery. This
incorporation fundamentally affects how the law develops post-Thirteenth Amendment,
the function of incarceration, and how the newly freed population appears in the political
realm. Nowhere is this seen more clearly, Davis notes, than in the transformation of the
slave codes into the state codified black codes in the post-war south that ―transferred
symbolically significant numbers of black people from the prison of slavery to the
slavery of prison‖ (Davis 1998d, 75).
Before the Thirteenth Amendment, states left the management and discipline of
the slave population to the loose network of slave masters. The function of the state was
relegated to arbitrating disputes amongst slaveholders in terms of the slave codes. These
codes ensured that slaves could not ―bear witness‖ in court of law,202 could not ―meet‖
with other slaves,203 set standards for rounding up and returning runaway slaves,204 and
the methods of monitoring the movement of the slave population.205 In effect, and
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For example, section 4 under the title ―Slaves, and Free Persons of Color‖ of Alabama‘s 1833
Constitution states ―No slave shall be admitted a witness against any person, in any matter, cause, or thing
whatsoever, civil or criminal, except in criminal cases, in which the evidence of one slave shall be admitted
for or against another slave.‖
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Again, from part entitled ―Slaves, and Free Persons of Color‖ in Alabama‘s 1833 Constitution, section 9
decrees, ―Riots, routs, unlawful assemblies, trespasses, and seditious speeches, by a slave or slaves, shall be
punished with stripes, not exceeding thirty-nine, at the discretion of a justice of the peace; and he who will,
may apprehend and carry him, her, or them, before such a justice.‖
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Once more, section 15 from the part entitled ―Slaves, and Free Persons of Color‖ in Alabama‘s 1833
Constitution decrees ―All runaway slaves may be lawfully apprehended by any person, and carried bdore
the next justice of the peace, who shall either commit them to the county jail, or send them to the owner, if
known, who shall pay for every slave so taken up, the sum of six dollars to the person apprehending him or
her, and also all reasonable costs and charges.‖
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Again, in Alabama‘s 1833 Constitution section 5 under ―Slaves, and Free Persons of Color‖ states that if
a slave has left ―the tenement of his master‖ ―without a pass, or some letter or token‖ then the slave could
be rounded up and carried ―before a justice of the peace, to be by his order punished with stripes, or not at
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although it is the obvious point it bears pointing out: prior to the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment, slaves had no juridical subjectivity, and thus no capacity to
appear within the political realm. Only constituted in law through their negation, the
slave population was not positively inserted into the syntactical grammar of political
subjectivity. After the abolition of slavery the state was forced to recognize and manage
its former slave population as full juridical subjects, something for which it was ill
equipped and prepared.206 While this shift, almost universally included the capacity of the
newly freed black population to ―sue and be sued‖ in court, it often also meant simply
renaming the former slave codes as the black codes by reconstituting the relationship
between slave holder and slave as that between employer and apprentice.207 Thus, in as
much as the black codes were no more than thinly veiled slave laws, the newly granted
capacity of political appearance to the freed population of ex-slaves remained constrained
by the apparition of slavery.
The phantom of slavery not only rested behind the construction of the black
codes, but it also gave birth to new laws, thus ensuring all black labor would remain
within the purview of either former slaveholders or the state. These new laws, especially
seen in Mississippi‘s vagrancy laws, made it illegal for any newly freed black citizens to

his discretion, not exceeding twenty stripes.‖ Moreover, in section 6 one finds that a slave could receive
―ten lashes on his or her bare back‖ for each offense of trespassing on other plantations without ―being sent
upon lawful business.‖
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be unemployed, or unruly, generally lazy, or just insubordinate at work.208 Breaking these
laws was ―punishable by incarceration and forced labor, sometimes on the very
plantations that previously had thrived on slave labor‖ (Davis 2002, 29).209 Renaming the
slave codes as black codes, as well as the construction of new laws in response to the
disavowal of slavery in the constitution could not but leave an indelible impression in the
construction of law. In fact, one can easily say that much of post-war law develops to
both fend off the articulation of slavery while simultaneously incorporating the tradition
of slavery into the law itself in the metonymic shift from the slave codes to the black
codes. This shift not only bears the impression of the tradition of slavery under another
name, but it also has ramifications on how the former slave population was constructed as
legal, rights bearing, juridical subjects.
The main difference between the slave and the black codes lie in the fact that the
black codes did not just guarantee the right of the employer (slave master) over his
apprentice (property)—for that remained the same—but in the creation of new juridical
subject caught in the symbolic matrix employed by the state to manage and recapture the
208

Vagrancy laws were commonly employed in the post-war south to quickly and wantonly re-imprison the
newly freed population of ex-slaves. Some versions of these laws cast quite a wide net. For example, South
Carolina‘s Vagrancy Law from 1865 states: ―All persons who have not some fixed and known place of
abode, and some lawful and respectable employment; those who have not some visible and known means
of a fair, hones and reputable livelihood; all common prostitutes; those who are found wandering from
place to place, vending, bartering or peddling any articles or commodities, without a license from the
District Judge, or other proper authority; all common gamblers; persons who lead idle or disorderly lives,
or keep or frequent disorderly or disreputable houses or places; those who, not having sufficient means of
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free labor of its newly freed black population.210 As Davis argues, this shift from the
slave to the black codes both ―acknowledged and nullified black people‘s new juridical
status as US citizens‖ (Davis 1998d, 76). The displaced metonymy of slavery within the
law itself gives rise to the schematization of a juridical subject that allows for the
appearance of the former slave population within the political realm, albeit paradoxically.
Through the incorporation of slavery into the constitution through the lens of
imprisonment, the new political subject appears to disappear. It is granted rights to have
them taken away. Oscillating between absence and presence, the new juridical subject is
not the product of the repression of slavery, but rather of the negative impression of what
has not been schematized—a disavowal simultaneously transforming and preserving the
tradition of slavery.
Because the modes of punishment are based on assumed qualities of its juridical
subject, it should not be a surprise that with the creation of a new juridical subject, the
paradoxical subject of the disavowal of slavery—the modes of punishment transformed
in response to it. Prior to the abolition of slavery the assumed subject of imprisonment
was a right‘s bearing individual. The modes of punishment transformed in response to the
creation of the new paradoxical subject. For what purpose could the removal of one‘s
rights serve if the juridical subject was constructed to have the subject‘s rights removed
advance of the subject itself? How was the state to mobilize imprisonment as form of
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In ―The Metamorphosis of Slavery, 1865-1900,‖ Pete Daniels describes the situation as such: ―Coercion,
the crucial element in involuntary servitude, came from sources other than the worlds of the landlords or
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punishment when the subject to be imprisoned is not the right bearing juridical subject,
but rather a juridical subject deprived of rights?
Convict leasing developed as a mode of punishment in response to this new
juridical subject, and was in practice post-Thirteenth Amendment state-codified
slavery.211 Where the state could not keep black labor under the control of its former
slave masters,212 it rounded up, imprisoned, and rented out black labor under the convictleasing program. In many respects, convict leasing was worse than slavery.213 Much of
this has to do with the lack of capital invested in the convicts and the disproportionate
amount of surplus value the new industries of the south were willing to extract from the
newly imprisoned black labor force. As W. E. B. Du Bois notes in ―The Spawn of
Slavery‖:
[t]he innocent, the guilty, and the depraved were herded together, children and
adults, men and women, given into the complete control of practically
irresponsible men, whose sole object was to make the most money possible. (Du
Bois 2005, 4)
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States quickly became dependent on this new income, forming the kernel of what Davis
argues eventually becomes the prison industrial complex.214 As Du Bois would note, in
light of this new income for the state, ―it was almost impossible to remove the clutches of
this vicious system from the state ―(Du Bois 2005, 5). With what little capital was put
toward the labor landing in the state coffers and a seemingly endless amount of black
convict labor provided by the enforcement of the black codes, companies often extracted
surplus value at the expense of the health of its workers, something that was not
economically viable under slavery.
While many of the punishments used to control convict labor were similar to
those used on the plantations of the antebellum south, the economic realities of convict
leasing intensified them. One only needs to look to Pratt Mines in Alabama as an
example. Here the convicts were controlled by an unsupervised gang of ―overseers‖ who
often hung ―men by their thumbs or ankles‖ as punishments for minor offenses
(Blackmon 2008, 96). When the convicts committed major offenses, such as failing to
―work at the rate demanded by their overseers,‖ they received ―as many as sixty or
seventy lashes‖—so many that the ―skin literally fell from their backs‖ (Blackmon 2008,
96f.). In instances where convicts attempted to escape these conditions, they were often
[…] subject to many of the same torturous restraints as their slave forebears—
shackles, balls and chains, or objects riveted to iron cuffs or collars to limit their
mobility. A convict recaptured after escaping a labor camp in Muscogee County,
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Georgia, had a steel ring placed around his neck to which ‗was fixed a spike,
curling inward, so that rapid running was impossible.‘ (Blackmon 2008, 97)
Outside of these punishments, the prisoners were often literally worked to death. In many
instances large unmarked mass graves were used to dispose of the bodies at long-term
work sites.215 In other words, as Davis argues, under the convict-leasing system in the
post-war south a
[…] small but significant number of black men and women were condemned to
live out the worst nightmares of what slavery might have been had the cost of
purchasing slaves been low enough to justify conditions of genocide. (Davis
1998d, 87)
Convicts were a cheap commodity more profitable to dispose of than to take care of after
the transformation of law and the modes of punishment post Thirteenth Amendment. By
incorporating methods of punishment employed during slavery, the modes of punishment
fundamentally and materially transformed. This transformation was the direct result of
the modes of punishment‘s response to the new juridical subject produced by the
constitutional disavowal of slavery. This transformation in juridical subjectivity, the law,
and the modes of punishment undoubtedly bears the impression of slavery past abolition
and into the present.
Carrying this negative impression forward constitutes a political schematization
of the previously unrecognized population of slaves as criminal. In other words, now that
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terrible health problems, sometimes of epidemic level. They could result in soaring death rates for some
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than being transported to their labor camps directly, mortality was higher‖ (Mancini 1996, 66).
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slavery was incorporated into the modes of punishment and the newly freed population
was coded as criminal, the transformation in the law ―symbolically emphasized that black
people‘s social status continued to be that of slaves, even though the institution of slavery
had been disestablished‖ (Davis 1998e, 100).216 The very mechanism that writes the
former slave population into the political as juridical subjects only does so by making this
population appear as criminal, where criminals are now constituted as slaves. Allowed to
appear as juridical subjects whose rights are afforded only to be taken away, the subject
of disavowal appears as criminal in the political, thus constituting the racist equation of
blackness with criminality through an unrecognized metonymy of slavery. As Davis
writes, these ―ideological and institutional carryovers from slavery began to fortify the
equation of blackness and criminality in US society‖ (Davis 1998d, 75). Thus, through
the defensive construction of the law in response to slavery and slavery‘s imprint on
modes of punishment, one can see that the constitutional disavowal of slavery constructs
a new political subject: the black criminal. This new subject constrains the possibility of
state recognized political subjectivity in advance for the newly freed population, the rule
of its schematization of political appearance becomes a steel band wrapped around its
neck with an inward curling spike to stop it from running away.
Variegated bits and pieces, shattered fragments of slavery are lodged with the
modes of punishment. So much so, one is tempted to claim that while they are different
institutions, the post-Thirteenth Amendment developments in the modes of punishment
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1996, 18).
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bear tradition of slavery into the present. This is of course not accidental, for perhaps the
logic of the state depends on the logic that both founds chattel slavery and becomes
carried over into the modes of punishment. In other words, one might claim that just as
slavery was central to the project and construction of the United States, so too is the
prison a central to the projects of the present political formation of the United States.217
And in fact, when one looks at these statistics of incarceration in the United States one
cannot help but become suspicious.218
By turning to and briefly outlining Davis‘ investigation of the foundational
relationship between slavery and the prison in the United States, the full nature and
explanatory force of disavowal becomes clear. Disavowal highlights the non-synthetic
nature of law and its effects on both the modes of punishment and the construction of
juridical subjectivity. In other words, one could say that modern logic of incarceration is
the same as slavery because it creates the idea of a right‘s bearing individual from an
originary negation based on racialized modes of punishment.219 But it seems to go even
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See also: Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color Blindness
(New York: The New Press, 2010).
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There are a few statistics and demographics composing the prison system in the United States that
immediately stand out. With a total prison population, as of 2007, of 2,293,157, the United States leads the
world in incarcerating its population. The total population of the United States is roughly 5% of the world‘s
population; yet, the number of people imprisoned by the United States makes up roughly 20% of the
world‘s total imprisoned population. This results in the fact that, as recently indicated in The Pew Center on
the States 2008 report, there are ―more than one in every 100 adults is now confined in an American jail or
prison‖ (Pew Center 2008, 3). While this fact may be striking enough on its own, when one breaks down
the demographics of who is imprisoned the ratios drastically shift. One finds that while white men over the
age of 18 compose 1: 106, Hispanic men over 18 compose 1: 36, and most strikingly black men over 18
compose 1:15 (a ratio that increases to 1:9 when one looks specifically at black men between the ages of
20-34) (Pew Center 2008, 6).
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Davis makes this point in a particularly Hegelian fashion in her ―Unfinished Lecture on Liberation.‖ She
write ―One of the striking paradoxes of the bourgeois ideological tradition resides in an enduring
philosophical emphasis on the idea of freedom alongside an equally pervasive failure to acknowledge the
denial of freedom to entire categories of real, social human beings‖ (Davis 1998b, 53). She goes on to
characterize this form of freedom when she writes Davis argues ―The master‘s notion of freedom, in fact,
involved this capacity to control the lives of others—the master felt himself free at the expense of the
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further than tracing out the genealogy of originary violence, it also hones in on the
existence of the non-identical at the heart of politics, at the heart of the law. In this case,
we can see that the non-identical is the negative impression of slavery within the law,
which carries on the unarticulated tradition it forms in reaction to. The non-identical at
the heart of the law, thus, represents the limits of political rationality because the legal
schema of disavowal engenders an appearance it can only permanently mistranslate—a
mistranslation imprisoning a whole population within the tradition of slavery. Always
failing to articulate that which is its ailment, political rationality cannot but continually
fail to overcome what was never included within it to begin with.

IV. Taking Account of Political Disavowal
From Totem and Taboo to Moses and Monotheism, Freud investigates the effect
of the historical and material organization of the modes of punishment on consciousness.
For what else could the relationship be between phylogenesis and ontogenesis, other than
the relationship historical and the individual? And what more than the historical
constellation of law and punishment, of the constitution of the symbolic and the
institution of guilt, is at the center of Freud‘s explorations into the relationship between
phylogenesis and ontogenesis in both texts? In following out the historical constellation
and the material inscription of the modes of punishment on the psyche, Freud‘s late work

freedom of another. As the conscious slave certainly realized, this merely abstract freedom to suppress the
lives others rendered the master a slave of his own misconceptions, his own misdeeds, his own brutality
and infliction of oppression‖ (Davis 1998b, 55). Psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott also makes this point when
he writes ―The enslavement of African Negroes provided and still provides us with a false easiness about
our own freedom; and the reappearance of the slavery theme in our books, films and songs is largely our
way of getting the feeling that we ourselves are free‖ (Winnicott 1990, 215).

192

on the political points us toward the constitutive nature of disavowal in the political
realm.
As we have seen, disavowal as a political concept characterizes the effect of the
non-schematized deed setting the political in motion has on the development not only of
its self-narration, but also the construction of the laws forming the backbone of the
political, the very boundaries of the political realm itself. For as I have argued, the very
deed acting as the catalyst for the political remains within the political while not
appearing in the political. Not appearing in the political except through the impression it
makes on the laws that react against it, the non-identical creates as it were, a spectral
figure in negative. It forms a cryptogram with no code that subjects the political realm to
what it cannot understand, to what literally remains beyond, before, outside of, yet
necessarily immanent to the very rationality emerging from the deed itself.
Not included in the very rationality it initiates, excised from the very schema of
the logic of appearance in the political, disavowal as both a material and psychical
phenomenon marks the very threshold of rationality‘s promise of mastery and
overcoming. Marking this limit, and thus perhaps turning political thought toward the
non-identical, might very well mean taking into account the apparition of the negative
impression of the non-identical that bolsters the appearance of the political realm. In light
of this, we can see that the very logic that gives rise to appearance, as such, in the
political realm will necessarily be structured by the negative impression of what remains
unschematized. And just as Marx will conclude that it is only under the conditions where
workers do not own the products of their labor, that workers believe they are not entitled
to the products of their labor, so too one can say that, for Freud, it is only under historical
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conditions in which the law both fends off and repeats what founds it, it is only under
historical conditions when political appearance includes to exclude, that disavowal is
constitutive of the ego.
But what are we to make of this shift from appearance to the non-schematized?
How are we thus to understand the effect this shift might have the very foundations of
political rationality, and perhaps the affective investment that sparks and nurtures the
illusions of overcoming that have come to form the structure of political rationality? To
answer this question we must ask what type of apparition is the disavowed, what spectral
form haunts us when it is the negative impression? Can the specter of disavowal be
dispelled through uncovering the secrets of long forgotten trauma? Or is the specter of
disavowal a poltergeist, that which haunts indirectly and permanently, that which
haunting the very ground upon which we stand leaves us all forsaken?
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Conclusion
From Spirits to Phantoms, From Phantoms to Poltergeists:
Critique and Structure
[…] his very body was an empty hall echoing with sonorous defeated names; he was not a
being, an entity, he was a commonwealth. He was a barracks filled with stubborn back-looking
ghosts.
--William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom
124 was spiteful.
--- Toni Morrison, Beloved

A critique of reason would begin by turning toward that which exists but does not
appear; a psychoanalytic critique of reason turns toward the constitutive and historical
function of disavowal. In order to fully understand the implications of this claim, we
must, as this dissertation has suggested, view Freud through the lens of Kantian critique.
When we stand at the intersection of Freud and Kant, we can see that disavowal refers to
the limit of cognition, the unrecognizable thing pressing in and thus shaping the contours
of thought, of the symbolic, of the law itself. Turning political thought toward that which
is but does not appear, toward the unconscious constitution of the political, forces the
political to confront the limits of what it can master and overcome; for disavowal
represents not only the limit of appearance, but also the end of the reign of the logic of
non-contradiction. In other words, disavowal lies beyond, consciousness, beyond the
repressed—indeed even beyond the spirit.
As I have argued, politics may be beset by political illusions, i.e. a classical
Marxist understanding of ideology, but political thought is beset by the illusion that it can
overcome and master these illusions. The only way to temper the dialectical illusions of
political thought is to transform its assumptions about the nature of consciousness by
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turning it toward the non-identical. In turning consciousness toward the non-identical one
turns consciousness not toward that which can be brought to consciousness but remains
hidden, but rather one turns consciousness toward those aspects of itself that are formed
by, stamped by, that which is but cannot appear. And when we begin to think about this
reorientation from the view of the political, what one finds is a shift from a sole focus on
those illusions which are subject to the corrective of rational thought to the introduction
of those intractable splits in consciousness giving rise to what rational thought can only
recognize as contradictions. In other words, what one finds in this reorientation is the
limit of the power of rationality within the political in the illumination of the very
threshold between what appears and the conditions of appearance itself. And it is at this
threshold that we find the function of disavowal, not repression.
Repression does not mark the limit of either rationality or political rationality.
From the repression of the drives to the repressive apparatus of the state, repression is
always secures the dominant modes of rationality; it preserves the unity of the ego, the
unity of the state. Moreover, repressive unity is secured by denying appearance to what
has already appeared—for repression is only an ―after-pressure‖ after all—and as such,
repression does not erase or obliterate that which it removes, but only hides what has
already been cognized. And in this sense, what remains repressed is only that which is
but remains hidden, it is that which awaits the right key to unlock it, the clever analyst or
detective to set it free. Until then, of course, it appears indirectly in the form of symptoms
that haunt, a spirit wrecking havoc upon the present; but all of these symptoms can be
undone by breaking the spell and setting the repressed free, of putting the cryptogram of
trauma together. Spirits can always be set free.
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Disavowal, in stark contrast to repression, is a puzzle that comes with all the
wrong pieces. Rather than representing that which appears and is then denied entrance to
consciousness, disavowal represents that which is, but never appeared. On the other side
of the split giving rise to appearance itself, what has been disavowed is radically timeless,
a-rational, and constantly present in symbolic structure giving rise to appearance itself.
As such, when consciousness, if it ever, attempts to work though the disavowed it can
only mistranslate it, misinterpret its significance. It can only misunderstand what has
been disavowed because the very structure of its understanding is constructed from the
negative impression of what has been disavowed. As such, disavowal represents the
limits of the power of rationality itself. Having been left behind from the beginning, it
cannot be reincorporated, recuperated, into a system that never incorporated it to begin
with. What has been disavowed represents the limit of thought, and thus the nonidentical, which political thought, must turn to if it is to critique its illusions of mastery
and overcoming. Because the disavowed is trapped in a web of mistranslation, it
represents something more troubling than spirits, something more terrifying because it
cannot be set free.
When we take up the non-identical, as what has been disavowed, in a political
context we are forced to confront the timeless reverberations of what exists outside of the
structure of political appearance, the deeds which while giving rise to the structure are
not incorporated into it. Indeed, when political thought begins to turn toward what has
been disavowed, it must engage in a genealogy. But this genealogy must take a different
form. It represents an investigation between thought and the non-identical; an attempt to
understand not only the negative impression of the non-identical in the law, but also how
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this negative impression sustains itself throughout time, simultaneously resisting
rationality while asserting its presence within the very law that excludes it. Having
already been constituted in disavowal, there is no escape from the non-identical in
political appearance. This is not to say constitutive disavowal is universal, and thus
inescapable; rather this is to say that as long as the historical conditions of our political
life are structured by the mechanism of disavowal, then the non-identical will trouble it.
And in this sense, thinking disavowal as a political concept must begin with the historical
transmission of the non-identical and its effect on construction of political subjectivity. In
light of this genealogy of what is but does not appear, I would like to suggest that we
must turn from a notion of spirit to a notion of the phantom.

Transgenerational Haunting: Legacies of the Non-identical

We must, thus, take up an investigation in to the historical transmission of the
non-identical beyond the boundaries of reason. This is a task that psychoanalysis alone
has taken up and developed in its focus on the intergenerational transmission of trauma.
Nowhere, I believe, is this phenomenon more clearly articulated and so closely brought in
line with the concept of disavowal, than in the work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria
Torok.220 I would like to briefly turn to their notion of the phantom in order to illuminate
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Gayatri Spivak also takes up the work of Abraham and Torok in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason.
Specifically, Spivak takes up the concept of cyptonymy, as she attempts to ―docket the encypting of the
name of the ‗native informant‘ as the name of Man—a name that carries the inaugurating affect of being
human‖ (Spivak 1999, 5). She further argues that ―as the historical narrative moves from colony to
postcolony to globality, the native informant is thrown out—to use the Freudian concept-metaphor of
Verwerfung—into the discursive world as a cryptonym, inhabiting us so that we cannot claim the credit of
our proper name‖ (Spivak 1999, 111). Spivak‘s usage of this concept, as I understand, is meant to indicate
the constitutive symbolic exclusion folded into the system of signification. Whereas, Spivak takes up the
native informant as what has been foreclosed (Verwefung) from and thus encrypted into the symbolic, I am

198

what it means to think the intergenerational transmission of trauma as the historical
transmission of the non-identical, so that I may gesture toward what this may mean in
terms of political thought.
Torok and Abraham define the phantom in their 1975 essay, ―‗The Lost Object—
Me‘: Notes on Endocryptic Identification.‖ They write that the phantom represents ―a
memory without legal burial place‖ for the patient (Abraham and Torok 1994a, 141).
The development of this illegal memory causes a ―genuinely covert shift in the entire
psyche‖ for Abraham and Torok (Abraham and Torok 1994a, 141). While initially the
concept of the phantom sounds similar to the concept of repression, the difference
becomes clear when one learns that the phantom haunts the subject, but does not belong
to the subject; for the phantom is ―[t]he buried speech of the parent‖ that has become
―(a) dead (gap) without a burial place in the child‖ (Abraham and Torok 1994a, 140fn.).
In other words, the phantom describes the transmission of unconscious material from the
parent to the child, or how the non-identical becomes transferred between generations.221
Nicolas Abraham further clarifies this concept in an essay entitled ―Notes on the
Phantom: A Compliment to Freud‘s Metapsychology‖ also written in 1975. In this essay
he argues the phantom is ―mean to objectify, even if under the guise of individual or
collective hallucinations, the gap produced in us by the concealment of some part of the
love object‘s life‖ (Abraham and Torok 1994b, 171). The phantom, thus, represents what
I do not understand about the other. Yet, the question the other poses to me is also

appealing to what has been disavowed (Verleugnung) from the symbolic, and thus unconsciously passed
along throughout the generations, i.e. Abraham and Torok‘s concept of the phantom.
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Thus further clarify this when they write, ―[t]his unknown phantom returns from the unconscious to
haunt its host and may lead to phobias, madness, and obsessions. Its effect can persist through several
generations and determine the fate of an entire family line (Abraham and Torok 1994a, 140fn).
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unconscious to the other. And in this sense, it becomes clear that ―what haunts are not the
dead, but the gaps left within us by the secrets of others‖ (Abraham and Torok 1994b,
171). I am not haunted by the unconscious basis of my own actions, but rather the
phantom haunting me is the unconscious gap driving the other. The phantom, thus,
represents the incorporation of other‘s secret, which thus forces us to continually attempt
to translate and render sense out of what cannot become conscious, or expelled.
One cannot exorcize a phantom once possessed. How could one? For what
becomes lodged in me is not only locked, but I do not even have the key; for I did not
forge the lock. It is not my secret that I internalize—it belongs to someone else. In light
of this, Abraham writes
[t]he phantom is a formation of the unconscious that has never been
conscious—for good reason. It passes—in a way yet to be determined—
from the parent‘s unconscious into the child‘s. Clearly, the phantom has a
function different from dynamic repression. The phantom‘s periodic and
compulsive return lies beyond the scope of symptom formation in the
sense of the return of the repressed; it works like a ventriloquist, like a
stranger within the subject‘s own mental topography. (Abraham and Torok
1994b, 173)
Like the disavowed the phantom has never been ―conscious‖ and differs from the
structure of the repression, perhaps even from the spirit of repression. What returns, what
comes crashing down on the subject is not the return of one‘s own denied affect, the
uncanny return of what is at once most foreign and most one‘s own. Rather, when one is
haunted by a phantom, one is unconsciously driven by the unconscious drives of another.
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―The Phantom which returns to haunt,‖ Abraham writes, ―bears witness to the existence
of the dead buried within the other‖ (Abraham and Torok 1994b, 175). The phantom
makes a transgenerational puppet of the subject, internally sabotaging the subject in
accordance with unconscious wishes and drives formed in a historical context that do not
belong to the subject. Disassociating the subject from its own actions, the phantom drives
the subject to re-enact the unconscious suffering of another, to fulfill the other‘s
unconscious wish. The subject preserves the other history by carrying it within; the
subject ―preserves history, but in a poisonous, unmetabolized version‖ (Apprey 2002,
12).
Because the phantom cannot be uncovered, at least in the same manner as
repression, and because the phantom always implicates another, Abraham argues the
―phantom remains beyond the reach of the tools of the classical analysis‖ (Abraham and
Torok 1994b, 174). The subject can only be liberated from the incorporation of the
other‘s secret, he writes, when ―its radically heterogeneous nature with respect to the
subject is recognized, a subject to whom it at no time has any direct reference‖ (Abraham
and Torok 1994b, 174). But how this radical heterogeneity that not only
―gives rise to endless repetition‖ but also ―eludes rationalization‖ can come to be
recognized is not clear (Abraham and Torok 1994b, 174). What form of rationality could
recognize this difference as difference and not as contradiction? It would have to be a
form of rationality that is not just turned toward the non-identical, but rather would have
to spring from the non-identical, a form of rationality that is not yet and may not even
come to be.
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In turning to the phantom we can begin to see the outline of a form of critique that
would take up a genealogical investigation into the non-identical, and especially the
structures of transmitting the non-identical as an unrecongizable inheritance structuring
the subject beyond any possiblity of rational mastery. For it is a historical thread that
remains but does not appear, structuring our drives and actions with a secret meaning that
is not our own, and which we cannot come to know or recognize. And it is toward the
phantom of the disavowed, not the spirit of repression, that political thought must turn if
it wants to take up the non-identical and its inheritance. Yet, to take up the phantom
politically we must move from the family to the state, we must move from the
interpersonal to the structural, we must thus move from the phantom to the poltergeist.

Poltergeist as Political Critique

Spirits we would like to escape haunt us. We fight against them. Sometimes we
overcome them. All the while it is not the spirit that has under its thrall; rather, it is the
phantom. Tangled in a battle against spirit, the real object of our subjection is the
phantom. Thus, we often mistake the victory over the spirit for a victory over subjection,
while simultaneously and more radically we remain under the spell of phantoms, gaps in
us produced by others, locks to which there are no keys. I would like to end this project
by suggesting that if we wanted to think the phantom as structural phenomenon, if we
wanted to think about the political transmission and inheritance of the non-identical, we
must turn from the phantom to the poltergeist.

202

While, as we have seen, the phantom differs from the spirit because the phantom
represents a radically intersubjective split in consciousness that cannot be recuperated.
What would it mean to think of this intersubjective split in consciousness as structured by
something other than the dynamics of the family, of that small Oedipal fantasy of the
nuclear family, or any family structure? It would have to mean making the move from the
phantom to the poltergeist, from intersubjectivity to structure. Perhaps to better
understand what is at stake in this shift of terminology—I am tempted to stay away from
the term ―metaphor‖—we should examine the type of specter the poltergeist represents.
While phantom or spirits represent the transfigured presence of something that
does not belong, the poltergeist represents a thing that remains without figure in its active
presence. A poltergeist haunts houses, inadvertently terrorizing the people who choose to
live there. It is a ghost of structure. Never appearing it is only indicated in the movement
of objects, the shaking of walls, the throwing of knives. The fact that it does not appear is
not accidental, but given its nature, necessary. A spirit, what has been repressed, normally
refers to a person to whom some horrible event has taken place; it can thus take a definite
form. A phantom, as what has been disavowed, is no more than the mistranslation of the
incorporation of a radical heterogeneity; it is our attempt to give figure to those things
affecting us that we cannot understand. In contrast to both the spirit and the phantom, the
poltergeist cannot come to form because it neither represents some individual figure nor
an unrepresentable gap. Rather the poltergeist refers to the historical reverberations of an
event, some thing that is not the type of thing to have a form as such. The event is
repeated in slamming of the doors, in the ripping up of the floorboards. The poltergeist
cannot come to form because it refers not a thing with a form, but rather to an event re-
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enacted in the very wood-work of the house. As a very part of the house, as long as the
house stands so too does the poltergeist.
And perhaps when we try to think the political implications of the critical power
of the Freudian concept of disavowal, we make the (metaphorical) move from phantoms
to poltergeists. For the concept of the poltergeist seems to allude to the structural
intergenerational transmission of the non-identical. And indeed is this not what we saw
with the constitutional preservation slavery in the form of the prison? Is not the structural
displacement of slavery from the plantation to the prison, not the institutional
preservation of an unmetabolized event remaining non-identical to the very structure of
law it gives rise to? Moreover, is not the structural haunting of slavery, the political
poltergeist of our system of law, not manifested in the terrorizing affects of not only
maintaining a racially striated population through the violent threats of the law and the
mythological racist narratives securing the paradoxical political subjectivity of the
African American population? Is not slavery, the non-identical of the political,
transferred from generation to generation through the minute structural displacements
within the very wood-work of law? And if the law represents the very boundaries of the
phenomena of political subjectivity and action, then is not the very political realm
haunted by a poltergeist wrecking havoc in its compulsive return? Is not the formless
form resisting appearance except in its indirect effects, the blind re-enactment of the
variegated unschematized aspects of slavery?
A critique of reason, indeed, turns to the non-identical. A psychoanalytic critique
of reason re-orients the psyche toward constitutive feature of disavowal. Both of these
shifts move reason from what it can know, and thus control, toward that which escapes it.
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It is a move away from the illusions of spirit and toward the darker entrapment of the
phantom. Thus, as we have seen a psychoanalytic critique of political reason demands
turning reason toward structural phantom, the poltergeist. It would mean turning thought
to those compulsive aspects of our history resisting form, yet persisting beyond the
boundaries of reason alone—to the political inheritance of those unspeakable things
unspoken.
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